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1 Introduction 
In the last decade a lot of attention has been paid to corporate governance issues, 
evolution and growth. Worldwide, a large number of countries have issued 
governance codes, including recommendations on how to achieve good governance. 
 
The term corporate governance first appeared in publications in the 1980s, after 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) published articles proposing their theory of the firm.  
According to Jensen and Meckling, the theory of the firm consists of economic 
theories, which describe the nature of the company or corporation, including its 
existence, its behaviour, and its relationship with the market. In 1999, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and has since become an international 
benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders. 
According to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, released in 2004, 
corporate governance can be defined as follows;  
 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and 
the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
It is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and 
procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides 
the structure through which the company objectives are set and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance”.  
 
From the Western point of view, corporate governance issues are approached from 
two perspectives: The shareholder value orientation and the stakeholder orientation. 
The shareholder value approach, prevailing in the Anglo-US system, focuses on the 
interests of a company’s shareholders, assuming that managers are self-interested 
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economic agents (Berle/Means 1932; Jensen/Meckling 1976; Fama/Jensen 1983a). 
The concept deals with how the whole system of corporate governance works, to 
align the interests of corporate insiders and stockholders. It deals with the question 
how to discipline managers, so they will act on behalf of the shareholders. It can be 
defined as follows:  
 
“Corporate Governance covers all the mechanisms by which managers are led to act 
in the interests of the corporation’s owner” (Brealey/Myers 1981).  
 
Corporate governance approached from a different perspective would be the 
stakeholder orientation, prevailing in Continental Europe and Japan. This approach 
does not solely focus on the interests of shareholders, but also involves the interests 
of stakeholders (especially the interests of employees of a company), as well as the 
equal balance of their interests. Here for example, the banks take an interest in the 
institution which affect the flow of information to shareholders, and protect their 
interests (Shleifer/Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). This approach mainly 
concentrates on the continuity and efficiency of the company itself. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) state:  
 
“Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. By giving 
legal rights to investors and or vesting countervailing power in concentrated 
ownership, investors find a way to get managers look out of their interests.”  
 
Additionally, they do not only consider the role of shareholders as a supplier of 
finance, but also the role of external suppliers of finance, like banks that provide 
financial resources. The stakeholder theory supports the idea that shareholders are 
only one of a number of important stakeholder groups, like customers, suppliers, 
employees and local communities. The purpose of the corporation is to serve and 
balance the often conflicting interests of all stakeholders. Stakeholders having a stake 
in the company are essential to the enterprise operation and are affected by the firm’s 
success or failure. Therefore it is important to them that their interests and firm-
specific investments have guaranteed protection. The stakeholder theory achieved 
popularity through the work of Freeman (1984) who suggested that corporations 
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should look beyond the shareholder theory of profit maximisation, and take into 
consideration other stakeholder groups that the corporation is associated with and 
which contribute to the company’s achievements. Freeman (1984:25) stated that: 
 
”A stakeholder in an organization is any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives. “ 
 
All these definitions have an interest in meeting the requirements of different interest 
groups, which are related to a company. In other words,  
 
“Corporate governance is simply the governance of a particular organizational form 
– a corporation and the primary goal of a corporate governance system should be the 
integrity of the firm” (Zingales 1997:3ff).  
 
According to Roe (2003) stakeholders’ relative influence on the decision making 
process varies across countries due to political and social factors. Depending on the 
prevailing approach and the institutional environment in a country, shareholders’ 
interest and influence in profit maximisation might have priority, or based on the 
stakeholder approach labor protection and employee welfare might receive higher 
priority over profit maximisation (Tirole 2001). In the cross-country quantitative 
analysis of Gourevitch and Shinn (2007), legal and political institutional structures 
are examined having an impact on differences in minority shareholder protections and 
ownership concentration among countries. In the analysis, the crucial role of 
institutional investors is explored in particular, and its influence on shaping political 
preferences for different rules of corporate governance.  
 
In general, the theory of corporate governance involves the principal-agent paradigm, 
which focuses on the execution of control within a company, based upon conflicts of 
interest between various parties – namely the shareholder-corporate management 
relationship. The key assumption is that profits in a firm should be maximised. In the 
case that corporate managers achieve a sub-optimal result for the shareholders, there 
should exist the possibility to replace them. Literature on corporate governance tries 
to explain the nature of these conflicts, and means by which they may be resolved. 
Therefore, to comprehend the meaning of the term better, it can be stated that 
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corporate governance circumscribes the institutional framework, which involves a set 
of regulations and tools for implementation, with which a company is managed and 
controlled. In general, it can be subdivided between internal and external corporate 
governance. Internal corporate governance focuses on the relationship and the 
interrelation of the different institutions within the company (board of directors and 
supervisory board). External corporate governance focuses on the relationship of the 
company to its environment, like the relationship to shareholders and stakeholders 
(labour, suppliers, customers, banks and public institutions). The most important 
scholars in this field are Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Coase 
(1937, 1960) und Williamson (1975, 1985), who contributed with their articles to the 
clarification of differing forms of contracts, organisational forms and corporate 
structures. In their contribution on corporate governance these authors criticise the 
efficiency assumptions of neoclassical economics, with regard to optimal organisation 
structure and size, implications of separation of ownership from control, optimal form 
of contracts, motivation of employees in organisations and the target function of an 
organisation. Roe (2004) analyses the institutions of corporate governance in relation 
with the principal-agent paradigm, agency costs and shareholder-manager alignment 
problem. In his article, he outlines the mechanisms that allocate authority among the 
board of directors, senior management and shareholders that affect, modulate, and 
control the decisions made at the top of the firm. Denis and Mc Connell (2003) cross-
country analysis explores different corporate governance systems around the world, 
with a focus on Europe, Japan, developing and emerging countries. Their comparisons 
of differing systems involves the analysis of internal and external corporate governance 
and their mechanisms in an international perspective and leads to the question whether 
there exists one single system of corporate governance.  
 
In Western countries, enterprises are working under established corporate governance 
systems, which rely on functioning institutional, economical and social pillars. 
Therefore corporate governance systems in developed countries have already entered 
a mature stage due to a learning process. Transition economies are still on a learning 
curve, as most of these countries have recently changed their economic systems from 
a planned economy to a market-based economy. Most of the ex-socialist countries 
already introduced legal and institutional foundations combined with market-based 
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mechanisms in order to create structures so that corporate governance can function, 
but they still did not enter a mature stage. 
 
As mentioned before, the concept of corporate governance does not have a very long 
tradition and history in transformation economies or in developed economies. At the 
beginning of economic reforms in China, the understanding of the term corporate 
governance (公司治理) was quite different to the definition used today. Until the 
1980’s the Chinese business landscape was characterised by production units and 
factories working according to a plan. Therefore the term corporate governance was 
much more related to describing the institutional framework of the government 
administration managing production units in a planned economy. After the 
introduction of the stock market and the transformation of these production units and 
factories into corporations in the 1990’s, the term corporate governance took on a 
complete new meaning, describing the institutional framework of the government 
administration managing profit-maximising corporations. Within the last twenty years 
the understanding of corporate governance has changed fundamentally, although an 
explicit boundary between the old and the new meaning of the term has never been 
formally defined. In China, the development of corporate governance has gone 
through several stages, starting with the reform of the state-owned enterprises in 1978. 
With the introduction of the banking and fiscal reform in 1994, enterprise reform 
entered a new stage as financing of the state-owned sector was changed. In 2002, the 
Chinese corporate governance code was introduced to enterprises, followed by the 
implementation of corporate social responsibility in 2007 (SASAC 2008). 
Summarising, can be stated that the Chinese model of corporate governance embraces 
both Western models, including the shareholder orientation as well as the stakeholder 
orientation.   
 
The increased interest for corporate governance in China is manifold. In the 1980’s 
the debate over the separation of economic activities in the state-owned sector from 
the government and the party, contributed towards the Chinese leadership becoming 
more open to the idea of corporate governance. Economic reforms were introduced 
with the aim of reducing political power concentration in strategically important 
industries. Low efficiency and low transparency within state ownership was present 
in almost all industries, and also contributed to the governance debate, thereby 
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emphasising the urgency and importance that was placed on developing a functioning 
governance system in the country. Thereby the role of ownership in economic 
inefficiency was analysed, resulting in an intensive debate over the design and 
refinement on an overall institutional framework. In the Chinese case the internal 
corporate governance framework in the state-owned enterprises was adjusted, as well 
as the external corporate governance framework. Other reasons are the debate for 
more transparency in the enterprises’ decision-making process, as well as recruitment 
and staffing of the various boards and committees. Furthermore, ongoing 
globalisation and intense competition for finance on the international capital markets 
require the design and refinement of a governance system, applicable for China. The 
intense competition for finance on international capital markets is one of the reasons 
that Chinese enterprises are under pressure to comply with international accounting 
standards, especially among enterprises going global. For China, a transformation 
economy, the change from a planned economy to a market economy involves 
continuous development of the economy and the society, by simultaneously facing 
path-dependent issues. By applying new institutional economics, the implementation 
of standards and regulations has an impact on the economic success of state-owned 
enterprises and the economic system. In fact, interest in corporate governance in 
China arises from the need to understand the institutional framework, which involves 
a set of regulations and tools with which Chinese enterprises are managed and 
controlled. 
 
In the case of China, in the last few years policymakers combined their efforts to 
speed up the process of moving towards a market-based economy (Goldman Sachs 
Group 2004; Tenev et al. 2002). China’s declared goal is to achieve an economic 
environment with sustained and shared growth 1 . As a result good corporate 
governance practices are of critical importance and an important precondition for the 
government’s efforts to develop the financial market. Good corporate governance is 
 
1 At the 14th  National Congress of the Communist Party of China  (中国共产党全国代表大), October 12 to 18, 
1992, Deng Xiaoping (Chinese political leader who was twice purged from the Communist party 1967 and 1976) 
and twice rehabilitated (1973 and 1977) before he became head of the party in China; officially retired as head of 
state in November 1989) emphasized push for a market-oriented economy. He argued that further reform was 
necessary to raise China's standard of living. In 1993, Jiang Zemin (General secretary of the Chinese Communist 
party (CCP; 1989–2002) and president of China (1993–2003) focused moving China into Socialist Market Economy, 
which means to move China's centrally-planned socialist economy into a government-regulated capitalist market 
economy. 
                                                                                                                                                          7 
regarded as an essential element in the ongoing restructuring reform of the state-
owned sector.   
 
By analysing the compatibility of corporate governance in a transformation economy, 
the internal and external corporate governance framework in China is examined. On 
the basis of OECD principles of corporate governance, the internal corporate 
governance framework in Chinese enterprises is observed. Internal aspects include 
ownership structure, rights and obligations of shareholders, equitable treatment of 
shareholders, and the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency and 
responsibilities of the board. Per definition, the corporate body of a Chinese 
corporation consists of the board of directors, the board of supervisors, independent 
directors and stakeholders. The analysis attempts to provide relevant features for the 
internal governance framework in Chinese enterprises and the institutional change 
within state-owned enterprises. The analysis shows, that the internal organisation of 
Chinese listed enterprises is characterised by strong relationships between the owner 
and managers, and a clear separation between the state and the company’s 
management is not achieved. Chinese corporations are promoting and protecting the 
economic position of the state and the Communist Party, and this is regarded as the 
most sustainable form of internal corporate governance. The examination of external 
corporate governance is undertaken on the basis of institutional change from a 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy, taking the restructuring process of 
the state-owned sector, the banking system and capital market reform. The 
introduction of market-oriented elements into the economy resulted in a structural 
change in the relationship between the state and the state-owned enterprises. Thereby 
the state has retreated from its dominant role in the economy, but its intervention in 
strategic decision-making is still present.  
 
The thesis distinguishes the state from the party2. At first glance, both are pursuing a 
policy to strengthen the Chinese economy. At second glance, the dissociation is 
justifiable, as the state as well as the Communist Party pursues differing priorities in 
the course of economic reforms. The state is acting as a modernisation agent with the 
aim of improving efficiency and transparency within state-ownership. The 
 
2 Further explanation related to the political distinction between the Chinese state and the Communist Party, see 
Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (2007) and Zheng (1997). 
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Communist Party is acting as a mediator in preserving the integration of economic 
and socio-political interest, with the aim of the realisation of a harmonious society 
within the framework of reform. Several scholars are differentiating in their analysis 
of the Chinese system between the state and Communist Party. Lieberthal/Oksenberg 
(1988) portray in their book on policy making in the energy sector the different roles 
of the state and the Communist Party. By providing three case studies of energy 
policy making they are showing the different levels of power in leadership, 
bureaucratic structures and policy processes. Lieberthal (1995) examines the 
governing role of the Communist Party, including its struggle for power, elite 
political conflicts and policy initiatives as well as the governing role of the state 
concerning the organizational structure in contemporary China. Zheng (1997) 
disaggregates the Chinese state from the Communist Party with a comprehensive 
analysis of institutional change after 1949 in China.  
 
The concept of corporate governance is primarily designed to support market 
economies in improving coordination mechanisms among differing market 
participants. By analysing the compatibility of corporate governance in China, the 
thesis shows, that differing Chinese specific internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms and controls are active to reduce inefficiencies within state-
ownership. The thesis attempts to challenge the validity of general assumptions 
within the corporate governance framework for transformation economies. 
Differentiation is important as corporate governance regimes in developed countries 
cannot be used for transformation economies. This criticism does not want to 
question the theory of corporate governance in principle. More so it attempts to show 
that differing coordination mechanisms are active when corporate governance is 
addressed. It is assumed that these coordination mechanisms are working according to 
varying modes dependent on the environment of institutional change. Therefore it is 
significant to know which mechanisms are supportive for institutional change and 
which are not. In China, corporate governance mechanisms and controls are designed 
to reduce the inefficiencies within state-ownership that arises from agency problems, 
a property rights regime in favour of the state and soft budget constraints. Internal 
corporate governance controls monitor activities of the management and take 
measures to accomplish state and party defined goals. External corporate governance 
controls encompass the state, the Communist Party and external stakeholders 
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exercising control over the organisation. By analyzing the compatibility of corporate 
governance in China, this thesis shows that corporate mechanisms are applied for the 
realisation of the transformation process and the introduction of a sophisticated legal 
and regulatory framework. It is clear that the implementation of corporate governance 
standards is playing an immense role within the transformation process, having a 
strong impact on the economic reform process, but at the same time it also has its 
limitations.  
 
This thesis applies the new institutional economics approach for the analysis of the 
restructuring of the Chinese state-owned sector, and assesses the impact of corporate 
governance on the state-owned sector. Principal agent, transaction costs and property 
rights theories represent the supporting theoretical pillars of a corporate governance 
system. All three elements refer to the discipline of new institutional economics, and 
are leading approaches in respect to the analysis of organisations in economics. In 
contrast to neoclassical assumptions, new institutional economics postulates that 
individuals have incomplete information, cope with uncertainty resulting from an 
information lack and assume that economic actors are behaving irrational. In order to 
overcome the lack of information, individuals are facing transaction costs and risk. 
The approach applied tries to find an answer for economic change, by understanding 
economic actors’ incentives and motivations and beliefs, as well as their norms and 
rules in pursuit of the realisation of their objectives (North 1994). For China, the 
concept of new institutional economics is applied in regard to the identification in 
what way a planned socialist economy can be gradually transformed into a market-
oriented system. What kinds of restrictions are dominating the process of 
evolutionary institutional system change under economic transformation? 
Furthermore, this thesis attempts to clarify to what extent institutional change in 
China is feasible despite path dependence, which theoretically implies that it is nearly 
impossible to break out of an existing economic system. The thesis will show that the 
break out of an existing economic system is feasible to a certain degree by taking 
system-specific conditions into consideration.  
 
The transformation process requires the balancing of conflicting interests among 
differing socio-economic actors. The main socio-economic interest groups identified 
in the Chinese transformation economy can be split into three: (1) the Communist 
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Party apparatus, (2) the state and the bureaucracy, (3) the manager level beyond the 
board of directors and the workers of the state-owned sector. Each of these three 
groups are characterised by rent-seeking and opportunistic behaviour, whereby 
bargaining over resource allocation is common in order to take advantage of 
individual wealth-maximising opportunities. Consequently, this behaviour results in 
reduced efficiency at the expense of the economy. Each group consists of principals 
and agents, who are interacting with each other within given rules. Due to rent-
seeking and opportunism, they strive for changes in these rules on their behalf. 
Therefore, the economic and political interaction and exchange among the differing 
groups also determines the transformation path a system follows. Ex-socialist 
countries are challenged to transform rent-seeking and opportunistic behaviour into 
profit-seeking and rational behaviour, which results in a compromise over 
administrative and market institutions within an economy.  
 
Analysing the Chinese transformation process is in fact an examination of principal 
agent problems in a socialist economy. Principal-agency theory deals with the 
problem that arises with the execution of control within corporations, based upon 
conflicts of interest between various parties – namely the relationship between 
shareholders and the corporate management. The key assumption is that profits in a 
firm should be maximised. Due to information asymmetry between the principal and 
the agent, governance mechanisms should guarantee that corporate managers act in 
the best interest of owners. China’s situation is characterised by ownership 
concentration, shaped by dominant state control. The institutional setting of 
developed economies bases on the assumption that large institutional shareholders 
behave as agents whose basic purpose is to maximise profits and return on 
investments for their investors (Demsetz 1986; Shleifer/Vishny 1991). Gillan/Starks 
(2003) examine the relation between corporate governance and ownership structure, 
and the role of institutional investors in an international context, since in many 
countries; institutional investors have become dominant players in the financial 
markets. Another cross-country analysis investigates what enterprise- and country-
level characteristics attract investment by institutional investors, such as a strong 
preference for large and liquid stocks with good governance practices (Ferreira/Matos 
2008). Additionally, the study shows that preferences for investments by institutional 
investors are also depended on the maturity of international capital markets and the 
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proportion of domestic, foreign and independent institutional ownership in enterprises. 
The importance of institutional investors is also increasing in China, particularly 
insurance companies and collective investment funds have grown rapidly since 2004, 
but the portion of total equity (non-tradable as well as tradable) held by institutional 
investors is still relatively low compared to more advanced OECD countries (OECD 
2010:86).  
 
Centrally planned economies are specially affected by agency costs as appropriate 
incentive systems and optimal contracts are missing. Furthermore, as markets do not 
exist in a centrally planned economy and prices are not determined by demand and 
supply, neither the principal, nor the agent knows the accurate value of their products 
produced under the plan. As only planned prices exist, product-assessment does not 
account for quality and demand criteria or other relevant measures. Agency costs 
appear as higher expenses for monitoring and metering and costs get even higher 
during the transition in comparison with a country that already has a relatively stable 
market structure. By analysing the role of the interest groups from an internal and 
external corporate governance perspective, this thesis attempts to clarify to which 
degree and in which direction vested interests have the opportunity to influence a 
change in the organisational and institutional structure.  
 
Overall, the implementation of a corporate governance system in a corporation has to 
consider the complexity of various components and influencing factors. The focus of 
considerations of the thesis is to which extent the adoption of internationally defined 
corporate governance standards is applicable for the Chinese state-owned sector, and 
to which degree the implementation of corporate governance standards has a positive 
impact on the transformation process. The implementation of corporate governance 
standards has an influencing character in the decision-making process of corporate 
management and in a company’s performance. Therefore, institutional requirements 
play an important role in the scope of the management’s action, and in the 
relationship among differing - with the corporation aligned - interest groups. In 
Western literature, corporate governance issues are analysed either from the 
perspective of the shareholder or stakeholder approach, thereby primarily analysing 
information and incentive problems in Western developed economies. The main 
target of the thesis is to analyse the implementation of corporate governance in a 
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transformation economy, taking into consideration the balancing of conflicting 
interest among differing stakeholder groups.  
 
In the last few years a considerable amount of research has been done in the field of 
corporate governance in an international context, but research on China is still limited. 
China is seen as the largest developing country, with a population of 1.3 billion. Since 
the reforms in 1978 the country achieved on average 8-11 per cent annual GDP 
growth rate, and the government stated its goal of achieving an average annual 
growth of over 7 per cent between 2000 and 2020 (OECD 2010:20). Progress in the 
transformation economy has been substantial over the past thirty years. The 
implementation of corporate governance standards addresses the challenge for a 
dynamic and sustainable growth process.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
International capital markets are observing an increasing amount of competition for 
scarce financial resources. As a result, companies are compelled to meet shareholder 
and investor demand for transparency of a company’s critical factors for success and 
processes for success. In the recent past Western countries have undertaken many 
efforts to meet the necessary requirements. Western industrialised economies require 
listed companies to disclose publicly their financial accounts. International 
accounting standards are introduced to provide shareholders and investors with a 
uniform standard valuation for their assessment. The OECD Principles also note that 
(OECD 2004a:13): 
 
“The degree to which operations observe basic principles of good corporate 
governance is an increasingly important factor in investment decisions. Of particular 
relevance is the relationship between corporate governance and the increasingly 
international character of investment. International flows of capital enable 
companies to access financing from a much larger pool of investors. … Even if 
corporations do not rely primarily on foreign sources of capital, adherence to good 
corporate governance practices will help to improve confidence of domestic investors, 
reduce the cost of capital, underpin the good functioning of financial markets, and 
ultimately induce more stable sources of financing.” 
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In Western developed economies, two successful frameworks of corporate 
governance can be identified, which have become accepted in the international 
business environment. In Anglo-Saxon countries the corporate governance system is 
applied to align management actions with shareholder’s interest. Management is 
obliged to maximise the market value of the shareholders’ equity. In Continental 
Europe and Japan the corporate governance systems serves not only to align 
management and shareholder’s interest, but also to consider the interests of 
stakeholders. Corporate governance mechanisms are meant to build up long term 
relationships and to balance various interests. This thesis tries to shed some light on 
the question to which degree the introduction of a Western model of corporate 
governance is compatible with a transformation economy in China. In order to do so, 
it looks at the emerging corporate governance system in China in particular. China is 
considered to have a state-dominated business environment, where a clear separation 
of ownership from control (from government) has not yet been realised so far in 
Chinese enterprises.  
 
Given that corporate governance systems are quite different among countries and 
there is no one-size-fits-all model, this thesis addresses the question as to what 
specific features of Chinese corporate governance are highly linked with the 
enterprise reform, the bank sector and financial sector reform. This thesis will focus 
on the following questions: 
 
? Question 1: What role is corporate governance playing in a transformation 
economy like China, what contribution does it make to the reform process 
and where does it meet limitations? 
 
Furthermore, this thesis attempts to explore the impact corporate governance reforms 
have on the relationship between the state and the state-owned sector. 
 
? Question 2: How has the relationship altered between the state and Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOE)? 
a) From an internal corporate governance perspective? 
b) From an external corporate governance perspective? 
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Both questions are chosen consciously in order to identify the specific features of 
corporate governance in China. The goal of this thesis is not to undertake an analysis 
of the two differing corporate governance approaches present in Western countries – 
but instead to undertake a detailed analysis of the internal and external corporate 
governance perspective in China. Great importance is attached to the role of 
corporate governance in China and its contribution to more efficiency and 
transparency within the state-owned sector. However, its limitations in the 
transformation process will also be analysed.  
1.2 Methodology  
Background information regarding the reasoning for the implementation of the 
Western corporate governance concept in China’s state-owned sector is hard to come 
by. Official publications on corporate governance in China only offer general 
information, mostly based on the international OECD principles of corporate 
governance. This explains why most studies on China’s corporate governance only 
provide an overview of economic reforms in China and only shortly remark on 
corporate governance. 
 
This thesis starts by reviewing some of the key issues in implementing a Western 
concept in a context of both state ownership and a transformation economy. On the 
basis of OECD principles of corporate governance five parameters relevant for the 
internal corporate governance framework in enterprises are observed: (1) rights and 
obligations of shareholders, (2) equitable treatment of shareholders, (3) role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, (4) disclosure and transparency, and (5) 
responsibilities of the board. Furthermore, this thesis examines the corporate structure 
of China’s top 20 enterprises by studying the annual reports and websites of the 
enterprises in 2010, in addition to the economic methods commonly used in the field 
of new institutional economics. The board structure of these enterprises, which are 
mostly state-owned, are analysed. The data covers information about position, party 
membership, professional and educational background of the chief executive officers 
and directors. Because of this it is possible to construct the actual corporate 
institutional environment and learn about the internal aspects of the corporate 
governance system.  
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In a second step this thesis studies official documents and publications3 published by 
the state and the Chinese Communist Party in the framework of economic reforms 
since 1978, which gives an understanding of the external aspects of the corporate 
governance system. Generally speaking, official documents and publications 
represent incremental reform steps; these policies set the framework within which 
economic issues have been debated before informally among differing interest groups. 
Debate participants had the desire and ability to push the parameters of the debates in 
directions that are different from what political leaders had chosen, and thus were 
able to affect the policymaking process according to their own reform agendas 
(Fewsmith 1994). Thanks to the official documents, more information is disclosed on 
national economic policies, thereby offering a deep insight into the differing 
objectives of several interest groups within the framework of corporate governance 
implementation. Moreover, in order to capture the interaction between the central 
state, the Chinese Communist Party and the enterprises, the change in their relations 
is examined by comparing the situation before and after the introduction of corporate 
governance standards. 
 
2 China’s Emerging Corporate Governance System 
Worldwide it is recognised that there is not a single model of good corporate 
governance (OECD 2004a:2; Tenev et al. 2002). Globalisation has contributed a lot to 
international standardisation, but until now worldwide convergence on corporate 
governance practices could not be observed. Instead, it can be observed that different 
societies have built up different specific characteristics, according to their stage of 
industrialisation and their economic environment. In the following section, the basic 
principles of the corporate governance system will be elaborated upon and an 
overview of the actual status of China’s corporate governance discussion will be 
provided.  
 
 
 
 
3 The published official documents include statistical yearbooks, government report, and newspapers articles. 
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2.1 Terms and Definitions 
2.1.1 Definition of Corporate Governance Code 
Codes of corporate governance contribute to improving corporate governance 
structures by setting standards that capital market players can use for guidance and 
orientation. Corporate governance codes are designed to increase transparency for 
national and international investors concerning the regulations of the corporate 
management and corporate control. For this reason, compliance with the corporate 
governance code should provide confidence in the capital market and the corporate 
management in companies. Corporate governance codes are not legislated by law, but 
are rather understood as a guideline of best practices. Nowadays there are a multitude 
of national and international corporate governance codices and principles, such as the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the US Sarbanes Oxley Act, the British 
Combined Code and the German Corporate Governance Code.4  
 
Corporations are governed by corporate law, which is the fundamental pillar of 
corporate governance. Corporate law in all jurisdictions generally involves a body of 
law enabling the creation of an entity with five structural characteristics: (1) legal 
personality, (2) limited liability, (3) transferable shares, (4) centralised management 
under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership by shareholders 
(Hansmann/Kraakman 2000). Corporate law covers on the one hand corporate 
governance, which handles the various power relations within a corporation, and on 
the other hand corporate finance, which sets rules on how capital is used. 
2.1.2 Definition of OECD Principles of Corporate Governance  
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance do not have a binding characteristic 
for their member states and need to be adjusted in the light of a dynamic and 
changing corporate environment. The OECD (2004a) specifies the following 
elements crucial to good corporate governance; it is organised in six sections: 
 
 
 
4 See corporate governance codes released worldwide on the homepage of the European Corporate Governance 
Institute; http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php.  
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(1) Rights and obligations of shareholders 
(2) Equitable treatment of shareholders 
(3) Role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
(4) Disclosure and transparency 
(5) Responsibilities of the board   
(6) Appendix 
 
By using the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance framework, each element 
will be explained in detail:  
 
Rights and obligations of shareholders 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholder’s rights. Shareholders’ rights include being able to participate and vote in 
general shareholder meetings and to elect and remove members of the board. 
Furthermore, it should be granted that they receive relevant information about the 
company on a regular basis. Shareholders have a right to receive a dividend (residual 
profit). As far as it concerns minority shareholders, their rights must be protected. 
Information disclosure on decision making processes and transparency in the 
operations of the company should be ensured. Shareholder’s obligation includes the 
use of voting rights.  
 
Equitable treatment of shareholders 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. In the case of violation of 
their rights, the opportunity to avenge should be guaranteed. Within a class of shares, 
all shares should carry the same voting rights and should be treated equally.  
 
Role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability 
of financially sound enterprises. In the case of violation of their rights, the 
opportunity to avenge should be guaranteed.  Relevant and reliable information in the 
operation of a company to the interests of stakeholders should be provided on a 
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regular basis. Stakeholders make a relevant contribution to the performance of the 
company therefore their role in the corporation should be encouraged.   
 
Disclosure and transparency 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely, detailed and accurate 
disclosure of information is made regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership and governance of the company. An (internal) 
audit committee should be established.  
Main points of transparency include disclosure of information on: 
 
? Financial and operating results of the company 
? Responsibilities of the board   
? Short- and long term goals of the company 
? Ownership structure 
? Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives 
? Existing risk factors in a company’s environment 
? Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders  
? Governance structures and policies 
 
Responsibilities of the board 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of the management by the board and the board’s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders. The decision making process of 
the board should be based on high ethical standards and should take into account the 
interests of stakeholders. Non-executive members of the board should be introduced 
to the board, which are independent from executive members of board. Their task 
should be to form independent judgements, especially with respect to the company’s 
strategy, performance, asset management and management appointments. Executive 
management compensation should be related to the company’s general level of 
profitability and overall performance. Total compensation, as well as procedures for 
determining compensations should be disclosed in financial statements.  
 
In the course of globalisation, the OECD values improvement of competitiveness and 
access to capital in global markets as crucial. Furthermore, the OECD emphasises the 
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importance of transparency and disclosure by announcing: “The disclosure of the 
corporation’s contractual and governance structures may reduce uncertainties for 
investors and help lower capital costs by decreasing related risk premia. Such 
transparency may also encourage a common understanding of the “rule of the game”, 
and provide employees with information that may help reduce labour friction.” 
 
Chapter 5 addresses the importance of financial disclosure and transparency. By 
strengthening disclosure regimes for listed companies, the protection of investors can 
be assured and greater accountability by a company’s board and management can be 
ensured. By providing accurate information to stakeholders, who include investors, 
employees, suppliers etc, a win- win situation can be achieved.  
2.2  Chinese Corporate Governance Code 
In the last few years, the financial collapse of multinational companies as Enron and 
Worldcom have triggered an intense discussion over the quality of corporate 
governance in Western companies in the USA and Europe. In almost the same 
manner, a number of listed companies in China have violated provisions relating to 
financial reporting and management. Amongst others, Guangxia (Yinchuan) Industry 
Co. Ltd., Sanjiu Pharmaceutical Co., and Macat Optics and Electronics Co., Ltd. can 
be mentioned5. Such cases of mismanagement drove authorities to take measures to 
improve corporate governance.  
2.2.1 Development of Chinese Corporate Governance Code 
In the Anglo-American corporate governance model which is based on a functioning 
stock and capital-market, hostile takeovers6 play a central control function concerning 
the efficiency of corporate management. In Continental Europe and Japan, where the 
German corporate governance model is prevailing; institutional investors, especially 
banks, insurance companies and investment funds, play a central role, whereby 
employee representation is significant. Both concepts represent different interest 
 
5 Corporate scandals in China are reported by, Shi/Weisert 2002; Zhang 2004; Asian Times 2004:  
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FL07Ad04.html, New York Times 2002: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0DEFD9143DF935A2575BC0A9649C8B63&sec=&spon=&pag
ewanted=all, Zhang 2004; International Herald Tribune 2005: 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/04/03/bloomberg/sxyuan.php. 
6 Hostile takeovers are possible due to a functioning bankruptcy law.  
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groups that are in the position of having an impact on corporate behaviour. In China, 
since the end of the Maoist era and the end of the planned economy, corporate 
governance standards and regulations needed to be established from scratch, 
especially in view of the evolving market-based environment. Planned economies 
neither have a tradition of corporate governance, nor the required foundation for the 
establishment of a corporate governance system. The state recognised the necessity to 
install new corporate organs within the enterprises in order to control them better and 
to comply with international standards. The concept of the Chinese corporate 
governance code is based on the model of US legal and regulatory systems 
(Shi/Weisert 2002:44) and expanded by the German model of the supervisory board. 
Generally speaking, the code has to be seen in context with the actual reform of the 
Chinese banking sector and stock market.  
 
In January 2002 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) passed the 
final version of the Chinese corporate governance code (CSRC 2002). Before the 
enactment of the code, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission released a 
draft7. Over several conferences, organised by the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission in corporation with the OECD and the World Bank, the draft was peer-
reviewed. Since 1997, the CSRC has put a lot of effort into the establishment of a 
Chinese corporate governance code. In 2003, the Chinese government established the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), whose 
main task is to modernise and restructure 151 Chinese major SOEs (SASAC 2008). 
However, it is necessary to address the fact that the new economy in China has 
inherited many features of the old planned economy. Therefore, an overlap is 
observable. The government is in a dilemma, on the one hand it wants to be a key 
figure in corporate governance, both as drafter and enforcer of rules, and on the other 
hand it wants to be a major shareholder of listed companies (Tomasic 2006:16). 
 
Corporate governance was installed with the primary goal of separating the activities 
of the government and the party from operations in state-owned enterprises. As far 
back as the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China in 1978, policymakers stated that: 
 
7 On September 11, 2001, the CSRC released for comment a draft of its Principles of Corporate Governance for 
Chinese listed companies.   
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“… one of the serious shortcomings in the structure of economic management in our 
country is the over-concentration of authority, … 
…it is necessary to act firmly in line with economic law, attach importance to the role 
of the law of value, consciously combine ideological and political work with 
economic methods and give full play to the enthusiasm of cadres and workers for 
production; 
… it is necessary, under the centralized leadership of the Party, to tackle 
conscientiously the failure to make a distinction between the Party, the government 
and the enterprise and to put a stop to the substitution of Party for government and 
the substitution of government for enterprise administration, to institute a division of 
responsibilities among different levels…” (Beijing Review 1978) 
 
In addition, in the 1980’s, Deng Xiaoping placed great importance in his speech On 
the reform of the system of the Party and State Leadership (党和国家领导制度的改
革) to the separation of the party from the government, the reduction of political 
power concentration from the hands of selected groups and a necessary degree of 
decentralisation (Renminribao 1980). At that time policymakers agreed that the party 
should design national policies, while the central government should make and 
implement policies to carry them out (Goldman/MacFarquhar 1999:11). 8  With 
regards to economic decisions and orders, it was up to the State Council and the 
Central Economic and Financial Leading Group to issue them, thereby the occurrence 
of different voices coming out of the central leadership was avoided (Zhao Ziyang 
2009). These moves targeted limited political reforms (政治改革) in China, but had a 
strong impact on the following economic reforms (经济改革) in the country. In order 
to support the economic modernisation program, policymakers launched reforms with 
the aim of establishing an effective and efficient government administrative system at 
the central and provincial levels9. The government as well as the Communist Party 
 
8 In addition to Deng Xiaoping, especially Zhao Ziyang advocated the shift of functions from the Communist party 
to the government administration. See: “Advance along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics”; report 
delivered at the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 25, 1987 by Zhao Ziyang. His 
efforts came to an abrupt end with the demonstrations at the Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Zhao Ziyang 2009). 
 
9 At that time, central and provincial party committees were advised not to interfere or to make decisions concerning 
government work. See: Nie, Gaomin et al.: Guanyu dangzheng fenkai de lilun tantao (Theoretical discussions on 
separating the party from the government). After a quote from Zheng (1997:193). 
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agreed on emphasising economic efficiency in the country (Zhao Ziyang 2009). 
Currently, the Chinese debate on the separation of the state from the Communist party 
has been resumed (Du Gangjian 2001; People’s Daily (2007c); He Jiadong 2004). 
The Chinese Communist Party approaches its members by emphasising its focus on 
their party work only, and not to drift towards other activities (News from the 
Chinese Communist Party 2009). Therefore, quality and sustainability of party work 
will be improved.  
 
The corporate governance model is still a relatively new concept. Before 1978 most 
companies in China were state-owned and the government was both owner and 
manager of the state-owned enterprises. Beside the state-owned sector, collective 
ownership also existed. I will simply describe the different stages of corporate 
governance development, by identifying the milestones of its evolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage O:1950-1978 
 
Stage 1: 1978-92 
Milestones:  
 
1978 SOE reform 
1988 SOE Law 
1990 Stock exchange 
1992 SOE contract system 
Stage 2: 1993-97 
Milestones:  
 
1993 Company Law 
1993 Accounting Law 
1994 Bank reform  
St
ag
e 
Stage 3: 1998- present 
Milestones:  
 
1998 Securities Law 
1998 Social Security Reform 
1999 Revision Accounting Law 
1999 Contract Law 
2002 Corporate Governance   
Code 
2005 Revision Securities Law 
2006 Revision Company Law 
2007 Corporate social 
responsibility 
 
Timeframe
Figure 1: Milestones of corporate governance in China 
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With the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan (中国五年计划) in 1952 (1953–57), 
the State Planning Commission (国家计划委员会) adopted the Soviet style economic 
model, based on state ownership in the industrial sector, collectivism in agriculture, 
and strictly centralized planned economy system. Under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China, the state demanded absolute ownership of all assets, 
including managerial rights in SOEs. All policies and regulations concerning the 
state-owned sector were centralised ruled and created by departments of government, 
but the planning and allocation were often done at provincial and county levels rather 
than by Beijing (Walder 1999; Yusuf et al. 2005:50). The economy was planned 
through the help of Five-Year Plans. Government bureaus determined prices, 
production quotas and allocation of resources, and SOEs had to fulfil the plan. 
Chinese state-owned enterprises provided an important source of revenue for the state, 
as the central government had direct access to their revenues.  
 
Stage 1:1978-1992 
After Deng Xiaoping took over leadership in 1978, domestic economic reforms were 
officially introduced nationwide. In 1978, the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China decreed an end to the period of class 
struggle, by focusing on economic modernisation. The aim of the introduction of 
economic reforms was to transform China into a country with a mixed economy: 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics (具有中国特色的社会主义). Transition was 
realised, as the planned economy and the state sector were gradually complemented 
by the steady introduction of competition and market based mechanisms (Naughton 
1995). By adopting this gradual approach, the old planned economy was not 
displaced but instead reformed, while market based elements were allowed to be 
established. Resistance from differing interest groups within the Communist party 
characterised each reform period and resulted in a periodical slowdown of the reform 
process. The reforms of the 1980s were strongly influenced by Chen Yun, who 
played an important role in the reform period of Deng Xiaoping. Chen Yun was a 
representative of the birdcage economy ( 鸟 笼 经 济 ) 10 , that insisted on a 
predominantly planned economy and who showed reservations towards a dynamic 
 
10 The cage is the plan, and it may be large or small. But within the cage the bird (the economy) is free to fly as he 
wishes (Zhao Ziyang 2009). 
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reform program. Chen Yun opposed the direction the reforms were taking, since he 
believed that more freedom in the economy would lead to more tolerance in social, 
cultural and even political arenas. Nevertheless, transition was realised through the 
reorganisation of a planned economy based on a dominating public ownership of 
means of production, into an economy that encourages the simultaneous operation of 
publicly and privately owned enterprises. The following ten years can be regarded as 
an initial pilot for the market economy concept, which had the aim of improving 
incentives, freeing up prices, introducing market competition and increasing the 
market scope for efficient resource allocation. Collectives and private enterprises 
were allowed on a limited scale and competed with state-owned enterprises. In 1986, 
the contract responsibility system11 was introduced with the aim of improving SOEs 
performance and efficiency. The contract responsibility system was adopted as a 
further initiative towards the decentralisation of the enterprise management system 
and allowed greater management autonomy to state-owned enterprises, at least 
formally. The adoption of performance contracts in state-owned enterprises did not 
meet expectations, as incentives were not appropriately chosen and did not generate 
expected performance targets (Yusuf et al. 2006:68; Qian 1996). In the 1980’s the 
state sector was in deficit, partly due to high inflation resulting from an overheating 
economy. Reformers acknowledged that the SOE reforms did not show the expected 
results and progress, and alternative measures were deemed necessary to corporate 
governance regimes in developed countries cannot be assumed for transformation 
economies allow the country to enter into a new stage of reform. A partial 
decentralisation was introduced to the state-owned sector, as less state-owned 
enterprises were under the direction of the central government. The establishment of 
private enterprises (个体户)12 was allowed to a minor degree only. Joint Ventures13 
 
11 Tenev et al (2002:13) analyzed four common elements. First, all of them involved a contract –based relationship 
between the enterprise, usually represented by its directors, and its supervisory agency. Second, the directors faced 
substantial risks and rewards as a result of participating in these programs, because their performance was linked to 
their enterprises’ performance. Third, these schemes involved open selection (as opposed to direct administrative 
appointment) of enterprise directors. Finally, most of these systems had multiyear targets and incentives in order to 
weaken the ratchet effects.  
12 After 1978, the government allowed the development of private enterprises as a supplement to the state and 
collective sector. The establishment of private enterprises is based on individual entrepreneurship and self-
employment in the non-state business sector, and was created in response to the increase of unemployment and 
economic stagnation in the country.  
13 The creation of Joint Ventures played an incremental role in the reform process of state-owned enterprises, by 
having a main emphasis on technology transfer. In this context, the implementation of corporate governance was not 
linked to the creation of Joint Ventures.  
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were allowed under the condition that the state held a share of at least 51 per cent. In 
1990, the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen were established.  
 
Stage 2: 1993-1997 
After Deng Xiaoping’s journey to south China in 1992, economic reform in the 
country got a new, strong impetus. As a result of the 3rd plenum of 14th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, the “Decision of the CCPCC on Several 
Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure” 
(Renminribao 1993) was issued. Policymakers started to focus on the establishment 
of a modern enterprise system in China. The system involved corporate structure, 
governance, and management based on the principles of corporation, and with 
provisions for full separation of the state’s exercise of ownership rights from the 
enterprise’s exercise of legal person property rights. Furthermore, this decision 
encouraged the development of diversified forms of enterprise ownership, including 
privately owned, individually owned and foreign invested companies (Tenev et al. 
2002:16). In 1993, the Company Law was adopted in China. The transformation of 
state owned companies into public corporations was initiated and the importance of 
establishing a modern corporate system underlined. Through the Company Law, the 
government sought to bring organisational standards in line with Western-style 
corporate governance (Guthrie 1998). In 1994, the government initiated the first steps 
towards banking reform and separated policy from commercial lending. In 1994, the 
value-added tax system was adopted in China, applicable to all enterprises, regardless 
of which ownership type they were. This decision redefined relations between the 
government and SOEs, as it reduced the state’s dependence on enterprise profits, 
which was at this point the primary income source for the government. With the 
introduction of the tax system, all enterprises were obliged to pay a defined 
percentage tax rate. This was a first step toward the tax system reform, which is 
currently still a topic in China (Hauff 2002, Wong 2005).  
 
Although the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen were established in 1990, a 
boom of listed enterprises on the stock exchanges and the value of shares issued came 
three years later. In 1993 there were 183 companies listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchange, and RMB 9.6 billion in shares were issued and sold 
(Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2007). The companies listed on the stock exchange 
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were determined by government, and were mainly state-owned enterprises. The 
listing of state-owned enterprises aimed to provide external access to financial 
channels, either domestic ones or from abroad. Furthermore, domestic private 
investors were provided with an alternative to putting their savings in the state-owned 
banks or keeping it at home.  
 
Stage 3:1997-present 
The Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) 
promulgated the Securities Law in 1998. Since China's accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese leadership agreed on dismantling trade 
barriers and reducing customs tariffs. The deregulation of industries was declared as a 
goal, although industries such as banking and telecommunications remain highly 
regulated (China Daily 2006a).  
In 2001, the CSRC promulgated the code of corporate governance for listed 
companies. In 2002, when the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party took 
place, Chinese policymakers decided to put their efforts behind the reform of the 
state-owned assets management. The reform of state-owned assets management took 
place by means of privatisation, corporatisation and through the listing of SOEs. 
Furthermore, the building of market-supporting institutions, including legal 
institutions, has become the focus of the reform, although deeper institutional reforms 
are still necessary. In 2008, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission promulgated the guidelines on corporate social responsibility for state-
owned enterprises. One-year later separate guidelines were published for the state-
owned banking sector (China Banking Association 2009).  
2.2.2 Legal Character of Chinese Corporate Governance Code 
Legal provisions concerning the corporate body structure of a company, rights and 
responsibilities and delegation of decision-making power are important determinants 
of corporate law. In addition, it is significant as to whether parties involved can 
realise and enforce their rights and to which degree they have trust in the national rule 
of law.  
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In contrast, the corporate governance code functions as a guideline to improve 
communication between the capital market and a company. Furthermore it covers 
ethical values and good practices. Two basic principles were adopted, namely that it 
would only apply to Chinese listed corporations and that it would not be mandatory 
by law. According to the Chinese government, the code of corporate governance is 
formulated  
 
“…to promote the establishment and improvement of modern enterprise system by 
listed companies, to standardize the operation of listed companies and to bring 
forward the healthy development of the securities market of China” (CSRC 2002).  
 
The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国公司法)14, 
the Securities Law (中华人民共和国证券法) promulgated in December 1998 and the 
Chinese Corporate Governance Code for Listed Companies (上市公司治理准则) 
issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Economic and 
Trade Commission; represents the legal groundwork for corporate governance in 
China 15 . The Company Law requires corporations to form three statutory and 
indispensable corporate governance bodies: (1) the shareholders, acting as a body at 
the general meeting; (2) the board of directors; and (3) the board of supervisors. In 
addition, the Law introduced two statutory corporate positions – the chair of board of 
directors and the chief executive officer (Schipani/Liu 2001:6). The new, revised 
PRC Company Law took effect on January 1, 2006 and was adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on October 27, 2005. The main 
purpose of the revision was to encourage the protection of minority shareholders16 
and to improve corporate governance17. The Security Law was also revised with the 
aim strengthening regulations of Chinese listed companies.  
 
 
14 Adopted at the 5th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on December 29, 
1993; revised in 2006. The Company Law of 1993 (Corporate Law) is the first comprehensive piece of legislation 
on business corporations since 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was founded.  
15 Shi/Weisert (2002:40) also mention the Certified Accountant Law (issued 1993), Audit Law (issued 1994), 
People’s Bank of China Law and Commercial Bank Law (both issued 1995), and Accounting Law (issued 1999).  
16  The new Company Law introduces a number of measures aimed at increasing the protection of minority 
shareholders. Shareholders now have a statutory right to receive information, require a repurchase of their shares 
and petition for dissolution of the company. 
17 The new Company Law allows the corporate veil to be lifted in certain circumstances, which may result in the 
controlling shareholder being held personally liable for the debts of the company. 
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In the last few years, the Chinese government has been actively revising and 
improving the regulatory framework for corporate governance. Ever since 1992 when 
the CSRC was established, the Chinese legislative and administrative authorities have 
stipulated more than 300 laws, regulations, rules, standards, and guidelines 
concerning the securities and future market.  
 
The establishment of a corporate legal system cannot be taken for granted as under 
Mao’s defined ideology the party was regarded as being above the law, and not as 
being interacting with society in accordance with a legal system. In fact, the state of 
lawlessness in China started with the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957, and reached its 
climax in the Cultural Revolution (Zheng 1997:163), which resulted in a disruption of 
law and order. The establishment of a legal system aims to create a new basis of 
legitimacy for the Communist party, and to maintain social order and stability in the 
country (Zheng 1997:164). Earlier in 1978, a report to the State Council, submitted by 
Hu Qiaomu, pointed out that economic laws are objective and for the sake of the 
country must not be violated (Fewsmith 1999:55). Indeed, the report reflected the 
ultimate need for legal development in the framework of economic reforms. The 
publication of this report signified a first step towards a retreat from ideology and 
from the party’s claim on truth. Thereby party members as well as state bureaucrats 
were advised to observe the law. Today it is apparent that abidance by the law is still 
subject to an intense conflict among party members, as it demands control loss and 
severe restriction on their room for manoeuvre. With the introduction of the new 
party constitution in 1982, policymakers undertook a commitment that required all 
party organisations and members to operate within the framework of law. With the 
legal reforms in 1982 of the state constitution, all state organs, public organisations 
and enterprises were required to abide by the law. This move marked the separation 
of the party from the government. This step caused great tension, as the principle 
inherent in bureaucratic rationality conflicts with the privileged claim on truth on 
which the party originally based its legitimacy (Fewsmith 1999:55). 
 
China has so far heavily relied upon a legal and regulatory approach to corporate 
governance. Chinese regulatory bodies, like the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (中国证券监督管理委员会), the National Development and Reform 
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Commission (国家发展和改革委员会), the Shanghai Stock Exchange (上海证券交
易所) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (深圳证券交易所), have issued them. However, 
laws and regulations are only a part of the whole corporate governance scene; it still 
needs other institutional infrastructure for effective corporate governance such as 
mature markets for securities, corporate control, executive labour and intermediaries 
(Ho 2003:10) and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The Chinese corporate governance code is a market-based element implemented 
within the course of economic reforms. The Chinese corporate governance code 
strongly follows the published recommendations of the OECD principles, including 
some variations. Variations account for Chinese specific features in context of 
China’s tradition, history, culture and corporate law system. It is questionable 
whether or not the corporate governance code can function as rule for management 
behaviour on behalf of the shareholders of a company, as in the Chinese context 
corporate governance does not necessarily meet the same institutional conditions as in 
Western countries. In fact, Chinese corporations installed a two-tier board system, in 
contrast to the unitary board system applied in Anglo-American corporations. In 
regards to the role of the controlling shareholder and the regulatory objective of 
minority shareholder protection, the code follows the recommendations of the Anglo-
American model. Minority shareholder protection has low priority in China, in 
particular as the state holds the majority block holdings in most Chinese listed 
companies. Minority shareholders only play an inferior role in Chinese corporate 
structure. At the time when corporate governance code was adopted, the Chinese 
government aimed to attract international investors’ capital. In order to gain the trust 
of international investors and to comply with international standards, the legal 
protection of minority shareholder was important. The agenda of the Anglo-American 
corporate governance code is in many aspects contradictory to the Chinese law 
system and administration system. Most relevant laws have been enacted, but 
enforcement mechanisms remain poor, and Chinese courts do not possess of a lot of 
experience and expertise in dealing with such cases. In socialism, China does not 
have the necessary foundation for corporate governance in a market-based sense and 
consequently processes in the corporate legal system have been adapted and changed 
by state administration. By implementing the corporate governance code, Chinese 
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economic policymakers adopted regulations and standards in conformance to the 
requirements of a transition economy, and not a pure market-based economy. 
Concluding, the Chinese corporate governance code neither complies one hundred 
per cent with the Anglo-American model, nor the Continental-European model. 
Rather it is understood as a mixed model, containing elements of both and further 
extended by Chinese specific features – a model with Chinese characteristics, which 
will be outlined in the next chapters.  
2.3  Internal corporate governance and institutional change in     
state-owned enterprises 
Modern corporations are governed by internal and external factors which must 
interact effectively with each other. Internal factors are the institutional framework 
within the company (e.g. shareholder’s meeting, board of directors, supervisory board) 
and external factors are the framework outside the company. 
 
The following section tries to give an insight to which degree the guidelines and 
recommendations of the corporate governance code are applied and where it meets 
limitations in the Chinese context. The corporate governance code meets the 
expectations of domestic and international investors, who regard the code as a 
standard for best practices and ethical values related to managing, directing and 
overseeing listed corporations. The implementation of the code requires new impulses 
for disclosure, transparency, auditing and coverage which have not been required in a 
planned economy.  
 
The code consists of 8 different parts with 95 articles. Part 1 deals with shareholders 
and the general meeting; part 2 with controlling shareholders and listed companies; 
part 3 with the management board; part 4 with the supervisory board; part 5 with 
performance evolution, incentives and control mechanism; part 6 with the 
relationship to stakeholders; while part 7 deals with information that should be 
disclosed to ensure transparency. The last part is the appendix.   
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(1)Shareholders and the General Meeting 股东与股东大会 
(2)Controlling Shareholders and Listed Companies 控股股东与上市公司  
(3)Directors and the Board of Directors 董事与董事会 
(4)Supervisors and the Supervisory Committee 临事与临事会 
(5)Performance Evolution, Incentives and Control 
Mechanism  
绩效评价与鼓励约束机制 
(6)Stakeholders 利益相关者 
(7)Disclosure and Transparency 信息披露与透明度 
(8)Appendix. 附则 
 
2.3.1 Shareholders and Board Meeting 
In the first chapter, the Chinese code of corporate governance underlines the 
significance of shareholder’s rights. In a first step, the code discusses (1) rights of 
shareholders and (2) rules for a shareholder meeting (CSRC 2002).  
 
? Article §§ 1 of the code states that regarding shareholder rights, shareholders 
should enjoy the full exercise of their legal rights, which also includes bearing 
the corresponding duties based on the shares they hold.  
 
? Article §§ 3 requires the listed company to establish efficient channels, so that 
shareholders will be provided timely with accurate, company-related 
information.  
 
? Article §§ 4 provides shareholders the right to protect their interests and 
rights through civil litigation or other legal means in accordance with laws and 
administrative regulations. 
 
In agreement with the Company Law, the shareholders’ meeting decides upon the 
most important issues: arranging the policies, investment plans, recruiting and 
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removing directors and supervisors, and approving quarterly and annual reports. 
Although the code in Article §§ 2 states that minority shareholders should have equal 
status with other shareholders, the Company Law does not provide any detailed 
provisions for the protection of the interests of the minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, the Company Law does not stipulate a legislative basis for undertaking 
legal actions. In the case that minority shareholders want to take action and sue 
directors or state representatives, they cannot trust upon receiving legal support. 
Regarding the rules for the shareholders’ meeting,  
 
? Article §§5 states that convening and voting procedures should be set out in 
the behalf of the shareholders, by means of its articles of association, including 
rules governing such matters as notification, registration, etc. The shareholders 
can either be present at the shareholder’s meetings in person or they appoint a 
proxy vote on their behalf, and both means of voting possess the same legal 
effect.  
 
? Article §§ 8 requires listed companies to use modern telecommunication 
technologies in shareholder’s meeting to improve shareholder participation. 
  
? Article §§11 encourages the role of institutional investors in the decision 
making process, including the appointment of company directors and in the 
compensation and supervision of management.  
 
In order to provide guidelines for meetings of shareholders in listed corporations, the 
Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the “Standard Opinions on 
Meeting of Shareholders in Listed Corporations” in February 1998 and amended it on 
May 18, 2000. As the name Standard Opinions already says, they are not mandatory 
or legally binding.  
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2.3.2 Controlling Shareholders and Listed Companies  
In the second chapter, the Chinese Code of Corporate Governance discusses (1) 
behaviour rules for controlling shareholders, and (2) the independence of listed 
companies. 
Regarding the behaviour rules for controlling shareholders (CSRC 2002),  
 
? Article §§ 15 stipulates that during the restructuring and reorganisation of a 
company that plans to list, the controlling shareholders should observe the 
principle of “first restructuring, then listing”, and shall emphasise the 
establishment of a reasonably balanced shareholding structure. 
 
? Article §§ 16 requires that listed companies do not include non-operational 
institutions and welfare institutions in their operation. 
  
? Article §§ 18 notes that reforming labour, personnel and distribution systems, 
transforming operational and managerial mechanisms are tasks to be done by 
the controlling shareholder. The aim should be to establish systems such as 
management selection through bidding and competition in the employment of 
employees based on competitive selection and an income distribution scheme 
that provides sufficient incentives.  
 
? Article §§ 19 requires the controlling shareholder not to take advantage of 
his privileged position in the company to gain additional benefit and to respect 
shareholders legal rights and interests. 
  
Regarding the independence of listed companies,  
 
? Article §§ 22 requires a listed company to be separated from its controlling 
shareholder in aspects such as personnel, assets and financial affairs - It shall 
also be independent in institution, and business, shall practice independent 
business accounting, and shall independently bear risks and obligations.  
Furthermore,  
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? Article §§ 26 gives controlling organs like the board of directors, the 
supervisory committee and other internal offices more weight in operating in 
an independent manner, not subordinated by a company’s controlling 
shareholder.  
2.3.3 Controlling Body 
The code attempts to strengthen the roles of the controlling body in a listed company 
as the board of directors, board of supervisors and independent directors.  
2.3.3.1 Board of Directors 
In the third chapter, the Chinese code of corporate governance looks at the role of 
directors and board of directors in six aspects (CSRC 2002): (1) election procedure of 
directors, (2) duties and responsibilities of directors, (3) duties and compensation of 
the board of directors, (4) rules and procedures of the board of directors, (5) 
independent directors (2.3.3.3 Independent Directors) and, (6) specialised committees 
of the board of directors.  
 
The Chinese Company Law complements the main provisions of the code of 
corporate governance, especially when dealing with the board of directors. The 
Company Law stipulates five rules: (1) limited liability companies and joint stock 
companies are required to set up a board of directors, (2) the number of directors 
should range from three to thirteen for a limited liability company and five to 
nineteen for a joint stock company, (3) the board of directors has the responsibility of 
appointing and removing management, (4) directors and managers must faithfully 
perform their duties, protect the company’s interests and ultimately answer to 
shareholders, (5) and a director’s appointment should not exceed three years, subject 
to re-appointment for a further term.  
 
The main points are outlined in the following (CSRC 2002):     
According to 
  
? Article §§ 29 and §§ 31 a listed company must establish standardised and 
transparent procedures for director election and detailed information 
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regarding the candidates for directorship shall be disclosed. Listed companies 
in which the major shareholder has a stake of more than 30%, shall adopt a 
cumulative voting system to ensure the voting rights of minority shareholders. 
 
? Article §§ 33 and §§ 36 lists the duties and responsibilities of the board of 
directors of listed companies  
 
? Article §§ 38 requires listed companies that in the case of violation of laws or 
regulations or a listed company’s articles of association, which causes losses to 
the listed company, directors should be liable for compensation.  
 
The board of directors represents inside and outside directors of the company, 
including the CEO. In practice, in the 1990’s over 70 per cent of directors and board 
chairmen were appointed by the state and legal person shareholders, and over 50 per 
cent were appointed by the controlling shareholders in proportion to their 
shareholding (Ho 2003; Tenev et al. 2002:83; Yusuf et al. 2006:194). In general, only 
rarely were individuals or outside shareholders elected at the shareholder’s meeting or 
board seats (Xu/Wang 1999). How strong the influence of the controlling shareholder 
is affecting the corporate governance reform will be illustrated below. 
 
In 2004 the government body SASAC 18  (State owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council) invited seven Chinese companies to 
participate in a pilot project on the BoD-reform (Wang Chenbo 2004). SASAC 
extended the experimental exercise to 14 companies in 2006 and to 30 in 2007, 
inviting foreign managers and CEOs to be part of a more transparent corporate 
governance system (Fernandez-Stembridge/Huchet 2006:34). The pilot included the 
Shenhua Group, Shanghai Baosteel Group, China Tietong Group, China Yiyao Group, 
China Gaoxin Investment Group, China Chengtong Group, and the China Guolu 
Group. Originally, in all these companies BoD already existed, but were highly 
influenced by interest groups close to the state. These kinds of BoD are also called in 
 
18 SASAC (namely, the former State Economic & Trade Committee) was established in 2003, before a multitude of 
government ministries and other bureaucratic entities got to have their say in the daily operations of SOEs. With the 
creation of SASAC, China had clarified and simplified its state-assets management system (Fernandez-Stembridge/ 
Huchet 2006:32). SASAC is exercising the government’s ownership rights with the objective to improve enterprises 
performance.  
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Chinese terms One person BoD (Wang Chenbo 2004). The reason for this expression 
was that in the 1990’s Chinese companies started to move in the direction of 
establishing a modern corporate governance system. By forming new institutions 
within a company, former managers of the SOEs became the new members of the 
BoD and former party committee secretaries or the SOE director became the new 
chair of the BoD. This created a high possibility that the BoD would be controlled by 
insiders (Zhou 2003; Xu/Wang 1999); therefore, insider control is dominant 
(Lawton/Cheng 2005:30). According to §§Article 120 (1) of the Company Law, the 
chair of the BoD is authorised to perform certain duties of the BoD between BoD 
meetings, in the case that the BoD is not holding meetings. The result is the 
concentration of power in the hands of one person. Consequently, no external 
managers were recruited and the members of BoD continued to be recruited from 
among the internal personnel. Therefore, companies cannot get rid of old practices 
and old monitoring systems. The ultimate responsibility remains with one person – 
the chair of the board of directors. During the pilot project on BoD reform, the 
companies involved also started to recruit external directors. The selection of the 
potential candidates proved to be quite difficult. According to the Company Law, no 
state officials were allowed to be recruited. Apart from the difficulties in finding 
candidates with appropriate qualifications, the SASAC, which originally initiated the 
reform, participated in the recruiting process. Finally, the companies had to wait for 
the approval of the government body SASAC before they could hire a new member 
for their BoD. This proves that government agencies are still playing a decisive role 
in the appointment of executives, on behalf of the major shareholder.   
The difficulties observed regarding the recruitment of potential candidates also 
pinpoints the fact that the Company Law does not provide a standard job description 
or profile concerning the qualifications and responsibilities of directors. The 
appointment of the chair of BoD is mainly dependent on the political position in 
hierarchy of the candidate. In the past it has been proven that primarily high-ranking 
cadres and local party committee’s secretaries were appointed (Garnaut et al. 
2005:122; Tenev et al. 2002). Close relationship between the government and former 
SOEs continue and government interference persists (Lawton/Cheng 2005:30; Tenev 
et al. 2002:98, 99).  
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The last policy dialogue on corporate governance of state-controlled listed companies 
in China in 2007, hosted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the OECD, also 
observed this unwanted development (OECD 2007a). Hu Ruying, Director of 
Research of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in China identified three areas that show 
weak distinction between government and enterprises, namely recruitment, incentives 
and oversight (OECD 2007a:3):  
 
? There has been no fundamental change in the traditional practice of 
appointing government officials to leadership positions in state controlled-
listed companies. A majority of board chairs and CEOs hold civil service 
ranks. The market for management personnel is underdeveloped and market-
based mechanisms for management selection have not been put in place.  
? Civil service management and government intervention still heavily influence 
the procedures and mechanisms for deciding executive remuneration in state 
controlled-listed companies. 
? The government generally does not govern SOEs based on ownership 
functions and reliance on a strong board. 
 
Senior officials, business leaders and scholars from China and OECD countries 
concluded that board operations still lack independence and efficiency (OECD 2007a). 
2.3.3.2 Board of Supervisors 
The fourth chapter deals with the supervisors and the board of supervisors. In order to 
reduce the risk of insider control, corporate governance regimes in Western countries 
solve the problem by introducing independent directors. This chapter briefly 
examines the duties and responsibilities of the supervisory board.  
 
The board of supervisors includes at least three members who are either shareholder 
representatives or employee representatives, with the percentage of representation of 
each group to be stipulated in the articles of association. The corporate employees in 
democratic elections elect the employee representatives on the board of supervisors. 
In order to secure the impartiality of supervisors, directors, executives and financial 
managers may not concurrently serve as supervisors (Company Law 1993:§§124).      
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According to the Chinese Company Law, Chinese corporate governance structures 
provide for a two-tier board system. This structure is similar to the German model. 
The German law stipulates a two-tier system for large publicly held corporations. 
German listed companies (Aktiengesellschaften) are composed of an elected 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), which appoints the board of directors (Vorstand), 
consisting of senior corporate managers. In Germany, the supervisory board’s main 
task can be defined as overseeing the management of the company. Furthermore, they 
have the power to appoint and dismiss members of the board of directors and the 
power to represent the corporation in its dealings with members of the board of 
directors. The Chinese corporate governance resembles on the surface the German 
model, but there are substantial differences between these two systems because they 
are not based on the same social and philosophical considerations (Tam 1999:86). On 
the contrary, the role of the supervisory board in Chinese corporations is still limited 
and shows many weaknesses. The institution of the supervisory board in Chinese 
listed companies is challenged by many factors, mainly because it cannot fulfil its 
attributed function.  
 
? Article §§ 59 states that the board of supervisors should overlook the 
corporate finance, the legitimacy of directors, managers and other senior 
management personnel’s performance of duties, and shall protect the 
company’s and the shareholders’ legal rights and interests (CSRC 2002). 
 
For instance, according to a Chinese survey in 2001, only 37 per cent of company 
representatives estimated that the supervisory board fulfils its tasks concerning 
financial issues and the BoD. The same survey revealed that 81 per cent of Chinese 
managers agreed that the decision-making process is centred within the BoD only 
(China Enterprise Confederation 2001). The Chinese supervisory board does not have 
any competencies related to the appointment or dismissal of the BoD.  
 
? Articles §§60 and §§61 state that members of the board of supervisors must 
be permitted access to information related to the companies operational status 
and must be allowed to hire independent intermediary agencies for 
professional consultation, without interference from other company employees 
(CSRC 2002).  
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The reporting duty of the BoD to the supervisory board is also missing. Although 
according to the law, the supervisory board has formally the competency to control 
and monitor the field of activity of the BoD, in reality they do not possess any direct 
tools to put sanctions on them. The ineffectiveness of the supervisory board is due to 
the Company Law, which merely provides it with limited powers and are not 
sufficient enough to effectively implement the monitoring function.  
 
Factors influencing the function of the supervisory board in a negative way can be 
identified as follows (Dang Wenjuan/Yuan Like 2006b:114ff.): Firstly, major 
shortcomings exist in the construction of the institution of the supervisory board itself. 
Originally, most Chinese listed companies were state-owned enterprises. Members of 
the management and board of directors mainly derive from the political cadre system 
of former days. As a result, it remains difficult to change their idea of management 
practices and their understanding of modern management instruments within a short 
time period. Today it can be still observed that the real power in a Chinese company 
is concentrated in the board of directors and the management, which in turn are 
nominated by the major shareholder, the state. Supervisory boards lose their 
effectiveness in particular because they do not become the centres of company 
operations and do not bear ultimate responsibility for them (OECD 2007a).  
Secondly, according to Chinese corporate governance structures the decision-making 
power and the monitoring power are two separated functions. The board of directors 
is in charge of the decision-making function and the supervisory board is in charge of 
the monitoring function. In comparison to the German board of supervisors, the 
Chinese board of supervisors lacks the power to execute its function. A Chinese 
idiom says: “哪里有权力，哪里就需要监督; 哪里有监督， 哪里就必须有权力” 
(Dang Wenjuan/Yuan Like 2006b:115) which translates as Where there is power, 
there you need monitoring; where there is monitoring, there must be power. This 
idiom explains in a simple way the complexity of the discrepancy of the whole 
concept in China. In reality, the supervisory board is not endowed with the necessary 
powers by the Company Law19 to monitor the board of directors. It is self-explaining 
 
19 The Company Law (1993), Article 126 stipulates the supervisory role of the board of supervisors by just saying 
that they should have the following powers, without delegating any power to them. The supervisory board shall 
exercise the following powers: 
(a) reviewing the finances of the company; 
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that their effective monitoring function is therefore not guaranteed or even put into 
practice.  
 
As mentioned above, the two-tier board system consists of two organs, the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors. These are elected by the shareholders and are 
required to submit information to the board meeting. Both are equally independent, 
which means that the decision-making function and monitoring function are of equal 
significance. However, in reality the practice is different to the theory. In Chinese 
listed companies only the role of the board of directors is regarded as meaningful and 
important, the role of the supervisory board is likely to be overlooked. China’s 
Company Law neither provides instructions on what the supervisory board should do 
if the board of the directors refuses their suggestions (Lawton/Cheng 2005:36), nor 
does the Company Law stipulate that the board of directors and management have to 
report regularly to the supervisory board (Tenev et al. 2002:100). In fact, the board of 
directors controls the company. In contrast to the German model, the Chinese 
supervisory board has no power to appoint and remove members of the management 
or the board of directors. The independency of the supervisory board can be regarded 
as a formal one only, without having any means to execute its monitoring function in 
an effective way. Thus, it has no controlling power and it can be stated that it is also 
deprived of the power of participating in the strategic decisions; neither can it 
participate in the decision-making of the board of directors, nor the management.  
Thirdly, a large number of supervisors lack profound business experience and a 
management background. They are not involved into the daily business and 
operations of the company, as directors and managers might be. Besides the lack of 
important management knowledge and the company’s ongoing operations, they rely 
even more on the management board. Publications on the topic discussed whether 
supervisors should be rather regarded merely as subordinates of the board of directors 
and managers, than an independent institution within the corporation (Dahya et al. 
 
 
(b) exercise supervision over the actions of directors or the manager when they are performing their duties, 
which actions violate laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association;  
(c) requiring directors and the manager to remedy a situation when the acts of such directors or manager 
harm the interests of the company; 
(d) propose the convening of interim meeting’s of shareholders general committee; and 
(e) other authorities stipulated in the articles of association.  
Supervisors shall be present at board meetings.  
In October 2005 the Chinese Company law has been revised.  
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2003:317). By knowing this power imbalance within the company, it is easier to 
understand why the supervisory board’s hands are tied and why they cannot carry out 
their monitoring function. 
 
? Article §§ 63 requires listed companies that in the case of violation of the 
laws, regulations or the company’s articles of association by directors, 
managers or other senior management personnel, the supervisory board may 
report directly to securities regulatory authorities (CSRC 2002).  
 
Because of the reasons mentioned above the probability that they will report 
malpractices to the authorities is quite low. 
Last, information asymmetry can explain the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board. 
According to the principal agent approach, the agent has an information lead over the 
principal, as the agent can use information over characteristics, intentions and actions 
in his own interest (Jensen/Meckling 1976; Grossman/Hart 1983). Exactly the same 
can be observed between the board of directors, the management and the board of 
supervisors. The supervisors have only limited access to a company’s information and 
current operation activities. Consequently, they rely heavily on information from the 
management board, which in turn is not required to provide information on a regular 
basis. The supervisory board is not well informed on the actual performance of the 
company, and again cannot carry out its monitoring function in an effective way. 
Knowing the close relationship between the management board and the major 
shareholder in the company, the reliability of the information provided must also to 
be put into question.  
Summarising, Chinese companies face problems in corporate governance similar to 
those of Western corporations. Because of several company crises during the last few 
years the operational capability of the supervisory function in Europe, especially in 
Germany, has been put in question. According to public debates, coalition building 
between the German board of directors and the supervisory board exist. In contrast, 
other commentators argue that in German groups the two functions of management 
and supervision are strictly separated, according to stock corporation law structure 
(Fallgatter 2003:703f) 
The detachment of the management and supervisory function results in an 
information asymmetry, as the management, due to its closeness to the operative 
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business, has an information lead. Information received by the supervisory board is 
only rarely provided, and its sufficiency and reliability must be put into question 
(Lawton/Cheng 2005:28). Perhaps the key to improving supervisors’ independence 
lies in further economic and political reform, perhaps by reducing political control 
over corporate affairs (including the hiring and firing of supervisors) by the 
government and the Communist party (Daya et al. 2003:318).  
2.3.3.3 Independent Directors 
Recent publications discuss the current role of independent directors in the Chinese 
corporate governance framework (Dang Wenjuan/Yuan Like 2006ab; Deng Li 2006; 
Clarke 2006) although the Chinese corporate governance code only touches on this 
topic in short (CSRC 2002).  
 
? Article §§ 49 requires listed companies to introduce independent directors 
who are independent from the listed company that employs them and the 
company’s major shareholders. An independent director may not hold any 
other position apart from independent director in the listed company. 
 
The organisation of independent directors in the Chinese corporate governance 
framework is related to the organisation of the board of directors. Actually, the 
Company Law does not make any stipulations corresponding to the organisation of 
independent directors. In August 2001, the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC 2001) issued the “Guidelines for the Introduction of an 
Independent Director system in listed companies”. These guidelines include all 
companies listed on domestic stock exchanges, but not Chinese companies listed 
overseas. The institution of independent directors has to fulfil three tasks (Shi/Weisert 
2002), which are (1) to represent the interests of small shareholders, (2) monitor the 
executive management and prevent the emergence of corporate misbehaviour and 
scandals. (3) and bear responsibility for society, as they are taking part in the shaping 
of perceptions regarding capital markets in society.  
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? Article §§ 50 states that independent directors shall carry out their duties 
independently and protect the interests of minority shareholders from being 
infringed (CSRC 2002). 
 
Thus, many of the criticisms of existing independent directors centre on their 
powerlessness to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders from the 
depredations of large shareholders and management (Clarke 2006:169). Protection of 
small and medium shareholders is crucial, since the financial market is regarded as an 
alternative to former traditional social protection schemes, the missing and still 
developing pension and social security system, and the limited access to private 
business sector lending. Many independent directors find it difficult to exert any 
substantial influence, other than symbolic, within the board (Schipani/Liu 2001:29). 
In general, five major shortcomings can be identified concerning the current situation 
of independent directors in Chinese listed companies (Deng Li 2006:158): Firstly, 
above all, it is still quite unclear in which direction the Chinese system of 
independent directors will evolve. The most specific problematic characteristic of 
Chinese corporate governance is the concentrated ownership structure compared to 
companies based in the US and UK, which mostly have a dispersed ownership 
structure. Due to the dominant shareholder structure, small shareholder interests are 
difficult to protect. In China, companies with widely dispersed public ownership 
where no individual owns a controlling block of shares is virtually and perhaps 
completely, non-existent (Clarke 2006:169). Secondly, the number of independent 
directors represented in the board is still low. Taking the proportion of independent 
directors participating in the general meeting compared with the international average 
shows that the proportion still falls far short. In the USA 75 per cent of the BoD 
consists of external directors. The CRSC mandated that in a first step by June 30, 
2002 at least two independent directors have to participate in the general meeting. In 
a second step, by June 30, 2003 the general meeting had to at least consist of one 
third of independent directors. By the end of 2004, 4,681 independent directors were 
employed by 1,377 Chinese listed companies in total, equivalent to an average of 
three independent directors for each listed company (OECD 2005a:2). Thirdly, the 
issue identified is maybe the most crucial one. In practice independent directors in 
Chinese listed companies are not independent, but rely heavily on the decision 
making of the major shareholder.  
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In reality, the board of directors and the board of supervisors nominate independent 
directors, which in turn are highly influenced by the major shareholder. Recently 
published research on corporate governance in China proves that independent 
directors still lack independence as the majority shareholder (OECD 2007a) 
nominates 90 per cent20 of independent directors. 
In economic terms, the interests of the majority shareholder are represented, and not 
the interests of the minority shareholders. The term independence refers to the 
condition that potential candidates should be independent from the listed company, 
management and the major shareholder As they are independent, independent 
directors are required to have knowledge about economic and corporate governance 
related issues. Another function which should not to be underestimated is to serve the 
public interest and to act on their behalf. This would include acting as an institution 
that guard against the malpractice of individual interests and possible offences against 
law and discipline within a company. The major shareholder exerts a strong influence 
on the election procedure and as a result the efficiency of their monitoring function 
within the company has to be put into question. In addition, the board of directors not 
only nominates independent directors, but also remunerates them. As this organ is 
executing both functions, the result is a relationship of dependence and independence 
remains weak and needs further examination.  
 
Fourthly, the establishment of an incentive system for independent directors must be 
strengthened. In general, an incentive system must be transparent and objective and 
affect a certain type of behaviour. Deng Li (2006:158) proposes an incentive 
mechanism that consists of two components, namely that independent directors 
should be paid a fixed component, such as an annual salary and the payment for s 
attending meetings. The fixed component should not be related to the company’s 
short-term or long-term performance. Actually, the concept behind the installation of 
a board of independent directors had in mind was to have a positive impact on the 
long-term performance of the company. Moreover, a variable component should also 
include independent directors remuneration, through these independent directors can 
participate in the company’s performance, e.g. stock options. In summary, from the 
Western point of view, the deployment of variable compensation is an important 
 
20 A study conducted in 2003 came to the same result as that controlling shareholder or management (China Finance 
Online 2006) nominates 90 per cent of independent directors. 
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incentive to increase the achievement of individual performance standards (Hewitt 
2004). In Chinese listed companies, the deployment of variable compensation e.g. 
stock options; is still not very common, rather the deployment of fixed compensation 
is prevalent.  
Fifthly and last, the institution of independent directors in China still lacks qualified 
directors. Recently, in Shanghai and Beijing, the CSRC started to introduce long-term 
training for independent directors. The goal is to improve their knowledge about 
shareholder and corporate governance culture. These trainings include classes on 
management organisation of specified industries, establishment of standards and 
regulations and the understanding of ethics and industry behaviour. Although there is 
a rising tendency of people participating in these trainings, the number remains low. 
At the same time, the demand for qualified independent directors is increasing.  
2.3.3.4 Performance Assessments, Incentives and Disciplinary Systems 
Chapter five of the code of corporate governance deals with performance assessment 
and incentives and disciplinary systems. Three areas can be identified: (1) 
performance assessment for directors, supervisors and management personnel, (2) 
selection of management personnel, and (3) incentive and disciplinary systems for 
management. The following major rules should be outlined (CSRC 2002): 
 
? Article §§ 69 requires listed company establish fair and transparent 
procedures for the assessment of the performance of directors, supervisors, and 
management.  
 
? Article §§ 70 state, that the evaluation of the directors and management 
personnel shall be conducted by the board of directors or by the remuneration 
and appraisal committee of the board of directors. The evaluation of the 
performance of independent directors and supervisors shall be conducted 
through a combination of self-review and peer review.  
 
? Article §§ 71 states that a listed company should adopt recruitment standards. 
No institution of individual shall interfere with a listed company’s normal 
recruiting procedure for management personnel.  
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According to  
 
? Article §§ 71 compensation should be determined by performance assessment 
only.  
 
The suggestions given by the corporate governance code regarding performance 
evaluation, incentives and control mechanism also imply limitations. By trying to 
establish a better understanding for the design of an adequate compensation and 
reward system for Chinese directors in Chinese listed companies, the most important 
characteristics of Mao Zedong’s established policy of the three old irons have to be 
taken into consideration. Therefore y one might possibly explain the current issues 
facing the design and implementation of adequate performance assessment, incentives 
and disciplinary systems for Chinese directors. Before 1978, when the reform policy 
was introduced to China, the compensation system was centrally managed by the 
Chinese government, an appropriate incentive and disciplinary system did not exist so 
far. The compensation system consisted of the three old irons (旧三铁) system 
(Ding/Warner 2001:317), which was formative for Chinese state-owned companies 
during the time period from 1950 to 1978; and was completely controlled by the 
government. The three supporting pillars of this system were (1) the iron wages (铁工
资), (2) the iron rice bowl (铁饭碗) and (3) the iron chair (铁交椅). The iron wages 
is a synonym for the state-administrated reward system, the low-wage policy, flat 
wage structures and complicated and inflexible wage schemes. The iron rice bowl is a 
synonym for unified job allocation, guaranteed life-time employment, and cradle to 
grave welfare. The iron chair is a synonym for factory directors regarded as state 
cadres, the appointment of directors directly by government authority, based on 
political selection and with an absence of punishment for poor business performance. 
State-employees who were entitled to a working contract based on the three old irons 
system, also benefited from the fact that their children were also qualified to work for 
the same company. Therefore state-owned enterprises secured employment for future 
generations. Cadres and directors, working for state-owned companies obtained 
credibility by being a loyal member of the party. Nowadays, most Chinese listed 
companies are former state-owned companies, which have all shown these 
characteristics before reform. The main point is that in earlier day’s performance and 
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productivity of the company did not represent the key criterion for compensation and 
selection of management personnel, instead it was an individual’s loyalty to the party. 
21 Additionally, privileges associated with the size of the SOE, such as rank and 
influence, brought more personal gain to the directors than efficient production or 
profits (Lawton/Cheng 2005:26). Listed companies lack innovative compensation 
mechanisms, such as stock option programs, so a manager’s compensation is linked 
to his individual performance. A lot of efforts have been undertaken to move away 
from this old system, but bad habits still persist.  
2.3.3.5 Stakeholders 
? Article §§ 81 to §§ 86 discusses the legal rights of stakeholders, which are a 
main driver for a company’s healthy and sustainable development (CSRC 
2002). 
 
In Western literature, the relationship between the company’s board and its 
stakeholders has led to an intense discussion among academic scholars (Freeman 
1984; Smith 2003; Friedman/Miles 2006; Charreaux/Desbrières 2001). The 
stakeholder-oriented approach does not primarily focus on the interests of the 
shareholders but also takes into account the interests of other company-related groups 
like employees, customers, suppliers, government, public and banks. Stakeholders are 
seen as important contributors to the corporate long-term sustainable value of a 
company, as they are undertake firm-specific investments in the company’s favour 
(Blair/Stout 1999; Zingales 1997; Rajan/Zingales 1998ab). Stakeholder theory alleges 
that different groups have a stake in the activities of the firm.  
 
In the case of China, it is essential to point out that nearly all stakeholders are 
strongly related to the state or local governments. In the Chinese case, the distinction 
between shareholders and stakeholders is complex to a certain degree, since the 
several state-related areas at the national as well as local level are acting as 
shareholders as well as stakeholders at the same time. SOEs are operating under the 
 
21 In Chinese state owned companies, the key criterion for promotion of a cadre was explained by the catchword 又
红又专 (Warner/Ding 2001:325; Zhu/Dowling 1998:119). On the one hand this catchword refers to red, which 
means the relation to the party and on the other hand it refers to expert, which means expertise. Especially during 
the Cultural Revolution a lot of intention was paid to the term red. Only under the condition that a cadre was 又红, 
close to the party, he could consider to get a promotion.  
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control of the central or local governments, which are the dominant shareholders. 
SOEs employees are state employees/ local government employees. Most Chinese 
banks are state-owned/ local government-owned. SOEs management is highly 
connected to the party and government bureaus, in regard to their important role in 
appointment and promotion. SOEs suppliers are mainly SOEs themselves, as the state 
is interested in supporting domestic plant utilisation. SOE customers are not 
necessarily individual costumers but also SOEs, which are purchasing industrial 
products. Obviously an average Chinese SOE is surrounded by an environment, 
namely stakeholders, which are highly influenced in their decision making by the 
state and local government themselves. Thus, one stakeholder group in China are 
government bureaus and officials, as well as state-owned units. Highly influenced 
stakeholders can be regarded as a reason for the inefficiency SOEs, which increases 
through collusion among stakeholder groups (Cauley et al. 1999:203). Furthermore, 
incentive schemes to motivate these stakeholders to operate more efficiently are 
missing (Cauley/Sandler 1992; Tirole 1986). Therefore these stakeholders are making 
no effort to undertake firm-specific investments as they are not acting in their own 
interest but as a sub-agent for the state or local government’s interests. The second 
stakeholder group in China are employees and workers. With the introduction of the 
People’s Republic of China Employment Contract Law (中华人民共和国劳动合同
法) promulgated in June 2007 and effective as of January 1，200822; the state 
acknowledges the significance in improving regulations concerning employment 
relations. The new law responds to the demand for stronger labour rights and labour 
protection in the economy. Recently a debate was started in China as to whether the 
state or the public is the owner of the state-owned enterprises; and whether capital 
interests or workers interests should be given priority. By definition the employees 
are the owner of the state-owned enterprises, and the state is performing its duty on 
exercising its property rights on their behalf. Wang Hui (2009) argues that the state 
has to take over a smoothing function in order to balance shareholders and workers 
interests. Thereby the state has to bring its labour standards into conformity with 
 
22 §Article 2: This Law governs the establishment of employment relationships between, and the conclusion, 
performance, amendment and termination of employment contracts by enterprises, individual economic 
organizations and private non-enterprise units in the People’s Republic of China (“Employers”) on the one hand and 
workers in the People’s Republic of China on the other hand. 
Where state authorities, institutions or social organizations establish employment relationships with workers (other 
than civil servants and those working personnel who are managed with reference to the Civil Servants Law), the 
conclusion, performance, amendment and termination of the employment contracts between them shall be handled 
pursuant to this law. 
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basic internationally recognised worker rights, which do not support conditions such 
as artificially low wages, long and often unpaid overtime, few legal protections and 
unsafe working conditions. In 2006, employees of a state-owned enterprise in Jiangsu 
took legal action to fight for stronger labour rights and better working conditions in 
their enterprise. In 2007, state-owned workers initiatives in Guangdong province were 
accompanied by spontaneous work stoppage and organised strike activities. These 
conflicts and social actions reflect the social zeitgeist of the time, combined with 
distrust in the ability of the state to take responsibility for the workers’ interests. This 
triggers the question of whether the state is acting above party lines or is acting as a 
neoliberal state, as the owner of the state-owned sector. Wang Hui (2009) concludes 
that the recognition of workers’ rights, most importantly freedom of association and 
the right to organise and bargain collectively, is an important starting point for more 
democracy in the country. The future development and change of the role of the 
labour unions in Chinese enterprises needs continuous observation. 
 
In the Chinese context, little attention has been paid to the third group of stakeholders; 
the small investors. This is not only specific to China. Most countries in the world, 
including those in Europe, as well as in Latin America, East Asia, and Africa, show 
this feature. Corporations typically have controlling owners, who are often founders 
or their offspring (Schleifer/Vishny 1997:754). In Europe and Japan, banks and 
financial institutions exercise controlling ownership. In most East Asian countries, 
crony capitalism prevails with controlling families and controlling ownership, with 
two-thirds of listed firms controlled by a single shareholder or family relatives in 
those countries (Claessens et al. 2000). These countries can be characterised as being 
insider-dominated systems. Applying that to China, insider control is a well-known 
problem, as most of the industry and the financial system is dominated by the state.  
 
Policymakers are aware that due to the omnipresence of the main shareholder, the 
interests of other important stakeholders are excluded and not taken into account. Due 
to the significant shortcomings of the system in protecting stakeholder interests (Zhu 
Yong et al. 2006:356), in December 2004 the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) promulgated the “Provisions on Strengthening the Protection of 
the Rights and Interests of the General Public Shareholders” (CSRC 2004). The aim 
of this was to implement a mechanism for preventing listed companies from control 
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abuse, and effectively protecting the legitimate rights and interests of small investors, 
especially the general public. Since the introduction of the Chinese corporate 
governance code, this circular is the first attempt towards improving the protection of 
small investor interests. This kind of agency problem can be mainly observed in East 
Asian countries where controlling shareholders are family holdings, bloc holdings or 
even the state itself. Claessens et al. (1999a) discusses the expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ wealth by majority shareholders in East Asian countries. La Porta et al. 
(1998) examined weak legal protection of investors, which is associated with more 
concentrated ownership of shares. Chen Xiaohong, director of the Enterprise 
Research Institute in China, argues that interests of stakeholder groups have been 
ignored in the past and as a consequence rules and guidelines for state-related 
shareholders have to be improved and clarified (OECD 2007b).  
2.3.3.6 Disclosure and Transparency 
Chapter seven of the code of corporate governance deals with information disclosure 
and transparency in three areas: (1) listed companies ongoing information disclosure, 
(2) disclosure of information regarding corporate governance, and (3) disclosure of 
controlling shareholder’s interest. Disclosure and transparency requirements in the 
light of the ongoing accounting reform in China are discussed in detail in chapter 5.  
2.4 Legal Consequences of Non Compliance with Corporate 
Governance Regulations 
The rudimentary legal framework and the essential absence of shareholder litigation 
do not provide a strong institutional foundation for legal consequences in the case of 
non compliance with CCGC regulations. China’s corporate legal system (in particular 
the Company Law and the Security Law) does not have a long history and still needs 
revision in many aspects. Poor law enforcement is due to the insufficient evolution of 
institutional conditions. In 2002, the CSRC and the SASAC started to undertake joint 
inspections of all listed companies, to check whether listed companies abide by the 
guidelines or not (OECD 2005a:3). As this inspection was based on a self-check of 
the companies in question, the results were mainly positive.  
Several scholars criticise existing public institutions for being weak in enforcement of 
laws and regulations. Tang (2008:147) argues that the Company Law does not 
                                                                                                                                                          51 
provide the CSRC with any specific power to curb illegalities, while the new 
Securities Law just ordered all listed companies to disclose their de facto controlling 
persons.23  Clarke (2003:15) states that the CSRC as a quasi-government agency with 
the task of both  enforcing the rules regarding disclosure and meeting the 
requirements of the investment quality of public issuers, the bureau is limited by its 
personnel scale to enforce the law24.   
In contrast to the OECD principles of corporate governance, Chinese corporate 
governance principles are not designed to be mandatory. It has to be questioned 
whether the CSRC has the tools to enforce compliance and the legal authority under 
Article §§167 of the Securities Law to regulate in this area (Clarke 2005:189). Mallin 
and Rong (1998) state that any system of corporate governance which develops in 
China is likely to embody the special role of the state and contain certain 
idiosyncratic aspects. Under a one-party system, a complete independent and 
uncorrupted judiciary is impossible.  
 
Up until now, the three new corporate bodies created by the Company Law and the 
corporate governance code cannot function independently, and therefore the goals of 
the corporate governance reforms cannot be achieved. Although many SOEs have 
been transformed into business corporations, their management functions still tend to 
avoid the corporate governance requirements imposed by the Corporate Law and the 
corporate governance code and retain the traditional SOE governance model 
(Schipani/Liu 2001:14).  
 
As mentioned above, the weak legal and institutional framework provided by the 
revised Company Law and revised Securities Law still shows limitations. In 2005, a 
revision of the Criminal Law was proposed, which would have made the directors, 
managers and the controlling shareholder of a listed company subject to criminal 
liabilities if they knowingly make the company: (1) provide commodities, services or 
 
23 §§71(1) Securities Law. Under the §§ 17(2) Company Law, the term controlling shareholder means a shareholder 
whose shares accounts for more than 50 per cent of total equity of a company limited by shares, or a shareholder 
whose shares account for less than 50 per cent but who holds the voting rights on the strength of its shares, which 
are enough to have an important influence on resolutions of shareholders general meeting. 
24 Bai/Xu/Ren (2005) undertook a survey with 607 samples of the administrative sanctions and disciplinary actions 
taken by CSRC, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange up to the end of 2004. Estimating there are 600 – 2500 
illegal cases which have not been detected and punished in the same period. The scarcity and inefficiency of the 
enforcement actions may be the result of: (1) deficiency of independence of the regulatory agencies; (2) deficiency 
of enforcement measures of the agencies; (3) complexity of the stock markets; (4) underdeveloped regulatory 
techniques and (5) flows in the regulatory institutions.  
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other assets to other units or persons while receiving no considerations; (2) purchase 
or sell commodities, service or other assets under manifestly unfair conditions; (3) 
sell commodities, provide services or transfer other assets to manifestly insolvent 
units or persons; (4) provide collateral for the debts of manifestly insolvent units or 
persons, provide collateral for the debts of units or persons without justified reasons; 
(5) disclaim a property right to bear a debt for others without justified reasons. The 
law revision is to strengthen the protection of minority shareholders and to improve 
corporate governance in China. In 2011, the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee has placed the revision of the law in its legislative agenda, and the 
revision of the Criminal Law eliminated the death penalty for thirteen economy-
related crimes, as the government moved to restructure its penalty system and better 
protect human rights. 
 
Clarke (2003:12) concludes that instead of the intended effect – more efficiency in 
state-owned enterprises due to the introduction of corporate governance – the 
opposite has been achieved: the entire corporate sector has come to be governed, to a 
significant degree, by principles that are needed and only applicable, if at all, to the 
state sector.  
2.5 Relationship between laosanhui and xinsanhui 
2.5.1 Institutional Change within Chinese State-Owned Enterprises 
The transformation process from central planning to market economy requires the 
substitution of old institutions by new ones. Old institutions, which are characterised 
by rent-seeking and bureaucracy, need to be withdrawn in favour of new institutions 
characterised by performance and market orientation. New market institutions have 
been introduced to Chinese listed companies according to the needs of the capital 
markets, international standards and furthermore for the execution of corporate 
control. The new institutions consist of the shareholder’s meeting, the board of 
directors, and the supervisory board. By introducing these new institutions, reformer 
failed to dismantle old structures. The coexistence of new and old corporate bodies is 
a distinctive feature of China’s process of institutional transformation (Garnaut et al. 
2005:128; Hua et al. 2006:405; Schipani/Liu 2001:18; Nee et al. 2007:28). The old 
corporate body is represented by the old three committees (老三会) including the 
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labour union, the employee representative committee and the Communist party 
committee. It now exists side by side with new corporate bodies. Central enterprise 
managers are deeply embedded in the overall system of patronage25 that is the essence 
of Communist party rule in China (Naugthon 2008). According to Chinese managers 
of SOEs, more than 50 per cent believe that the relationship between these two 
institutions is still characterised by contradictions (China Enterprise Federation 2001) 
which are not compatible (Renminribao 2003). Recently the SASAC (2008) even 
posed the question that under the assumption that most party committee members 
assume top management positions in large state-owned enterprises (thereby 
combining the position of a party member and a director in the company); would it 
not implicate insider control? The same ambiguity is observed for the recruitment of 
outside directors in state-owned enterprises, which should be independent by 
definition. As party committee members are still present in Chinese enterprises, their 
independence is questionable.  
 
The relationship between the old and the new three committees in Chinese enterprises 
has been widely debated in Chinese literature (Liu Xiang-guo 2006; Tang You-Yuan 
2006; Wang Tianyun 2007). One commentator argues that Chinese SOEs are covered 
on the outside with a new mantle, but from the inside the content remains the same 
(新瓶装旧酒) (Tang You-Yuan 2006). Going a step further, the Chinese debate is in 
fact concerned with the co-existence of state-socialist institutions with new market 
institutions. The legacy of the planned economy is characterised by an environment 
of weak economic institutions in which existing state-socialist institutions are still 
playing a significant role. 
 
Under the old corporate bodies, SOEs were regarded as production centres of the 
government whose main task was to fulfil the production plans of the state bureaus. 
They were not compelled to focus on profit-maximisation. SOEs managers’ 
performance was measured on the fulfilment of the production plans and not against 
resonance to the market situation. In actual fact, SOEs managers were more 
government cadres than professional managers. The introduction of new corporate 
bodies responds to the demand of the capital market and foreign investors. The goal, 
 
25 Informal institutions are heritage of Chinese culture that is based on traditional culture, personal networks, 
clientelism, patronage, corruption and clan organisation.  
                                                                                                                                                          54 
which is also heavily supported by the government, is to turn Chinese SOEs into 
more successful and more attractive companies. This can only be achieved if 
excessive governmental control is eliminated and if management is effectively held 
accountable for performance.  
 
In economic terms, the institution of the old three committees can be translated into a 
state-oriented approach26, whereas the new institution of the three corporate bodies 
refers to a shareholder-oriented approach. Liu Xiangguo (2006) states that in 
reformed state-owned enterprises the party committee still assumes a leadership role 
over the employee representative meeting and the labour union. Furthermore, since 
party committee members entered the board of directors, most of the time party 
committee members make company-related strategic decisions and exercise control 
over the company’s management. This kind of disambiguity is a throw-back to the so-
called concurrent system (兼任制) in state-owned enterprises, where top enterprise 
managers were required to act both as party secretaries and factory directors or chairs 
of the board of directors (You 1998). The overlap between the old and new corporate 
bodies provides a channel for political influence on corporate governance (Garnaut et 
al. 2005:128). On the one hand, there are the old values of tradition, conformity and 
collective spirit. On the other hand, there are the new values of transparency, 
openness, individuality and competition. 
2.5.2 Empirical Evidence for Institutional Change in Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises 
In order to approach the debate in an empirical way, data for the Top 20 Chinese 
companies from the latest publication of the Fortune 2010 was used (Fortune 2010), 
which includes the annual reports and websites of the enterprises. Enterprises are 
chosen based on the ranking of the Top 20 Chinese companies according to Fortune 
2010. For the following test, the following variables are relevant: dominant state-
 
26 Party influence can be observed from the Communist Party Committee. Since the amendment of the Trade Union 
Law in 2001, trade unions are in charge of the core duties of a union, and are not protected by the state anymore. 
The state has withdrawn from management activities and rather supports management decisions. Anyway, unions 
have on the one hand to remain loyal to the Communist party and on the other hand respond to economic 
development (Heuer 2005). Additionally, they need to respond to the needs and requirements of their membership – 
especially in areas where the state has withdrawn its activities. Since the introduction of the contract responsibility 
system, the Employee Representative Meeting obtains a consultative role, and does not have much relevance. The 
influencing power remains with the Communist Party Committee, which holds control over the appointment and 
removal of relevant managers, the CEO of the board, and strategic decision-making (Liu Xiangguo 2006).  
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ownership, operating and cash flow result and corporatisation on the Chinese capital 
market. Taking the Top 20 Chinese companies from the latest publication of the 
Fortune 2010 listing of the World’s largest 500 companies27, the corporate structure 
and the relationship between the Top Management and the Chinese Communist Party 
and central government is analysed. Concerning the companies mentioned above, 19 
out of 20 are clearly state-owned enterprises. Nearly 90 per cent out of the nineteen 
are based in Beijing, followed by Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou. The results 
prove that 80 per cent of the board of director members are also party members. 
Furthermore 48 per cent of the board of director members, in particular the chief 
executive officer of state-owned companies, hold a post as a party secretary in the 
Communist Party. Their curriculum vitae show that most of the CEO’s have spent 
their professional lives working in the private and public sectors. The survey also 
reveals that 53 per cent of the board of director members were working in public 
services before such as ministries, governmental departments and local bureaus. The 
typical professional career of a CEO of a state-owned enterprise involves party 
membership and work experience in the public sector. The combination of these two 
factors is the basis for networking which entails access to informal channels, 
information and resources.  
 
The institutional shift has lead to the coexistence of two systems and proves to be 
much more complex than it was expected as the degree of duties, influence and 
decision-making power of each corporate body has not been clarified until now. The 
new corporate bodies are inhibited from carrying out their predetermined duties and 
therefore their efficiency has to be put into question. The co-existence of the old three 
committees (老三会) and the new three committees (新三会) in Chinese listed 
companies (Liu Xiang-guo 2006; Tang You-Yuan 2006; Wang Tianyun 2007) can be 
regarded as a unique feature of corporate governance in China and characterises the 
system of a hybrid economy. Thereby the Communist Party is creating an 
environment for its stakeholder position; they would not necessarily have in the role 
of the shareholder. The old corporate actors remain powerful in most of the SOEs and 
continue to play an influential role, which does not necessarily involve disadvantages 
for such a company. The informal, relation-based-structures (guanxi network) have a 
 
27 For a detailed analysis of China’s Top 20 companies in 2010 see Chapter 3. 
                                                                                                                                                          56 
long tradition in China and have proven to be very efficient for certain interest groups. 
As far as it concerns the state-oriented approach, informal institutions are rather 
important. In contrast, the shareholder-oriented approach relies on the establishment 
of formal institutions. Certainly one may argue that informal networks are also 
omnipresent in Western enterprises outside of institutional systems. However, the 
significant difference to Western countries lies in the obstacles of enforcement of the 
rule by law in China. Clarke (2007) argues that despite the magnificent growth in the 
scale of economic activity since 1995, litigation comparatively falls behind and does 
not show any progress. Liebman (2007) states that the role of Chinese courts has 
reached a point where it is rather contested than trusted.  
 
Due to well-working informal relationships and networks, newly introduced formal 
institutions within Chinese companies cannot become effective, and are restricted in 
their scope of activity, rather than being supported and protected. The thesis argues 
that because of well working informal networks, formal institutions have only limited 
impact on enterprises. These political and administrative networks inside companies 
are very complex and multilayered. In addition, regulatory frameworks are difficult to 
put into practice as the legal and judiciary framework in China is still weak and is 
lacking in assertiveness. In other words, the enactment of laws and regulations are 
insufficient as long as their enforcement mechanisms do not work. 
 
Knowing these facts combined with historical and socio-political factors of Chinese 
circumstances of poor quality legal and regulatory institutions, it explains why people 
learned in the past to rely rather on interpersonal relationships than on formal 
institutions. Taking into account the low maturity of the rule of law, claims on the 
protection of the law are characterised by uncertainty with business people relying 
heavily on the social mechanism which is coordinating individual behaviour 
(Hendrischke 2007). Guanxi networks’ crucial role is mostly caused by historical 
factors, as given the unstable environment in China enterprises were compelled to 
build up stable and reliant networks with all government levels. The role of guanxi 
networks changed over the time, since in the past traditional informal relations were 
rather describing personal and family-related networks, whereas today they are 
related to business. Guanxi networking is important to safeguard better access to 
scarce resources and an adequate supply of the necessary resources for the companies. 
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Furthermore networking is regarded as a guarantor of reliable firm performance 
because it allows firms to internalise market transactions and establish networks of 
value-creating relationships, including those with governments. 
 
Additionally, in the course of the economic reforms, these administrative and political 
networks have not been eliminated. However, the new corporate governance bodies 
cannot act independently and the persistence of relation-based structures have to a 
certain degree had a negative effect on corporate governance reform in the long run. 
Assuming that members of these administrative-political networks are determined to 
protect their own interests, the resulting tension between shareholders and political 
elites creates a negative effect on the efficiency of the company. The guanxi (关系) 
network is present and will continue to be a distinguishing mark of Chinese business 
and economic environment in the near future. Informal institutions and guanxi 
networks are likely to reduce transaction costs and behavioural uncertainty during 
transactions. Guanxi network is regarded as a form of social network given that 
guanxi is a form of social capital and therefore guanxi practices are social exchanges 
(Peng/Luo 2000; Fu et al. 2006; Warren et al. 2004; Millington et al. 2005). As long 
as formal boundaries are not specified between old and new institutions, political 
influence and networking will prevail.  
 
The conclusion is that internal corporate governance in Chinese corporations 
promotes and protects the economic position of the state and the Communist Party, 
which is regarded as the most sustainable form of corporate governance. The state 
and the Communist Party protect their interests by formal and informal means in 
order to influence and control corporate behaviour. The Communist Party does not 
only have economic interests in corporations, like shareholders do, but also political 
and social interests in addition to economic interests. By building-up a socialist 
harmonious society (和谐社会), the Chinese Communist Party is aware that the 
focus should be shifted from strong economic growth to promoting social security in 
the country. The Communist Party is aware of the need to respond to the social 
concerns from the general public, such as employment, healthcare reform, social 
security and affordable housing. On the other hand, the government is responding to 
the public through means of anti-corruption campaigns and by committing itself to be 
                                                                                                                                                          58 
more transparent in policymaking (Xinhuanet 2007). Chinese corporations are 
governed by the state to meet in first place the interests of the controlling shareholder 
state, and in second place the interests of international standards and international 
investors. Government bureaus usually primarily pursue the maximisation of a firm’s 
value. The government being a shareholder, has a stake in the company, and wants its 
interests to be protected in a way that preserves resources. Despite ongoing efforts to 
strengthen new corporate institutions within Chinese state-owned enterprises by 
implementing international standards, deep rooted historical and institutional criteria 
continue to be active. The result is that old and new institutions coexist side by side, 
causing tension between the two. The survival of elements of the old institutions 
relies strongly on their flexibility to adapt to the demands of the dynamically 
changing environment. This standing is intended in order to maintain the traditional 
relationship and cooperation between the state, the Communist Party and enterprises. 
From the perspective of the ruling elite, these mutually supportive relations between 
the state and enterprises and between the Communist Party and enterprises 
respectively, based on an old institutional framework which functioned well to a 
certain degree during the Maoistic phase, requires a new organisational culture 
between state and economy. The view of the ruling elite whereupon the dysfunctions 
in the system have resulted in the decision of the economic reforms and opening up in 
1978. 
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Figure 2: The three old committee and three new committee
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2.6 Conclusion 
The reorganisation of state-owned enterprises aims to separate enterprises from the 
government (政企分开). The government is tending towards withdrawing from the 
economy and allowing market forces to become more effective. Under the centrally 
planned system, the management of an enterprise possessed hardly any specific 
control rights, as branch ministries and bureaus of the government kept specific and 
residual control (Qian 1996:5). In the framework of the enterprise and corporate 
governance reform, control rights are shifted towards the management of the 
companies. Corporate governance elements have been implemented within 
enterprises, without dismantling traditional state institutions. With the Company Law 
(1994), new corporate bodies were introduced to Chinese enterprises, such as the 
board of directors, shareholders meeting and supervisory board. Now these new 
corporate bodies coexist next to socialist state institutions. From the internal corporate 
governance perspective, the relationship between the state and state-owned 
enterprises changed insofar as socialist state institutions do not possess monopoly 
control rights anymore. Socialist state institutions now have less scope left for direct 
interference and have to share control rights with the new corporate bodies. The 
coexistence is intended in order to maintain the traditional relationship and 
cooperation between the state and enterprises and between the Communist Party and 
enterprises respectively. 
 
Nonetheless, state and Communist Party intervention still persists in Chinese listed 
enterprises. Therefore, the management does not only serve the shareholder’s interest, 
which is the state, but also the Communist Party’s interest. So, traditional supportive 
relations between enterprises and the Communist Party are preserved. The 
Communist Party maintains direct control and power through their participation in the 
new corporate bodies as members of the board of directors. This is possible as 
Communist Party members of the party committee now fill the positions of chief 
executive officer or director. The state maintains control over strategic decisions by 
being supplier of financial sources as the controlling shareholder. By approving or 
withholding funds, the state can directly interfere into the decision making process of 
the board of directors. Both the Communist Party as well as government influence 
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companies’ decision in important areas such as the nomination of top management, 
executive assessment and compensation, asset acquisitions and divestments and 
annual budgets. They also possess a voice in the operation of the business.  
 
This thesis shows that the CEO of a Chinese company fulfils three different roles, 
being the key representative of the corporation. Today the task of a Chinese CEO is to 
encompass differing interests which contains (1) the needs of the company and the 
employees, (2) political objectives and (3) the need to respond to shareholder and 
market requirements. By responding to the needs of the company and the employees, 
the CEO is taking over a father role. He is interested in transforming the company 
into a global player which can sustain its position in the national and international 
market. By responding to the needs of the Communist Party, being a party member, 
the CEO is charged with considering the social objectives of the Communist Party 
such as a low unemployment rate 28 . Social objectives have been added to the 
economic reform process under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Under the leadership of 
Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, the policy programme was a commitment towards 
encouraging economic progress only and neglecting social objectives. Given that 
China was officially at the primary stage of socialism, the view was held that 
economic progress would automatically contribute towards solving social problems. 
Therefore the Communist Party’s prior objective was to adapt national policies in a 
way in which it could optimise market conditions. Under the leadership of Hu Jintao 
and Wen Jiabao, the attitude changed significantly, especially in the light of the 
increasing level of social tension and unrest in the country. With the introduction of 
the current official guiding socio-economic ideology of the scientific development 
concept (科学发展观), the Communist Party incorporates sustainable development, 
social welfare, a person-centred society and increased democracy with the aim of the 
creating a harmonious society (和谐社会). This approach responds to the country’s 
increasing instability and social problems, such as employment, healthcare reform, 
social security and affordable housing. By building-up a socialist harmonious society 
(和谐社会), the Chinese Communist Party is aware that the focus should be shifted 
from strong economic growth to promoting social security in the country. Social 
 
28At the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao declared employment as one of the 
important measures to improve the people's livelihood. Other social objectives declared by the Communist Party of 
China are people’s rights to education, medical and old-age care, and housing (Xinhuanet 2007). 
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issues have been brought to the attention of the Communist Party and have been 
discussed (Xinhuanet 2007). Thereby the Communist Party is taking on a mediator 
role between differing voices coming from the grassroots level, with the mutual aim 
of the realisation of a harmonious society. In actual fact, the Communist Party still 
articulates economic goals, such as the optimisation of economic structures and of 
economic returns.29 Due to the two reasons mentioned above, the CEO is subject to 
major constraints that a CEO in a Western company does not have to deal with. By 
acting as a corporate manager, the CEO has to respond to the requirements of the 
shareholder and the market. The shareholder, which in the Chinese case is the state, 
demands high dividends, and high performance management, cash flow management 
and risk management, which involve cost reduction and restructuring programs. 
These profit-maximising targets are in contrast to the social objectives of the 
Communist Party. In the domestic market, state-owned enterprises still have a 
monopoly and therefore work in a protected market due to government regulations. In 
international markets, companies are exposed to market forces, global competition 
and dynamic environment changes. 
Three roles of Chinese CEO in SOE 
Role  1. CEO/ Chairman  2. CPC member 3. Corporate Manager 
Task Respond to the needs of the 
company and the 
employees  
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Corporate governance  
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Global 
Orientation Efficiency- and value 
orientation 
Value orientation Efficiency- and transparency 
orientation 
Figure 3: Three roles of Chinese CEO in state-owned enterprises 
 
29 At the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao stated that China’s goal is to quadruple 
the per capita value of GDP by 2020 and complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects 
(Xinhuanet 2007). 
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China’s largest state-owned enterprises have shown strong efforts towards competing 
in the global market scene, with the aim of increasing market expansion, acquiring 
foreign technology and innovation and safeguarding resources. Recent examples of 
large-scale Chinese acquisitions abroad prove this tendency, e.g.; Lenovo’s 
acquisition of IBM’ PC business in 2004 and the takeover of the appliance 
manufacturer Maytag by China's largest home appliance maker Haier in 2005. The 
Chinese government encourages large enterprises in particular through the initiative 
Chinese Companies Going Global to expand overseas. Large state-owned enterprises 
are encouraged to acquire overseas companies, becoming multi-national companies 
by integrating them into a single corporate global brand name. Moreover, oversee 
acquisitions support the exigency of safeguarding natural resources in the long run. 
 
For the CEO of a Chinese listed company it is quite challenging to align the 
Communist party’s social objectives with the political objectives of the government 
and the economic objectives of the shareholders, whilst at the same time being 
responsible for the company and the employees. It is difficult for the board of 
directors to maintain managerial independence, while trying to respond to differing 
interest groups. On the one hand, business operations are supposed to be free from 
interference from any organisations and individuals. On the other hand, corporate 
management relies on guidance and direction from the party and the controlling 
shareholder. Due to this complexity and sensitivity the implementation of good 
corporate governance combined with transparency and efficiency is hard to achieve. 
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3 Restructuring of the Chinese State-Owned Sector  
The modernisation of enterprises and associated market institutions started over a 
quarter of a century ago, with the aim of strengthening and increasing the growth and 
efficiency of the national economy. However, for reasons explained and outlined 
below, the enterprise reform cannot be seen as an isolated reform, but is instead 
directly associated with the reform of the banking sector, capital market and the 
implementation of a nationwide social security system30.  
3.1 External Corporate Governance and Institutional Change in 
State-Owned Enterprises 
Since the early 1950’s Chinese SOEs are an integral part of the Chinese economy. 
Under the command economy, their main function was to provide revenue as source 
of general funds to the Chinese government. Many Chinese SOEs, similar to their 
European state-owned counterparts in former communist countries were formerly 
private companies which were nationalised following the Communist revolution 
(World Bank 1997). Nowadays, it is not only the central government that has a stake 
in Chinese state-owned enterprises, but also provincial and local governments. Before 
the reforms, SOEs represented the dominant economic force in the country in terms 
of their contribution to industrial output.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 Related concerns also include the establishment of an appropriate judiciary system, encouraging a competitive 
environment and training of managers.  
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Year Number of  
industrial 
enterprises  
(unit) 
Number of  state-
owned and state-
holding industrial 
enterprises  (unit) 
Share of state-owned 
and state-holding 
industrial enterprises 
in total industry in % 
Share of industry output 
of state-owned and state-
holding industrial 
enterprises in total 
industry in % 
          
1998 165.080 64.737 39% 50% 
1999 162.033 61.301 38% 49% 
2000 162.885 53.489 33% 47% 
2001 171.256 46.767 27% 44% 
2002 181.557 41.125 23% 41% 
2003 196.222 34.280 17% 38% 
2004 276.474 35.597 13% 35% 
2005 271.835 27.477 10% 33% 
2006 301.961 24.961 8% 31% 
2007 336.768 20.680 6% 30% 
          
Table 1: State-owned industrial enterprises (1998-2007) 
Source: Calculated from China Statistical Yearbook 2008 
 
In the recent years the number of state-owned industrial units decreased substantially 
(see table 1). The total number of SOEs has been reduced by means of change in 
ownership, bankruptcies and divesting. Additionally, two reasons can be identified 
for this trend since 1998. First, the number of firms classified as SOE decreased in the 
last years. According to Chinese statistical classification an enterprise is categorised 
as a SOE if the state ownership share is more than 51 per cent and annual sales are 
more than RMB 5 million31. Secondly, changes in ownership forms transformed 
SOEs into corporations.  
 
In China, enterprise classification involves four main types of ownership and can be 
distinguished as followed: state-owned enterprises (SOE), collectively-owned 
enterprises (COE), privately-owned enterprises (POE) (including former township 
and village enterprise; TVE), and foreign-owned enterprises (FOE) (units with funds 
from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and other foreign funded units). All enterprises 
are required to register their ownership type with the State Administration of Industry 
and Commerce (SAIC 1998).  
 
31 Data for Chinese state-owned industrial enterprises, available in China Statistical Yearbook, includes only those 
with state ownership share more than 51 per cent and annual sales income of over five million RMB. Small state-
owned industrial enterprises are excluded.  
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The size of the state sector is different in terms of asset-ownership, which has settled 
at approximately 45 per cent (see table 2), whereas investment in fixed assets has 
remained the same for twenty years (see table 3).  
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Year  Total assets 
of 
industrial 
enterprises 
Total assets 
of state-
owned and 
state 
shareholding 
industrial 
enterprises 
Total assets of 
private 
industrial 
enterprises 
Total assets of 
industrial 
enterprises with 
Hong Kong, 
Macao and 
Taiwan and 
foreign funds 
Total assets of 
other *) 
industrial 
enterprises  
Share of state-
owned and 
shareholding 
industrial 
enterprises in 
total assets in 
% 
Share of 
private 
industrial 
enterprises in 
total assets in 
% 
Share of 
industrial 
enterprises 
with Hong 
Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan 
and foreign 
funds in total 
assets in % 
Share of 
other*) 
industrial 
enterprises in 
total assets in 
%   
 
(in RMB 100 
million) 
                  
1998 108.822 74.916 1.487 21.327 11.092  69 1 20 10 
1999 116.969 80.472 2.289 23.019 11.189  69 2 20 10 
2000 126.211 84.015 3.874 25.714 12.608  67 3 20 10 
2001 135.402 87.902 5.902 28.354 13.245  65 4 21 10 
2002 146.218 89.095 8.760 31.514 16.850  61 6 22 12 
2003 168.808 94.520 14.525 39.260 20.502  56 9 23 12 
2004 215.358 109.708 23.725 55.602 26.323  51 11 26 12 
2005 244.784 117.630 30.325 64.308 32.521  48 12 26 13 
2006 291.215 135.153 40.515 77.109 38.438  46 14 26 13 
2007 353.037 158.188 53.305 96.367 45.178  45 15 27 13 
*) Collective-owned Enterprises, Cooperative Enterprises, Joint Ownership 
Enterprises 
           
Table 2: Total assets of industrial enterprises (1998-2007) 
Source: Calculated from China Statistical Yearbook 2008 
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Table 3: Percentage of investment in fixed assets by different economic units (1987-2007) 
Source: Calculated from China Statistical Yearbook 2008
Economic Unit 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
              
State-owned units  63% 61% 61% 65% 66% 67% 61% 56% 54% 52% 52% 
Collective-owned units 15% 16% 14% 12% 13% 17% 18% 16% 16% 16% 15% 
Private-owned units 22% 23% 25% 23% 21% 16% 12% 12% 13% 14% 14% 
Joint Ownership units        1% 1% 1% 0% 
Share Holding units       2% 4% 4% 5% 6% 
Foreign Funded units       4% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Units with Funds from Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan 
      2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 
Other       1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
                        
Economic Unit 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005 2006 2007 
              
State-owned units  54% 53% 50% 47% 43% 39% 36% 33% 33% 30% 28% 
Collective-owned units 15% 15% 15% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 4% 4% 
Private-owned units 13% 14% 14% 15% 15% 14% 14% 16% 16% 22% 24% 
Joint Ownership units 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Share Holding units 7% 8% 12% 15% 19% 23% 25% 27% 27% 31% 31% 
Foreign Funded units 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 5% 
Units with Funds from Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan 
5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
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According to theory, in a perfectly competitive market, capital is allocated with the 
aim of maximising returns within a limited timeframe. In China the capital allocation 
mechanism is not necessarily subject to profit maximisation. Table 3 illustrates that 
the proportion of investment in fixed assets remained more or less the same from 
1987-2007. In 1987, for the non-state sector, investment in fixed assets accounted for 
37 per cent of total investment, in 2007 it was 40 per cent. The investment share of 
the non-state sector was always above one-third of total investment during this period. 
In 1987 state sector investment in fixed assets accounted for 63 per cent of total 
investment, in 2007 it was 60 per cent. The state-sector has a continuing investment 
share of two-thirds in fixed assets over time. The state sector is comprised of state-
owned units and share-holding units, since former state-owned enterprises have been 
turned into share-holding enterprises over the last number years. This process allowed 
the companies to get listed on the stock market, without running the risk that the state 
might lose control over assets. The sudden increase of the proportion of capital 
investment to state-owned units by 10 per cent to 54 per cent in 1995 can be 
explained by an incremental shift of capital investment to share-holding units. 
Therefore the increase of the proportion of investment in fixed assets of share-holding 
units from 0 in 1992 to 31 per cent in 2007 is the logical consequence of the ongoing 
corporatisation process. Hence, the state remains as the main contributor of 
investment in fixed assets with a dominant portion of 60 per cent in 2007. According 
to this development, the capital allocation mechanism is not assumed to be employed 
according to efficiency reasoning. Under the assumption that the non state-sector is 
much more driven to maximise profit and investment decisions are related to return 
on investment; the non state-sector does not have any impact on the allocation 
mechanism.  
 
SOE share of industry output in the total industry has shrunk significantly, reform of 
Chinese SOE plays an integral role in Chinese economy. Former president Jiang 
Zemin (People’s Daily 2002) said that “the reform of state-owned enterprises in 
China will remain the central task of the economic restructuring.” The State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the supervisory body 
of state assets (China Daily 2004a), confirms that state-owned enterprise reform is at 
the core of the entire economic reform in China. Justin Yifu Lin (2005), chief 
economist at the World Bank, addresses that “China’s transition towards a market 
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economy depends on a final solution to the viability problem of firms in the 
traditional sectors. Since the viability problem is not yet solved, the Chinese 
government has been required to continue its interventions in markets in order to 
protect/subsidize the nonviable firms and the interventions come with consequences.” 
The IMF (2003) critically notes that “recent reforms have resulted in some efficiency 
gains but have been unable to substantially improve corporate governance and impose 
financial discipline, especially in the large SOEs.” SOEs still maintain a dominant 
position in China’s key industrial economy. In March 1989 the State Council 
implemented the first industrial policy guideline. The reform of state-owned 
enterprises in China was introduced during the 4th plenary session of the 15th 
Congress of the Communist Party of China by the passing of the “Decision of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Questions of the 
State-owned Enterprise Reform and Development” (People’s Daily 1999).  
 
China’s policy makers are determined to preserve important national assets and not to 
lose them to foreign investors, especially when it comes to the highly political 
question of the future of state-owned enterprises. Defined state enterprises represent 
the mainstay of China’s economy and the central government retains control of key 
industries. In 2006, the State Council released an explicit policy paper in which it 
outlined the strategically important sectors over which the state must maintain 
absolute control. The definition of what exactly these strategically important sectors 
were had been vague before. The chair of the SASAC, Li Rongrong, said that “the 
state should solely own, or have a majority share in, enterprises engaged in power 
generation and distribution, oil, petrochemicals and natural gas, telecommunications 
and armaments. The State must also have a controlling stake in the coal, aviation and 
shipping industries. Furthermore, reform and restructuring should be accelerated in 
SOEs engaged in the downstream petrochemical sector and in value-added telecom 
services, to allow injection of private or foreign capital. Central SOEs32 should also 
become heavyweights in sectors including machinery, automobiles, IT, construction, 
iron and steel and non-ferrous metals” (China Daily 2006). 
 
32 Since the founding of the SASAC (State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council) 
in 2003, a classification of central enterprises (中央企业) has been undertaken. Central enterprises are by definition, 
those enterprises regarded as key SOEs by the government. Key SOEs are main contributors to SOE profits and 
obtain about 25 per cent of SOE corporate investment. Key SOEs represent the foundation of China’s modern 
economy, nationally, as well as internationally.  
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By strategically formalising the key economic sectors, the government is committed 
to allocating capital to priority industries and to retreating from non-essential areas. 
Enterprises operating in these key sectors already rank among the most profitable in 
earnings and are the largest in size; i.e. tobacco, petroleum and natural gas, electric 
power and coal mining (see table 4). Key sectors in manufacturing include steel, 
chemicals and machinery. Key infrastructure sectors are banking, telecommunication 
and distribution. These industries are not only highly protected by the central 
government and party officials, but are also containing the vested interests of local 
institutions and officials. It is worth mentioning that the state is the main provider of 
infrastructure in China. These companies produce products and services which are 
necessary for further infrastructure development in backward regions of China. Due 
to the global economic crisis and the impact it is having on the Chinese economy, and 
since GDP growth is not double-digit anymore, the Chinese government issued a 
number of measures to boost industry’s and the public’s confidence in the Chinese 
economy. The most significant of these was a USD 586 billion (RMB 4 trillion) 
stimulus package and subsequent revitalisation plans for key industries 
(Businessweek 2009). Further government infrastructure spending reduces the 
dependence on external global markets and on export.  
 
 
Table 4: Industries with the highest degree of state-control 
Source: OECD (2010:114) 
 
By defining the area of state ownership in such a precise way, the government has 
openly declared which key sectors will be excluded, or severely limited to, foreign 
investors, in their allowable percentage of share acquisition. Key industries are also 
protected against hostile takeovers. Protection of key industries is also observed in 
Western countries. Measures taken to protect domestic enterprises from being 
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acquired by undesirable foreign investors have been observed in Germany 
(Businessweek 2007), as well as Russia (BBC News 2006) and France (Spiegel 2008). 
In Germany, policy makers have chosen not to define which industries are regarded 
as being strategically important, instead, the economics minister decides on a case-
by-case basis (Businessweek 2007). The Chinese government also defined the 
automotive and IT sector as key sectors in which it is trying to obtain a controlling 
stake. The same is observed in France where the state plays a strong role in car 
manufacturer Renault and France Telecom.  
 
The ongoing classification of several key industries in the national economy has 
already proven to be successful. For empirical relevance the data for the Top 20 
Chinese companies from the latest publication of the Fortune 2010 (table 5) was used, 
which proves that in an international environment Chinese restructured enterprises are 
competitive. According to the latest Fortune 2010 publication which lists the world’s 
largest 500 corporations, five Chinese companies rank among the world’s largest 100 
enterprises. The five companies are Sinopec (petroleum refining) with revenue of 
USD 187.5 billion, State Grid (utilities) with USD 184.5 billion, China National 
Petroleum (petroleum refining) with revenue of USD 165.5 billion, China Mobile 
Communications (telecommunication) with revenue of USD 71.7 billion and 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (banking) with revenue of USD 69.3 billion. 
According to the ranking, state-owned companies dominate the list, occupying 
nineteen enterprises out of twenty. The largest private company on the list, the Hong 
Kong trading company Noble Group, came in nineteenth, though its revenues rose to 
USD 31.2 billion (Fortune 2010). The Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, 
which is the largest of China's Big Four state-owned commercial banks, provided the 
largest initial public offering worldwide33, raising a record breaking  USD 21.9 billion 
in October 2006. As China's biggest bank by revenue and Asia's most profitable bank, 
with profits of USD 18.8 billion in 2009, it came in fifth on the 2010 Fortune list 
(Fortune 2010). In the following section the reform of state-owned enterprises will be 
analysed. 
 
 
33 The IPO of ICBC exceeded the current record holder, a USD 18.4 billion initial public offering by NTT DoCoMo 
of Japan in 1998. 
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2009 
National 
Rank  
2009 
Global 
Rank  
Company Revenues 
($ millions)1 
Profits 
($ millions)1 
Number of  
Employees 
  
Location  
Industry 
1 7 Sinpoec - China Petroleum & Chemical 187,518 5,756 633.383 Beijing Petroleum Refining 
2 8 State Grid 184,496 -343 1.533.800 Beijing Utilities 
3 10 China National Petroleum 165,496 10,273 1.649.992 Beijing Petroleum Refining 
4 77 China Mobile Communications 71,749 11,656 228.437 Beijing Telecommunications 
5    87 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 69,295 18,832 389.827 Beijing Banking 
6 116 China Construction Bank 58,361 15,628 301.537 Beijing Banking 
7 118 China Life Insurance  57,019 3,125 119.332 Beijing Insurance 
8 133 China Railway Construction 52,044 960 235.387 Beijing Engineering, Construction 
9 137 China Railway Group 50,704 1,008 276.150 Beijing Engineering, Construction 
10 141 Agricultural Bank of China 49,742 9,514 441.144 Beijing Banking 
11 143 Bank of China 49,682 11,868 262.566 Beijing Banking 
12 156 China Southern Power Grid 45,735 251 303.184 Guanzhou Utilities 
13 182 Dongfeng Motors 39,402 720 143.792 Wuhan Automotives 
14 187 China State Construction Engeneering 38,117 839 111.587 Beijing Engineering, Construction 
15 203  Sinochem  35,577 659 44.256 Bejing Trading  
16 204 China Telecommunications 35,557 581 495.239 Beijing Telecommunications 
17 223 Shanghai Automotives 33,629 1,070 69.931 Shanghai Automotives 
18 224 China Communications Construction 33,465 704 106.150 Beijing Engineering, Construction 
19 242 Noble Group (Hong Kong) 31,183 556 4.900 Honkong Trading 
20 252 China National Offshore Oil 30,680 3,634 65.800 Beijing Mining, Crude-oil production 
Notes:         
                     1 All dollar values were converted using the 31.12.2009 exchange rate of RMB 6,828 per US dollar.   
                     2 Market value is based on all shares outstanding, including those held by the government.    
Table 5: China's Top 20 companies 2010 (ranked by 2009 revenues) 
Source: Fortune (2010) 
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3.1.1 Institutional Change despite Path Dependence 
This thesis applies new institutional economics, as principal agent theory, transaction 
costs theory and property rights theory represent the supporting theoretical pillars of a 
corporate governance system. All three elements refer to the discipline of new 
institutional economics, and are leading approaches in respect to the analysis of 
organisations in economics. For China, the concept of new institutional economics is 
applied in regard to institutional system change under economic transformation. 
Economic reforms in China are characterised by path dependence (North 1990). The 
legacy old institutions from the centrally planned economy, results in the coexistence 
of old and new institutions in the transformation economy. Due to path dependency, 
this situation leads to an inconsistency within the institutional framework and 
hampers the transition process to a market economy. Institutional reforms in China 
are delayed and are to a certain degree suboptimal due to informal institutional 
arrangements, which have an active interest in the preservation of restrictions and are 
characterised as being reform-reluctant. These institutional arrangements can 
influence institutional change to a certain extent by influencing the degree of change 
of rules within transformation. The exertion on influence against widespread reforms 
is possible as the Communist Party holds its position in the long term and policies can 
be designed, independent from democratic elections. As already outlined above, the 
reform process in the state-owned sector led to substantial gains in the economic 
sector, and not to losses. Macroeconomic expenses of the transformation process arise 
from vested interests, which want to safeguard their position by means of reform 
blockades.  Economic reforms have not been carried out with a political reform, but 
the political system changed to being characterised as federalism, Chinese style 
(Montinola/Qian/Weingast 1995; Krug et al. 2005; Krug/Hendrischke 2008; Hauff 
2002). Regarding federalism as an institution, power devolves from the central to the 
local levels, which leads to interjurisdictional competition and authority 
decentralisation over public goods with varying levels of government. In general, 
federalism theory assumes benevolent governments at all levels (Qian/Weingast 
2005).34 Further research focuses on fiscal federalism in China (Qian/Weingast 1997, 
2005). Krug and Hendrischke (2008) argue that new institutional structures in China 
 
34 The opposite approach from the benevolent government is the Leviathan government (Buchanan 1975). 
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are emerging due to entrepreneurship and networks, which are choosing 
organisational forms and investing in organisational capabilities.  
 
The new institutional economics approach is applied as an analysis tool in order to 
find an explanation for the ongoing transformation process in China, combined with 
the restructuring of the state-owned sector. The following chapters attempt to align 
the economic analysis of the external corporate governance framework with the 
examination of Chinese cultural specific features. Generally speaking, a 
transformation process in an economic system allows the substitution of certain 
arrangements such as hierarchy versus market. The old system has been replaced by a 
new system. Finally, the transformation process should end in a functioning market 
economy (Bohnet 2006). By changing the coordination mechanism in the economy, 
differing influencing factors have to be adjusted such as the property rights regime, 
institutional rules and the principal-agent relationship. In addition hard budget 
constraints need to be introduced, and transaction costs have to be reduced. Finally, 
the system of governance has to be rearranged in the economy. According to the 
theory, all these adjustments lead to lower transaction costs (North 1997). A 
fundamental change in the governance system implies a change of the rules and 
institutions initiated by economic and political forces. Previously existing institutions 
will be removed to the advantage of new ones. The exchange of old institutions by 
new institutions for the coordination of market activities always generates transaction 
costs. Ideally, the new institutions should cause lower transactions costs than the old 
ones. Institutions evolve and shape arrangements in a dynamic and competitive 
environment, being divided into formal and informal institutions. North (1990) states 
“how and why institutions change incrementally and why even discontinuous changes 
are never completely discontinuous are the result of imbeddedness of informal 
constraints in societies”. Formal institutions involve institution creation, contracting, 
laws and regulations. Informal institutions involve behaviour, habits, unwritten 
customs and beliefs. Whereas formal institutions are codified rules and codes which 
are put down on paper, informal institutions base upon unwritten beliefs, customs, 
conventions and norms of behaviour. Consequently, imbedded informal institutions 
are much more reform-resistant than formal institutions. Institutions have several 
characteristics that influence behaviour; they (1) create incentives, (2) coordinate 
behaviour, (3) guide self-selection, (4) provide information on procedures, (5) allow 
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for causal attributions and (6) influence preferences related to intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation (Bohnet 2006). Knowing an economy’s culture and history helps in 
understanding the objectives and preferences of the agents which are part of networks. 
In fact, wealth distribution arises from the rules which are defined by these 
institutions. Therefore, institutional change is always subject to lock-in effects and 
path dependence (North 1990). China’s economic reforms are path dependent, and 
decision makers are locked into this certain path, even though past circumstances may 
no longer be relevant or another alternative would have been better. History and 
tradition plays an important role in path dependence, as historical preconditions have 
an impact on the path chosen. North (1990) argues that a change in the path is 
possible but entails high transaction costs. Therefore the coexistence of institutional 
systems with differing efficiency levels is the norm. In the Chinese case, the 
coexistence of socialistic and market-based institutions indicates that gradual reform 
efforts mostly result in partial reforms. North (1990) further argues that gradual 
reforms are mainly triggered by individuals and organisations, which are determined 
by vested interests. Hereby institutional change is a product of vested interests and 
competition among the organisations. These partial reforms do not necessarily 
produce more economic efficiency and transparency. Partial reforms are expected to 
generate rent-seeking opportunities arising from price differentials between the 
liberalised sectors of the economy and those still coordinated by nonmarket 
mechanisms (Murphy/Shleifer/Vishny 1992).  
 
In order to understand China’s reform of state-owned companies one must analyse 
China’s industrialisation process within a wider historical context. The 
industrialisation process was characterised by major national experiments to reconcile 
socialist revolutionary principles with industrial development to achieve organisation 
without bureaucracy. Under the leadership of Mao, the objective was to elaborate an 
industrialisation process. In China, already in the Maostic phase, reforms being in line 
with party policies are always carried out through the trial-and-error method; this is 
referred to by the Chinese as crossing the river by stepping on each of the stones. 
Major reform endeavours follow a three-step process. Starting on an experimental 
basis, pilot projects are conducted on local levels. Positive results are analysed and 
the lessons learned are further implemented in several provinces. The last step of the 
process includes identifying successful pilot projects and proposing them to the 
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central government with a catalogue of measures for nationwide implementation. 
Famous example are the TVEs (township and village enterprises), which were 
originally initiated by local governments. The special feature about TVEs is that they 
never operated in urban areas, and were never part of central planning (Walder/Oi 
1999). Other former communist countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Russia 
announced the big bang policy to transform the country rapidly into capitalism. 
Chinese reformers tended instead to embrace an evolutionary and gradual reform 
process, which saw measures for transition being carried out step by step, without 
consulting a grand plan for reform35. 
 
Chinese policymakers tackled the reform with remarkable determination by founding 
the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) in 2003. The SASAC is authorised by the State Council. Its defined task is 
to supervise and manage, on behalf of the state, state-owned assets and to advance the 
reform and restructuring of state-owned enterprises36. Aside from its central bureau, 
regional branches have been established to govern local enterprises. Furthermore the 
SASAC provides administrative support to domestic and foreign private investors 
purchasing these businesses. Following theoretical reasoning, SASAC has been 
established to function as an intermediary between the state and state-owned 
enterprises, according to the principle that the function of public administration shall 
be separated from the function of the owner. So far 128 central enterprises are under 
supervision of the central SASAC (SASAC 2010a), with the goal to cut the number 
of SOEs under its supervision to less than 100. At the same time, SASAC’s head Li 
Rongrong states that another objective of the streamlining process is to get 30 central 
enterprises ranked among the world's top 500 companies by 2015 at the latest 
(Xinhuanet 2007). 
3.1.2 Transformation related Agency Problems 
With the introduction of SOE reform, there was no intention to abolish state 
ownership, but rather to increase efficiency within state ownership (Zhang Weiying 
 
35 Qian (1999b:44) argues that that kind of comparison is inappropriate. Hungry, Poland and Soviet Union, as well 
as China went through a two-stage process: First reforming the planned system and then building the market system.  
36 Classification of Chinese SOEs into Central enterprises (中央企业) by name, and Key enterprises (国有重点企
业) by region and name are listed on the homepage of SASAC (SASAC 2010ab). 
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1999:15). The reform path chosen was through corporatisation, and definitely not 
through privatisation (Lin 2001; Walder 1995; Rawski 1994, 1999; Zhu 1999)37. The 
goal was that through corporatisation, SOEs management would be finally separated 
from the government. However, the government also apparently wants to retain a 
dominant shareholder position in large SOEs. There are three reasons that corroborate 
why China’s state-owned enterprise reform never pursued the privatisation policy as 
the primarily objective (Chunman 2000):  
 
? One is the functional reason. The state-owned enterprises are the material 
foundation of Chinese socialism. They play a dominant and crucial role in the 
national economy and do not only appear in situations where the market does 
not work.  
? The second is the number. The number of state-owned enterprises, the fields 
they cover, the capital scale they occupy and their proportion of the whole 
national economy is big in China compared to other countries.  
? Thirdly, because of the previous two reasons, the operation and development 
of China’s national economy largely depend on the vitality, adaptability and 
efficient development of the state-owned enterprises in the market economy. 
 
Measures taken towards corporatising the state sector mainly targeted the large-scale 
state-owned enterprises which the state declared as the backbone of the China’s 
national economy. Concerning this strategically important target group, the central 
state explicitly articulated strong and substantial interest in keeping state ownership. 
Corporatisation and restructuring are much more in line with China’s socialist legacy 
and therefore are more common than privatisation (Oi 2003:2). During the Ninth 
Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) the program of grasping the big and letting go of the 
small (抓大放小) was introduced, with the aim of retaining ownership of strategic 
control over large SOEs in key industries and infrastructure sectors and letting go 
small and medium SOEs by means of ownership change. Whereas large SOEs were 
transformed into corporations, a huge number of small and medium SOEs were 
privatised during that period. Oi (2003) argues that political constraints in China have 
resulted in significant corporatisation and restructuring but relatively little 
 
37 Privatization of SOEs was the prevailing pattern for the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the 
reform process.  
 79 
privatisation. Furthermore she observes that privatisation has taken place primarily 
within medium and small enterprises, while corporatisation and restructuring has 
taken place in large enterprises. The diversification of the ownership of small and 
medium SOEs has been driven by local governments, largely in response to the poor 
financial performance of firms under their control.   
 
In the context of SOEs reform, public ownership of state-owned companies was 
transferred from central government to local governments and from government to 
enterprises, families and private persons (Oi/Walder 1999). In other words, the 
decentralisation of public ownership was a top-down process, whereby the 
management of public assets is a bottom-up process. This path was chosen 
intentionally, with the aim of reducing inefficient bureaucracy by putting the 
responsibility over the success or failure of state-owned companies into local 
authorities’ hands, and withdrawing the central government’s responsibility. .  
 
The central government realised that inefficiency of state-owned companies derived 
primarily from the problem that ownership was carried out and controlled by 
bureaucrats working for government organisations. SOE reform was not aimed at 
triggering a privatisation process in the country, but at the restructuring of the SOEs 
through corporatisation and by separating enterprise management from government 
bureaus and political influence. Furthermore, it was necessary to turn SOEs into 
efficient and self–reliant enterprises. SOEs reform proceeded under the principle of 
decentralisation. From a managerial control perspective, SOEs were managed and 
organized like cost centres 38 , profit centres 39  or investment centres 40  after 1978 
 
38 The Standard Cost Centre: A standard cost centre is a production or operating unit in which someone other than 
the local manager determines the outputs that will be produced as well as the expected inputs required to produce 
each unit of output. Industrial engineers and cost accountants specify the quantity and price standards for the 
materials, labour, energy, and machine time required to produce each widget, the generic term for a manufactured 
good. The cost centre manager’s job is to produce the demanded quantity and mix of widgets in an efficient manner, 
as determined by the standard cost system. The performance of a cost centre manager is evaluated by a complex 
system of cost variances that compare actual to budgeted cost performance (Anthony/Govindarajan 2004).  
39 Profit Centre: Many operating unit managers have responsibility and authority for both production and sales. They 
make decisions about what products and services to produce, how to produce them, their quality level, price, sales 
and distribution systems. But these managers may not have the authority to determine the level of capital investment 
in their facilities. In these cases, operating profit may be the single best (short-term) performance measure for how 
well the managers are creating value from the resources the company has put at their disposal. Such a unit, in which 
the manager has almost complete operational decision-making responsibility and is evaluated by a straightforward 
profit measure, is called a profit centre (Anthony/Govindarajan 2004).  
40 Investment center: When a local manager has all the responsibilities described above as well as the responsibility 
and authority for his center’s working capital and physical assets. The performance of such a unit is best measured 
with a metric that relates profits earned to the level of physical and financial assets employed in the center 
(Anthony/Govindarajan 2004).  
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(Xiang 1998:111; Huang 2003:140; Qian 1996; Zhu 1999). This transformation was 
gradual, characterised by a higher degree of managerial autonomy and a separation of 
ownership and control. Thus, SOEs are working as decentralised organisation units 
and no longer as centrally administrated production units. The conversion of SOEs 
into profitable corporate entities took place predominantly in the form of limited 
liability companies and joint stock companies (Lin 2001; Zhang 2001:3).  
 
There are several reasons, why Chinese government designated corporatisation as the 
preferred path for further SOE reform: 
 
? Listing on stock market which allowed them to generate new capital sources 
for investment, e.g. initial public offering at the stock market, without losing 
majority share. 
? Access to external finance, SOEs are actively seeking investment and capital 
injection from outside investors. 
? SOEs can be bought or sold, or even leased out (not possible under a strictly 
socialist system). 
? Efficiency increase within state ownership, by separating ownership from 
control. In the Chinese case, it is regarded instead as a separation of enterprise 
management from government offices and political influence. 
 
The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council implemented corporate social responsibility guidelines for state-owned 
enterprises in December 2007 and the Chinese Academy of International Trade & 
Economic Cooperation, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Commerce, drafted corporate 
social responsibility guidelines for foreign invested enterprises in August 2008. The 
intention is that enterprises do not only fulfil performance targets but also assume 
social responsibility (SASAC 2008). By undertaking such a commitment, the 
Communist Party is showing its strong commitment for interest intermediation for 
differing stakeholders that have voiced their expectations. With the implementation of 
the guidelines on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, the 
balance of social, economic and environmental aspects are emphasised in business 
enterprises. At the moment, SOE are facing a dilemma: how to cope with social, 
political and economic objectives which are not necessarily consistent. On one hand, 
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Chinese SOEs are charged with performance requirements like Western profit-
seeking companies, maximising revenue and reducing costs. On the other hand, the 
company has to fulfil national policy requirements. Chinese reformers became aware 
of the huge financial burden resulting from the preponderance of labour and social 
welfare costs in Chinese SOEs. The necessary measure taken was the successive 
downsizing of employees in SOEs and the welfare system. Nonetheless, the state still 
faces the financial burden of the income related pension provision for the huge 
number of aging former employees. The privatisation process is a necessary by-
product of SOE reform. The importance of privatisation starts to play a significant 
role, especially when it comes to the question of taking responsibility for millions of 
redundant workers41 that became dispensable in the course of the reform. Furthermore, 
it has to be taken into account that the reform process also involves the change from a 
labour-intensive to a capital-intensive industry. The Chinese situation differs 
profoundly from the Western situation within the corporate governance framework, 
as the protection of interests of the state and the party has priority. The situation 
becomes even more complex as the state does not involve the central government 
itself by definition, but also local governments. The same is applicable for the party 
system. State offices and state institutions possess a dominant shareholder role, whose 
strategic goals involving the profit maximisation goal in almost the same manner as 
outside investors. Party organisations possess a dominant political role, whose 
strategic social goals diverge from the profit maximisation goal. 
 
In brief, in an economy where market forces dominate, companies incurring losses 
would go bankrupt or be restructured. Due to soft budget constraints, which allow 
uncontrolled loan lending and missing credit ratings, these companies still exist. Even 
though, China’s Bankruptcy Law (Article 8) clearly defines that insolvent firms are to 
file for bankruptcy, the law gives ample leeway for negotiation and political 
intervention. In China, the adoption of firm liquidation as a sanctioning mechanism is 
subjected to particularly close scrutiny, as policy makers at the central and local level 
are afraid of social instability and social unrest. Therefore, they prefer reorganisation 
rather than liquidation; and do not dispose bankruptcy and liquidation decisions to 
economic mechanisms.  
 
41 Overstaffing is generally thought to be at least thirty per cent (Broadman 2001:854). 
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China’s market like other emerging countries is characterised by profound 
information asymmetry in the capital market, an underdeveloped corporate 
governance system, unbalanced legal enforcement and weak enforcement capability 
(Xu/Wang 1999; Peng 2004). Changes in the corporate system in China can be 
regarded as changes in the institution building process, mainly influenced by the 
central government, local governments and enterprises.  
3.1.3 Transformation related Property Rights 
Following the works of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), 
property rights theory and asset ownership has gained a lot of attention.  Earlier 
classical works on property rights has been published by Coase (1960), Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972, 1973), and Furubotn and Pejovich (1970, 1972, 1974). Whereas 
classical works on property rights place more attention on the historical and 
institutional framework that shapes and changes property rights, earlier works place 
more emphasis on the ownership models and incentive structures. All economic 
activities, including trade and production, are the exchange of bundles of property 
rights (Furubotn/Pejovich 1972). Property rights involve all rights to use, to generate 
income from and to transfer and or exchange assets and resources (Libecap 1989). 
Alchian/Demsetz (1973) specifies that capitalism heavily relies on markets and 
private property rights to resolve conflicts over scarce resources.  
 
Property rights are constituted by law and by the state in terms of articles and laws 
covering title. Ownership forms that govern rights are communal ownership, private 
ownership and state ownership (Demsetz 1967:453). Property rights arrangements 
subsequently improve efficiency in the allocation of resources. Under the condition of 
the existence of rules for the exchange of property rights, both trading parties will 
experience benefits. Property rights are an instrument that helps individuals to set the 
latitude and the usage of a resource, by applying laws, customs and mores of a society 
(Demsetz 1967:347). As an individual or legal person has defined rights in any 
resource, the person will therefore solely define how the resource will be deployed. In 
reality, property rights are a resource in the hands of several interest groups, and have 
to be apportioned among them.  
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Demsetz (1967:348) defines that the primary function of property rights is that of 
guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalisation42 of externalities. According to 
the new institutional economics approach, clearly defined private property rights are 
the precondition for the realisation of a market economy, and are a core tenet of a 
functioning capitalist economy. Poorly defined property rights give rise to agency 
problems and moral hazard (Alchian/Demsetz 1973). Three features characterise 
clearly defined property rights (Demsetz 1967; Furubotn/Pejovich 1974): 
 
? Property rights are attributed to a certain owner/ owners, with   
exclusive rights of ownership. 
? The owner/ owners of the property rights obtain a residual income 
arising from the asset.  
? The owner/ owners possess the right to control, or determine the use 
of the asset, to restructure, to sell or lease it. 
 
In addition, identified ownership confers residual rights of control over enterprise 
assets (Grossman/Hart 1986). Under the property rights theory, the enterprise has to 
face incomplete contracts, and property rights have to determine who is the repository 
of the residual control rights, in the case that transactions costs cannot be arranged by 
contractual arrangements (Grossman/Hart 1986).  
 
In emerging countries like China, legal institutions, like property rights, are defined in 
order to support the state in being effective in protecting state-ownership. By 
definition, in centrally planned economies – such as the former Eastern European 
countries - state-owned enterprises belong to everyone and to no one (Kornai 
1980:51). This definition means the subject is open to a lot of interpretation. In China, 
until the 90’s, per definition state-owned enterprises were formally owned by all 
people (全民所有制企业). Today, the constitution stipulates that “socialist public 
ownership is the basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of 
China. State economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the 
whole people and that the state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state 
economy (集体所有制, 国有制). In reality, Chinese people did not possess the right 
 
42 Ronald H. Coase (1960) first introduced the term internalization, in his paper The problem of social cost. In 
theory, the term is also known as the Coase-Theorem.  
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to monitor Chinese state-owned enterprises. In reality under this system, governments 
at different administrative levels are the sole owner of state-owned enterprises and 
control them on behalf of the public. Property rights regimes in central planned 
economies determine that resources and assets are owned by the state only. In China, 
allocation of inputs was according to plan (through administrative rather than market 
channels), but the planning and allocation were often done on provincial and county 
levels rather than by Beijing (Yusuf et al. 2006:50). In the Chinese case, several 
government agencies used to administer state assets on behalf of the public, and 
exercised both a partial shareholder role and a regulator role. The critical point is that 
planning offices redistributed earnings among enterprises in their jurisdiction because 
firms in planned economies did not possess clear and enforceable rights to retain 
profits and allocate them at their discretion (Walder 1992:525). Therefore 
unproductive state-owned enterprises normally benefit from subsidisation and tax 
advantages. This leads to the soft budget constraint described by Kornai (1980). 
Decision-makers in centrally planned economies are in the position to adapt property 
rights and institutions on their behalf. As a consequence investors are faced with a 
profound information asymmetry problem (La Porta et al. 2000). According to 
contracting theory, information asymmetry combined with underdeveloped property 
rights results in high risk premiums or market failure in investment assets (Fama 
1991). Institutional change targets the creation of property rights laws and 
privatisation in order to define how resources and assets can be used and transferred. 
The reform of legal institutions is necessary to define the rules in a new way in the 
market.  
From the viewpoint of corporate governance, shareholders have a claim on a residual 
income. That means shareholders have an entitlement to profits gained by the 
corporation. Shareholders are not entitled to manage the corporation; instead a board 
of directors is installed, which acts on behalf of the corporation. It is up to the board 
of directors to nominate qualified managers who act as agents for the board. This 
structure actually leads to separation of ownership from control. In China, as a result 
of complex ownership structure – where multiple differing government agents are 
involved - the assignment of property rights is not clarified, and control over residual 
income remains vague.  
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Theory assumes that investment increases when property rights are protected, having 
a positive influence on economic growth43. China’s experience proves by means of 
empirical and positive evidence that the country has maintained robust and growing 
markets (Walder/Oi 1999). The People's Republic of China has experienced strong 
growth with gross domestic product averaging 8.9 per cent between 1988-1993; 9.8 
per cent between 1993-1998; and 8.0 per cent between 1998-2003 (OECD 2005b:32). 
So far, China’s experience has not proven that maintaining state ownership holds 
back economic growth. As far as the ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in 
China is concerned, evidence suggests that central government is determined to 
preserve public ownership in the economy, especially in key industries. More 
precisely, the state is promoting ownership diversification and the approach of a 
shareholding system, without neglecting the security of control rights of enterprises 
under public ownership. This shows that new institutional economies also have their 
limitations, as it assumes that institutional efficiency can only be realised under the 
assumption of  a free market economy, decentralised decision making and 
competition (North 1990). The Chinese case proves that rapid economic growth can 
be realised even where inefficient institutions and non-productive resource allocation 
still exists. 
 
In general, assets are publicly owned, attributed to the central, provincial or local 
governments or to villages as collectives. Regardless, “China’s reform has witnessed 
a gradual reform through the gradual reassignment of specific property rights from 
higher government agencies to lower government agencies, or from government 
agencies to enterprises, managers, families, or individuals” (Walder/Oi 1999:6). 
Walder/Oi (1999) approach of ownership and fiscal decentralisation mainly focused 
on explaining the economic success of TVE (Township Village enterprises) in rural 
areas of China. Giving lower level local authorities, managers, families, or 
individuals appropriate incentives and the right to monitor the enterprise; they will act 
as shareholders, having an interest in acting economically advantageously and 
improving performance. In contrast, multiple government departments lack the 
appropriate incentives. Without a functioning system of checks and balances, 
bureaucrats acting as decision-maker may unconditionally seek their own self-
 
43 See North/Thomas (1973), North (1981, 1990, 1994), and Hayek (1989:66). 
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interests, with resulting opportunistic behaviour, according to Williamson (1975:26; 
1985). Opportunistic behaviour results in high transaction costs. The emergence of 
high transaction costs can be avoided through vertical integration. Government 
agencies exercise the shareholder role. Apart from reassignment of specific property 
rights, there has been attempted to provide the central feature of private markets, a 
system of private property rights. Nor has an attempt been made to develop 
commercial law or an independent court system for adjudication (Weingast 1995:1). 
Walder/Oi (1999:11) and co-authors describe patterns of change which substantiate 
the shift away from traditional state ownership. Walder/Oi identify five processes of 
change; the contracting and leasing of public firms; the outright sale of government 
assets to private individuals and families (transfer of ownership to elites); private 
gains for officials controlling public firms; state agencies or enterprises invest private 
funds (government budget) in new enterprises that operate independently as private 
firms; and private start-ups. As mentioned previously, by traditional property rights 
theory, China’s economic growth should be less efficient than under private 
ownership due to the vagueness in property rights. Walder and Oi conclude that “the 
utility of solutions that are suboptimal in theory”, seem to work and can be explained 
by means of empirical, positive evidence. Consequently, investors must have found a 
way to overcome the information asymmetry problem and the vagueness in property 
rights. Wank (1999:269-272) argues that China’s successful economic growth and 
advance arises from the advantages of partial reassignment of property rights that are 
absent when rapid privatisation has occurred. He explains that informal social ties 
that bind officials and entrepreneurs as co-owners  provides a means if specifying and 
enforcing property rights in ways that would not otherwise be possible in the absence 
of an effective system of government regulation and civil law. 
 
The implementation of corporate governance structures in China is a step forward 
defining ownership, as corporatisation helps to clarify property rights in SOEs. The 
introduction of the Company Law in 1994 determined the first step for separating 
government form management functions. The separation was aimed at reducing 
bureaucratic intervention and conflicting influence from several state agencies. 
Furthermore, the change of corporate form of SOEs into joint stock companies 
allowed the access of a limited number of shareholders by listing on the stock market. 
This means that former SOEs were able to raise necessary external capital, without 
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losing strategic majority. Under the Company Law, external investors must be listed 
in the articles of association. Furthermore the value of assets needed to be assessed 
and owners needed to be defined by name. As a result ownership rights could be 
transferred according to title. As mentioned earlier, before this time China lacked 
accurate determination of the owners of SOEs. Government agencies occupied two 
opponent roles, the role of the shareholder and the role of the regulator, without being 
responsible for performance targets. The establishment of SASAC was another step 
towards pushing forward the effective separation of management from government. 
In effect, the establishment of SASAC was also based on rationalisation 
considerations, as previously several bureaucratic government agencies managed and 
supervised state assets. Since 2003 only one government body has been in charge of 
that function. State assets which are under SASAC’s supervision are directly under 
the control of the State Council. Consequently, observers note that reform did not 
dramatically affect bureaucratic organisations; instead they actually introduced new 
government bodies making bureaucracy even more unwieldy (Fernandez-
Stembridge/Huchet 2006:34; Naughton 2006). Naughton (2006:2) notes that a 
fundamental feature of Wen Jiabao’s administration of the State Council is the high 
degree of support he gives to bureaucratic agencies and legitimate decision-making 
processes. As a result, Wen tends to support SASAC’s agenda. On behalf of the State 
Council, SASAC acts as an investor without participating directly in the operational 
business of enterprises. SASAC’s task is to hold control over state ownership, and to 
push forward value maximisation in defined state sectors in combination with the 
realisation of strategic government objectives. Currently, SASAC has taken measures 
toward establishing a claim on state-owned enterprise profits. SASAC, which 
exercises property rights on SOEs, pursues the aim of deriving income from them. 
According to SASAC, China's state-owned enterprises realised record profits of RMB 
1.6 trillion (USD 222 billion) in 2008, a 32 per cent increase compared to 2007 
(China Daily 2008). As profits have remained solely in the hands of SOEs since the 
taxation reform in 1994, a fundamental debate has arisen. At the moment, the 
government is working on a new accounting system which will allow the state to 
share the profits of the SOEs. By defining ownership, crucial questions such as who 
should monitor and control managers in SOEs, how capital should be raise and how 
should SOE’s be reorganised could be answered. In the specific case of China, it has 
also been taken into account that state-owned assets are burdened with debts. This 
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leads to the consequence that ownership also involves the assumption of accumulated 
debt. 
 
The development of ownership definition and a property right system has lead to the 
adoption of the Property Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China, at the 5th 
Session of the 10th National People's Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 
March 16, 2007, is hereby promulgated and came into effect on October 1, 2007. On 
March 8, 2007, the Property Law was formally introduced at the National People's 
Congress (China Daily 2007). Before the change of the constitution in 2002, the 
Communist Party invited private entrepreneurs to join the Communist Party (China 
Daily 2007). With the change of the constitution, the Communist Party tackled two 
problems. Firstly, former cadres who became shareholders in the past were 
legitimised in the Communist Party. Secondly, private entrepreneurs were accepted 
into the Communist Party. With this both groups, which belong mainly to the 
subversive middle class, have been integrated in the Communist Party, and have 
become a support pillar for the Communist Party. In 2004, China changed the 
country's constitution to preserve private-property rights by granting equal protection 
of property to the state, the collective and individuals (People’s Daily 2007a). Despite 
announcing the new Property Law, which symbolises a significant turning point in 
Chinese policy, all land in China is, in any case, owned by the state. Concerning real 
estate, individuals can only claim right to a 70-year lease on buildings. By designing 
the new Property Law, the state responded to the need of securing assets of its 
growing middle class, and putting investors, both foreign as well as domestic, at ease. 
In other words, the state responded in a symbolic way to the necessity of promoting 
economic growth.  
 
The adoption of the new Property Law has been fiercely debated in China (Yu Ge 
2006; Yin Tian 2001). The lack of consensus on this issue and also about the 
direction of China's economic reforms contributed to the delay of the enactment of 
the Property Rights Law. The debate was deepened when a law professor at Peking 
University’s Faculty of Law, Gong Xiantian, called the proposed bill unconstitutional 
and said that the setting up of a new property rights system was unacceptable. Despite 
the public opposition of the draft in form of an open letter to the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress (Gong Xiantian 2005), the Property Rights Law 
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was finally passed. The law covers the creation, transfer and ownership of property; 
companies (but not individuals) can file for bankruptcy and rights of creditors are 
better protected. 
3.1.4 Transformation related Soft Budget Constraints  
The term soft budget constraint was first introduced by Kornai (1980), explaining 
incentive problems and inefficiency of SOEs in socialist economies and transitional 
economies. Soft budget constraint arise mainly due to the state being unable to make 
a credible commitment not to refinance bad projects once some investment costs turn 
into sunk costs (Qian 1994:2). In contrast, the state provides financial support in the 
forms of subsidies, credits and tax concessions. Consequently, a budget constraint can 
be only hardened under the condition in which the state can credibly commit not to 
refinance an inefficient project. The hardness of the budget constraint is not a matter 
of direct policy choice, but rather the indirect result of putting institutions in place 
that discourage or interfere with refinancing (Kornai/Maskin/Roland 2002:21). 
Therefore soft budget constraints can be only mitigated in combination with 
institutional change. From the Western point of view improvement of the corporate 
governance system in transitional countries can be achieved through the privatisation 
of state-owned enterprises (Boycko/Schleifer/Vishny 1996). Private enterprises are 
obliged to work under hard budget constraints. Hard budget constraints require 
enterprises to work efficient and to disclose their financial situation. In the Chinese 
context, before reforms, soft budget constraints hinder state-owned enterprises in 
efficiency and transparency efforts as they are protected by means of government 
subsidies and regulation. State-owned enterprises’ corporate disclosure remains poor.  
 
Kornai (1980) argues that soft budget constraints can be put down to the fact that 
political constraints persist in socialist countries due to bureaucratic paternalism. The 
degree of paternalism in the relation between the state and micro-organisation is an 
important characteristic of the nature of a system.44 In contrary, Dewatripoint/Maskin 
(1995) illustrate that paternalism is not necessarily a condition for soft budget 
constraints. From their point of view, the primary cause for soft budget constraints are 
 
44 Kornai (1980:562-569) distinguishes four degrees of paternalism in socialist countries. He takes paternalism as 
the direct explanation for the softening of the budget constraint. According to Kornai, the relationship between the 
state and the firm is equivalent to a parent-child relationship, in which the state/ parent allots goods e.g. materials, 
labor, and the firm/ child tries to pump out as much as possible.  
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highly centralised systems in socialist countries, as in market economies de-
centralised systems are dominant. Therefore the transaction costs of refinancing will 
be so high, that refinancing ex post will be inefficient. Qian (1994) argues against this 
by explaining that the devolution of China’s fiscal system enhanced the competition 
among different local regions, and therefore reduced the possibility to refinance bad 
projects. Schleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that soft budget constraints arise when 
politicians and bureaucrats obtain control rights over enterprises, as they do not 
pursue profit-oriented targets. Li/Liang (1997) identified three causes of the soft 
budget constraint, applicable for China. According to them the main causes are 
political influence, creditor’s lack of information and commitment and insider control. 
In the case of insider control, the central government takes the individual benefits of 
firm insiders into account in their decision to liquidate or to refinance. In the analysis, 
however, Kornai (1980), as well as Li/Liang (1997) publication on soft budget 
constraints, both support the idea that informal relationships are also an integrated 
part of the whole problem. The literature shows, that the decision-making process on 
budgets in socialist countries are much more the result of a bargaining and 
negotiating process, rather than the result of hard facts. Therefore the thesis wants to 
prove in the following that soft budget constraints in China are hard to eliminate as 
informal relationships prevail, and the state does not possess effective tools to harden 
the budget constraints of the enterprises.  
In Chinese state-owned enterprises four major means of the problem of soft budget 
constraints can be identified (Garnaut et al. 2005:147): 
 
? Overdue loans 
Government directed bank support is a simple way to subsidise SOEs through 
bank lending and to maintain cover for social expenditures, transferred from the 
government to the SOEs (such as housing, education, healthcare and pensions).  
? Overdue interest payments  
High overdue amount of interest payments for bank loans. 
? Overdue taxes - central, local 
High overdue amount of tax payments to national as well as local tax offices. 
? Overdue social security payments – local 
High overdue amount of social security payments to local administrative offices.  
? Informal financial markets for financing and refinancing.  
 91 
In the recent past, Chinese banks started to work according to Basel II Capital 
Accord rating arrangements; consequently the informal financial sector is 
incrementally increasing. Small and private companies which have limited access 
to bank credit, rely heavily on informal finance. Where the private economy is 
less developed, the most common form is re-lending by SOEs to members of 
firms associations (对方). According to the OECD, (2005b:144) the member pays 
10 per cent interest on the amount borrowed and pledges inventories as a way to 
address the risk of non-payment. Members can borrow only once or twice a year, 
the maximum amount is RMB 1-2 million and most loans are for 3 months or 6 
months.  
 
According to Kornai (1998) soft budget constraint arise in vertical relationships 
where there exists a degree of dependency; i.e. a relationship of superiority and 
subordination between two organisations. In the case of a state-owned enterprises, 
this vertical relationship occurs because the owner; i.e. the state, is superior to the 
subordinate agent; i.e. the manager.   
In the case of China several vertical relationships can be identified, which are all 
characterised by a strong relationship to the central government or local governments 
respectively. In the following section the soft budget constraint will be analysed in the 
context of two three-tier hierarchies of central government – local government – 
enterprises, and central government – banks – enterprises (see chapter 3.1.5.1 and 
chapter 3.1.5.2).   
 
The term local government refers to all relevant levels of government, under the 
central government. This term includes the provincial (省), city (市), county (县) and 
township (镇 ) levels. In almost the same manner enterprises can be classified 
according to their level of administration. The term local enterprise (本地企业) refers 
to provincial enterprises (省级企业), city enterprises (市级企业), county enterprises 
(县级企业) and township (镇级企业) enterprises. 
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3.1.4.1 Motives for Soft Budget Constraints 
Both two three-tier hierarchies have in common that the basic source of soft budget 
constraints is that the ex post benefits of bailing out are higher than the benefits of 
liquidation. Soft budget constraints are possible even though they involve inefficiency 
because the initial investment is sunk (Kornai/Maskin/Roland 2002). Soft budget 
constraints in China are the result of several reasons which also complement each 
other to a certain degree and cannot be regarded in an isolated manner.  
 
Massive concern about employment 
Economic reforms in China were introduced and realised, chargeable to the 
environment and the society. Redundancy of state-owned workers increased and 
affected millions of individuals. Chinese policymakers are aware of this problem 
and focus on maintaining social stability as well as political legitimacy in the 
country. The problem of social unrest is becoming an urgent question in China’s 
policy. 45  Even at the expense of massive long-term problems of capital 
misallocation, the state shielded SOEs and banks from market forces so as to 
avoid near-term problems of social unrest. When push comes to shove, the 
government tempers the kind of market forces that would shut down major firms, 
drive up urban unemployment and possibly ignite social upheaval. Worth 
mentioning is the fact that on the one hand the state supports the reduction in the 
number of the civil service workers in state-owned companies as a result of 
efficiency improvement within state ownership, and on the other hand is 
concerned about the emergence of social unrest. Inefficiency of SOEs results 
mainly from the soft budget constraints, which derives from the long term priority 
to support employment growth and stability (Chiu/Lewis 2006:198).  
 
  
 
 
45 It is necessary to mention, that in the past the government only felt responsible for the urban population, and not 
for the rural population. In 2004, the Chinese government issued the document Nr. 1, which addresses for the first 
time the question how to increase the income of the rural peasants. With this document, the central government 
declares its readiness, to make political decisions in favor of certain social groups and maintain social stability. This 
signifies a new legitimacy strategy of the Chinese government, which tries to respond to the claim of social justice 
in the country (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2008).  
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Crony relationships are still prevailing in Chinese economy, and support the interests 
of the organisation to be rescued 
The reforms undertaken do not necessarily focus on the immediate realisation of 
efficiency in the heavy industry and the banking sector. Rather, the protection of 
interests of politically powerful social groups, like loyal party insiders (managers, 
state bureaucrats, etc) proves to have top priority. In general, in China’s state 
sector the hierarchy of control runs from the state to the industrial agencies at 
different levels of the government and then to the state-owned enterprises. 
Bai/Wang (1998) explain that soft budget constraints in the Chinese state sector 
persist alongside the agency problems of the bureaucracy. According to their 
model, the root of soft budget constraints is in the hierarchically managed system 
itself, the problem will persist under the current ownership and control 
arrangements in China’s state sector. Additionally, the banking sector serves as a 
useful financing tool where credit culture still remains to be weak. What 
ostensibly results is a patronage system bearing tremendous long-term costs to the 
nation’s macro-economy, but great short-term benefit to political authorities and 
their loyal supporters (Steinfeld 2004:649).  
 
Avoidance of economic spill over effects  
     As already mentioned Chinese industrial companies and the banking sector are   
all dominated by state ownership. Assuming the case that a large enterprise would 
not be bailed out by the state and goes bankrupt, other stakeholder groups like 
suppliers and banks would go bankrupt too. This could trigger a chain reaction of 
bankruptcies, with catastrophic results for the economy. Other state-owned 
companies might be affected and the danger of mass redundancy would emerge. 
Therefore the state, as well as local governments, are interested in supporting the 
organisation in question by all means necessary to guarantee its survival on the 
market by bailing it out. Furthermore, the bailing out of an organisation has to be 
regarded as an effective tool of prevention against social unrest in both urban and 
rural areas.  
 
Social function of state-owned enterprises  
In a centrally planned economy, state-owned enterprises provided a full 
package of social services to state-employees and their families, a concept 
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which is alien to Western companies. So far state-owned enterprises are 
engaged in providing subsistence allowances for laid off workers (下岗). 
Unemployed workers have to sign up with labour agencies and will receive a 
subsidy from the government. The state has not established a social-welfare 
system in China which would relieve state-owned enterprises from their 
responsibility. State-owned enterprises employ millions of workers knowing 
that overstaff and related costs hinder performance objectives. High labour 
costs work against flexibility in production costs and cash flow management. 
Soft budget constraints are possible as state-owned enterprises do not only 
matter from an economic point of view but also from a social and political 
viewpoint. The threat of a high unemployment rate, social unrest and political 
instability concerns both the state and the Communist Party (Weigelin-
Schwiedrzik 2008).  
 
State-sector where the market does not work   
Due to the huge size of the country, many regions in China are still 
underdeveloped and backward. Infrastructure development is important in 
China’s Western regions.46 In 2006, the Chinese government announced the 
construction of a socialist new countryside ( 社 会 主 义 新 农 村 ). 47 
Infrastructure projects in terms of road construction, railways, water supply, 
power generation and oil pipelines, are not necessarily profitable from an 
economic point of view, but are of strategic relevance to the Chinese 
government. State-owned industrial enterprises cover all strategically 
important segments. They provide products and services to customers in 
undeveloped regions. The provision of public infrastructure development 
ensures in China the utilisation of resources (especially human resources), 
stimulates sustainable economic growth in the domestic economy and 
guarantees social as well as political stability in local communities.  
 
46 The definition of China’s Western region incorporates the provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, Guizhou, Yunnan, 
Qinghai, Chongqing municipality and the two largest and most remote regions of Xinjiang and Tibet (Annual 
Report BOC 2008:379). 
47 The 11th five-year program for 2006-2010 periods was approved by the executive meeting of the State Council 
presided over by Premier Wen Jiabao. Zhongfa (2006), No. 1. 中国中央，国务院关于推进社会主义新农村建设
的若干意见 (Several opinions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council 
regarding the pushing ahead of the construction of a new socialist countryside).  
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3.1.5 The Role of the State in the Enterprise Reform 
The transformation from a planned economy to market-based economy requires a 
fundamental change in the relationship between the state and the state-owned 
enterprises. The vertical, reciprocal relationship which existed in socialism, changed 
to a horizontal one. The corporatisation process of state-owned enterprises intends to 
implement market-based coordination mechanisms in the state sector through the 
transfer of property and control rights. Thereby owners of assets are identified more 
easily. In the Chinese case, branches took over ownership, accompanied with rights 
and responsibilities. Corporatisation was initiated with the aim that the state’s 
strategic interests and objectives are still backed up in the enterprises. On the other 
hand, the state recognised the necessity of retreating to a certain degree from its 
dominant position, in order to assure that the market mechanisms worked. Corporate 
governance stands for market liberalisation and the retreat of the state from an overall 
control function to a sole regulatory function. In fact, corporate governance asks for a 
new definition of the role of the state in the economy, which is the responsibility for 
the provision of a market-based institutional framework. As a result of the immense 
social costs occurring during the transformation process, it is an important task of the 
state to establish a social welfare system, where income and social policy plays a 
fundamental role. In order to align economic and social questions, corporate social 
responsibility was added to the Chinese corporate governance discourse. Since the 
introduction of the construction of a harmonious society (和谐社会) in 2005 and the 
scientific concept on development (科学发展观) in 2007 by Hu Jintao, an approach 
that encourages enterprises to emphasise sustainable development, the Communist 
Party has put social responsibility on its agenda. Formal guidelines have been 
implemented by state agencies. Thereby, common social objectives have been 
addressed in order to balance economic, social and environmental factors in business 
organisations in the transformation economy. The introduction of social sustainability 
has to be also seen in the light of painful social reforms, where the state withdrew 
from a multitude of its previous social functions.  
   
Before reforms, the state-subsidised enterprise sector was characterised by a 
distortion of competition as enterprises were not treated equal. The social-political 
considerations of the state also contributed to inefficient production results in the 
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state-sector. By changing the function of the state – through the separation of 
corporate economic activity from state control – corporate governance standards 
should improve the efficient deployment of production factors in enterprises and 
resource allocation. Furthermore, soft budget constraints, which are relevant 
contributors to inefficiency, should be eliminated. When analysing corporate 
governance in China, it is helpful not to analyse the relationship between the 
shareholders and corporate management alone, but also to describe the relations 
between the enterprises and banks and local governments respectively. In the 
following section the thesis describes how the role of the state and its relationship to 
state-owned enterprises has changed over time. 
3.1.5.1 Central Government versus Banks versus Enterprises 
Chinese banks are still dominated to a large extent by state ownership, as the 
government controls and subsidises the banking system. In turn, Chinese banks 
finance state-owned enterprises. The high degree of state ownership of financial 
institutions is accompanied by a dominant emphasis on lending to state-owned and 
state controlled enterprises, while non-state enterprises have poorer but growing 
access to external credit (OECD 2005b:140). 
 
Government revenue and expenses 1949-93 
Historically Chinese SOEs provided an important source of revenue for the Chinese 
government. SOEs were primarily concerned with providing financial support to 
government bureaucracy and were not concerned with earning an economic surplus to 
satisfy shareholders. In the pre-reform era, the two most important income sources 
were tax incomes and monopoly profits generated by the SOEs (China Statistical 
Yearbook 2006). Starting from 1958, enterprise profits represented the main income 
source for the government. In 1958, enterprise profits represented 52.7 per cent of the 
total income of the Chinese government; in 1959 it stood at 61.6 per cent and in 1970 
at57.2 per cent (Donnithorne 1967:369; OECD 2004a:2). In 1978, revenue from 
enterprises accounted for 50.5 per cent of total government budget revenue and hence 
represented the largest source of revenue whereas in 1993it only accounted for 1.1 per 
cent of total government budget revenue (China Statistical Yearbook 2006). The 
sharp decline in government revenue provided by SOEs can be explained by the fact 
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that SOEs were allowed to retain realised profit for their own purposes. In the late 
1980’s, the contract responsibility system was introduced, as the central government 
was facing difficulties concerning the division of profits between the state and SOEs. 
The profit retention policy, as well as the contract responsibility system, resulted in a 
yearly bargaining and negotiation process between state officials and SOEs 
representatives over profit division.  
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Figure 4: State capital allocation to state-owned enterprises 
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In the period between 1949-1993 the central government directed state budgets to the 
SOEs, therefore the central government had direct access to the SOE, by receiving all 
of its earnings (no distinction between profits and taxes). Government savings were 
not generated through taxation, as there was practically no tax imposed on households. 
The household system was based on the Soviet model.48 Zhang (2002) argues that the 
agricultural products were the primary channel of transferring savings from the rural 
household sector to the state-owned industrial sector. As Lardy noted (1983), in the 
pre-reform era, prices were set by the government “largely to generate industrial 
profit, and thus government revenue”. Furthermore, the low-wage policy applied on 
workers in the state sector also contributed to an increase in state budget and savings. 
This was despite social services provided and financed by the state sector (Zhang 
2002). The point is that at that time the government exclusively disposed over 
monopoly power of capital allocation and control over the balance of revenue and 
expenses.  
 
Through the establishment of the mono-banking system in 1980, resource and capital 
allocation were transferred by banks operating as de facto lending arms under 
continuing state control. The government budget allocation was carried out through 
the central bank to designated sectors of the command economy. Long term 
investment was channelled through the budget and working capital to enterprises was 
determined administratively (Chiu/Lewis 2006:186). At that time, SOE investment49 
was primary financed from interest-free budgetary grants, retained profits were barely 
used (Cull/Xu 2003:535). Consequently the banking sector did not obtain a dominant 
position in the role of a financial source. In the pre-reform era, SOEs tried to 
maximise government budget and grants by applying for as much as possible. Self-
financing through equity finance did not represent a viable alternative and SOEs tried 
to minimise this form of financing. This behaviour resulted in soft budget constraints 
for state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks, and was the main reason for the 
negative financial development.  
 
48 Alternatively, the state can generate public savings by retaining part of the national income that could otherwise 
be saved by households and distribute only the remainder to private households. This is better known as the 
“deduction” approach in China, following the Karl Marx design of an ideal socialist economy, which was one of the 
theoretical blueprints of the central planning economy (Zhang 2002:3). 
49 Cull/Xu (2003) find that aside from government grants and bank loans, funds for investment come from six other 
sources – foreign investment, issuing of domestic stock or domestic debt, borrowing from enterprises, investment by 
other enterprises, and the enterprise’s retained funds. Retained funds came from three sources: retained profits, 
depreciation and major repair funds, and other enterprise retained funds.  
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Government revenue and expenses 1993-today 
Consequently in 1994, within the framework of the tax reform, the government 
changed its policy regarding public support of the state sector. The government 
delegated the task of SOE financing to the state banks, which provided bank loans to 
the SOE sector. State-owned enterprises no longer rely on fund appropriation, and the 
role of the state as the primary source of funds has been reduced. Since the 1980’s, 
household savings have poured into these banks, but the funds have been directed 
toward activities – loans to large-scale state industries – that have yielded decidedly 
low returns (Steinfeld 2004:646; He/Cao 2007). A specific characteristic of the 
corporate sector reform in China is that the state did not retreat from the allocation of 
capital, but still controls it. In addition to direct investment in fixed assets, 
government capital transfer to state-owned enterprises was about 63 per cent of 
government savings in 1992, and accounted for 83 per cent in 2001 (He/Cao 
2007:10f.).  
Several channels have been identified which are a source of financing for state-owned 
enterprises and investment in enterprises. In general, five channels have been 
identified, including an external channel, which is foreign direct investment. The 
other financing channels are household savings, government savings and enterprise 
savings. 
 
? Household saving 
Traditionally China has a relatively steady high household saving rate 50 
compared to other countries. Actually the state is the primary intermediary of 
capital transfer between household savings and state-owned enterprises in the 
financial system (Zhang Chunlin 2002). Zhang Chunlin (2002:8) identified 
three sub-channels through which financial resources are transferred from the 
household sector directly to the enterprise sector: 
Sub-channel (a): Households deposit part of their savings with state 
banks and thus become holders of debt claims against the state banks. 
Sub-channel (b): Households invest part of their savings in equities of 
enterprises that are transformed from wholly-state owned enterprises 
into joint-stock companies.  
 
50 He and Cao (2007) argue that the stable high national saving rate in China is due to fast growth of non-financial 
corporations and government savings, and not to the high household saving rate.   
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Sub-channel (c): Households invest their savings in private firms,   
TVEs, acquire small SOEs and turn them into joint stock cooperatives 
in which all employees hold shares of their firm. These investments 
are recorded as equity on the balance sheets of those non-state 
enterprises.  
Sub-channel (a) and (b) are explicitly monopolised by the state and 
have been main sources of finance for the enterprise sector. Sub-
channel (c) is also characterized by heavy government intervention.  
 
? Government saving  
Until a short time ago, the high government saving rate was due to low 
government consumption and high rate of retained revenues. Chinese 
government savings have been invested into two main channels, first into US 
Treasury bonds and second into Chinese domestic economy, primarily into 
state-owned companies. A part of the national income that could have been 
distributed among households was retained by the state with the help of 
administratively determined prices and wage rates and became budget 
revenue. It was then invested in enterprises and resulted in state owned equity. 
Recently, the Chinese government started activities to increase public 
spending and public expenditure policies which are undergoing a 
transformation to meet the changing requirements of the market economy. 
Although official government spending overall has grown rapidly in China – 
from 17.7 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 27.4 per cent of GDP in 2003 – it is still 
well below the OECD average of 44.5 per cent (OECD 2006). The rise in 
Chinese public spending has been most observed in infrastructure investment 
and in public administration; other areas still to be reformed are health and 
education, clean technology and agricultural production. 
 
? Enterprise saving  
High enterprise savings are due to a high rate of retained revenues. Retained 
revenues in addition to credit loans and subsidies represent the key financial 
sources for allowing employee levels to be maintained, especially in the light 
of the unexpected economic downturn. State-owned enterprises’ integral role 
is to provide employment and goods and services in the economy. Chinese 
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SOEs employ a large workforce. According to Fortune 2010, the workforce of 
the State Grid and China National Petroleum is over one million (see chapter 
3.1). China already faces an unemployment problem, especially in the rural 
areas of the country, which results in society discontent and social unrest.  By 
retaining revenues corporate managers are responding to the national policy 
of the Communist party, which declared employment as an important factor 
of a harmonious society. 
 
? Foreign direct investment (FDI)  
Foreign direct investment also plays an important role concerning the 
financing of Chinese state-owned enterprises. Overseas investors poured 
financial resources into former SOEs by acquiring shares and by forming joint 
ventures. Huang (2003) argues that foreign direct investment has less to do 
with financing state-owned enterprises, but is instead more of a supporting 
pillar for the ongoing privatisation process. As an explicit privatisation 
program is missing and credit constraints on the private sector exist, foreign 
investors provide venture capital to private entrepreneurs. Foreign investment 
boosts interregional capital mobility in a highly fragmented economy.  
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Figure 5: Financing of state-owned enterprises 
Source: Compiled by the author (Zhang Chunlin 2002, He/Cao 2007) 
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Households are the net creditors and the government and enterprises are the net 
debtors. The majority of household savings flow into state banks. The most important 
internal financing channel of state-owned enterprises is bank loans (He/Cao 2007:11). 
The central government’s shift from budgetary to bank financing of SOEs involves 
switching from financing SOEs with direct taxes to financing them with implicit taxes 
(quasi-fiscal revenue) collected from bank deposits (Gordon/Li 2003). By 1994, 
direct government transfers had nearly disappeared. Poorly performing SOEs started 
to rely on commercial credits, in other words they had to be bailed out by banks. In 
truth, commercial credits provided by state banks present a mixture of policy loans, 
stabilisation loans and commercial lending. State-owned banks face the dilemma of 
identifying good credit risks 51  and granting loans only under the condition of 
commercially oriented objectives. On the other hand banks realised that extending 
new loans to SOEs was throwing good money after bad (Cull/Xu 2003:540). The shift 
also signifies an end to the unbounded funding, by imposing a ceiling on grants, and 
requires SOEs to enhance at least a minimum profitability.  
 
In 1994, instead of the direct provision of SOEs revenue, the central government 
implemented tax reform so that state-owned enterprises would no longer remit after-
tax profits to government agencies. Consequently, the central government has 
changed to a system where fixed income is guaranteed, and the state is not the 
primary claimant of earnings after taxes. In contrast with a shareholder in Western 
companies, who is entitled to receive a dividend when the enterprise is profitable, 
China traditionally pursued a low or no dividend policy. A World Bank survey in 
2005 revealed that in China, no government entity – neither the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) nor SASAC – received any dividends, despite net profits being earned from 
centrally-administrated SOEs. Commentators note that state-owned enterprises did 
not turn over profits to their administrative superiors. Instead those superiors were 
transformed into holding companies of various kinds, and these holding companies 
were not required to – and did not – remit the profits further up to government itself 
(Naughton 2008). The same situation has been observed for local governments in 
relation with locally-administrated SOEs (Worldbank 2005). The World Bank study 
 
51 By analyzing product portfolio of an enterprise, profitability, credibility and signed contracts with customers.  
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(2005) identified four reasons why the government would not collect profit from 
SOEs:  
 
? Firstly, this decision seemed a natural extension of the logic prevailing in 
SOE reform in 1980s, which emphasised the independence of SOEs from the 
government.  
? Secondly, the central theme of SOE reform during 1992-1994 was the 
increase of managerial autonomy and the reduction of government 
intervention, as was evident in the State Council Regulation on 
Transformation of Management Mechanisms of SOEs in 1992. The collection 
of dividends from SOEs shows that the government is now moving in the 
opposite direction.  
? Thirdly, without corporatisation and some minimum progress in corporate 
governance, it would be difficult for the government to determine an 
acceptable rate of dividend without reopening the negotiation with 
management of each SOE on profit division.  
? Fourthly, SOEs as a whole were in poor financial situation in the early 1990s. 
What the government could collect did not amount to much, while the need 
for new capital injection was perceived as urgent and large. In 1994, the total 
profit of industrial SOEs was only 1.8 percent of GDP, which compared with 
3.3 percent of GDP in 2003.52  
 
52 China Statistical Yearbook (1995)   
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As a consequence, in 2004 the, SASAC reached an agreement in principle with the 
Ministry of Finance for the setting up of a state capital management budget for central 
state enterprises, the principal component of which is that a percentage of after-tax 
profits have to be turned over to the government. In May 2007 during a State Council 
meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao debated the plan of state-owned enterprises paying 
dividends to the government (MOFCOM 2007), and in September 2007 the State 
Council approved detailed regulations concerning the remittance of profit to the 
government.53 The approval of the establishment of a national budgetary system for 
state assets affects the 120,000 plus state enterprises nationwide and the 128 central 
enterprises, both of which will start paying dividends to the state. The MOF will be 
responsible for creating the national budget while the SASAC will have the power to 
decide on the budgets of the central enterprises (China Daily 2007). Starting in 2008, 
nationwide after-tax profits have been given to the Ministry of Finance first, after 
which a portion is transferred to the SASAC. In the first draft, central enterprises had 
to pay twenty per cent of their profits, although the final decision constituted that 
enterprises were to be divided into three groups, with remittance rates for after-tax 
profits set at zero, five, and ten per cent. Seventeen SASAC firms plus the State 
Tobacco Monopoly remit 10 per cent of their profits, 32 SASAC firms, mostly 
military industrial firms and research institutes, are exempted from paying for three 
years, and the remaining SASAC firms remit 5 per cent of their profits (Naughton 
2008). 54  Profit remittance for local governments is still not regulated, but it is 
estimated that detailed regulations will be promulgated by local SASAC offices in 
accordance with the central SASAC. It is expected that local state-owned enterprises 
are subject to a 5 or 10 per cent rate. Profit remittance is allocated through three 
defined channels: investment in assets e.g. company purchases, investment in 
restructuring and compensation for social benefits.55  
This development underscores that as a result of corporate restructuring, state-owned 
enterprises have been transformed into profitable enterprises, and that control over 
profit is a crucial criterion in the light of corporate governance reform, social security 
 
53 State Council, September 13，2007: 国务院关于实行国有资本经营预算的意见 (State Council views on the 
State Capital Management Budget); 
SASAC/MOF, December 12，2007: 财政部出台国有资本经营预算有关配套管理办法 (Management methods 
for receiving the state capital income of central enterprises). 
54 Entire name list: Caijing (2007): 央企“国有资本收益”收取出新规 (New regulations appear for central 
enterprise State capital income receipts and outlays). 
55 See article: Zhongguo xinwenwang (2008): 国资委公布央企上缴红利支配方式 将用于三领域 (SASAC 
promulgated the methodology for allocating remitted dividends, which will be used in three areas).  
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reform and fiscal reform. The introduction of state capital management budgets is 
necessary to enable the state, in particular the SASAC, to gain access over a 
significant portion of state-owned profits.   
 
Traditionally, Chinese banks have played a crucial role in the realisation of the 
government’s economic and social objectives. In recent years, since Chinese banks 
were transformed into financial institutions, local governments in particular have 
gained powerful influence over bank lending through the appointment of regional 
bank leaders (Jin/Zhou 2000:21). As already mentioned above, the majority of state-
owned companies actually belong to local governments, which are consequently 
highly interested in the survival of these firms under their jurisdiction. Moreover, the 
traditionally close ties between government and bank officials on the local level have 
created a culture that has given local government officials substantial influence over 
bank lending decisions56 (OECD 2005b:141). The high level of non-performing loans 
proves that in reality neither credit standards, nor effective credit classifications, exist 
(see chapter 4.3). This has resulted in a major problem of capital misallocation. 
Consequently, soft budget constraints arise due to the endogenous lack of credible 
commitment to liquidate an inefficient project instead of refinancing it.  
 
The point is that so far, Chinese state banks have been the main provider of external 
finance to enterprises, instead of the capital market. In China, the state actively 
promotes an industrial policy which results in a specific relationship between the state 
and the enterprises. Although corporate governance reforms have been undertaken, 
the concentrated ownership structure has been maintained. External finance provided 
by the stock market through individual households plays only a minor role in SOEs 
financing (see chapter 4.1.4, table 9). The concentrated ownership structure is also 
based on the dominant role of insiders in the enterprises. As the state is the main 
provider of external finance, it requires a return on its investment by asking for 
dividend payments. This move shows that the state is officially acting as a 
shareholder who is demanding profit maximisation within state ownership. Since 
 
56 Local government officials have traditionally had an important role in evaluating the performances of senior 
officials of state owned commercial banks branches and in determining their future career path within the broader 
government service. While these practices are changing and bank management becoming much more 
professionalized, local officials still having strong incentives to stay in good standing with local governments 
(OECD 2005b:170). SOE managers are in the same situation as government bureaucrats also appoint them.  
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economic reforms have started, the state has been ready to support financially state-
owned enterprises during their period of transformation. The state acknowledged that 
transformation requires investments which are sunk, and will not be paid back. As 
state-owned enterprises have now turned into profitable enterprises, the state is now 
asking for a piece of the cake. Dividend payments curtail enterprise savings by 
managers, which remained so far as retained revenues in the enterprises. Management 
generally tends to retain revenues in order to keep employee levels up, but also to 
build up a financial cushion in the case of downturn in their enterprise. Furthermore, 
dividend payments have positive impact on capital market discipline by forcing state-
owned enterprises to rely on external financial sources to obtain necessary funds. 
Changes in dividend distribution will work as a signal to the government of poor 
performance and is therefore a tool which allows corrective action to be taken by 
applying differing corporate governance mechanisms. This is especially valuable 
under asymmetric information which exists between the central state and the 
enterprises, and managers and the dominant shareholder respectively.  
 
An influencing corporate governance measure concerning the dividend policy in the 
state-owned sector is the Chinese corporate governance code. According to §87 
“Chinese listed enterprises shall truthfully, accurately, completely and timely disclose 
information” by means of quarterly and annual reports. Taking the China’s Top 20 
companies ranked by Fortune 2010 into account, annual reports of these enterprises 
include financial data on such as earnings per share, cash flows from operating 
activities and dividends payable to equity shareholders of the company. Corporate 
governance systems and measures are substantial as public financial statements can 
produce meaningful information to the state. 
Functioning dividend payment is only guarantied as long as financial statements and 
cash flow statements are disclosed and are reliable. Therefore the state in particular is 
highly interested in corporate governance reform which requires transparency and 
financial disclosure. By requiring the fulfilment of disclosure requirements within 
state ownership, the state is able to exercise ownership rights on an informed basis. 
Dividend payment will have a positive impact on corporate governance in China. The 
demand for corporate governance institutions will increase, which will contribute 
positively to higher transparency in the enterprises.  
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3.1.5.2 Central Government versus Local Government versus Enterprises 
As mentioned previously, through SOE reform the central government intended to 
enhance efficiency within state ownership. The reform path chosen to improve state-
owned enterprise performance was through corporatisation, and through 
decentralisation. Several scholars characterise the Chinese economy as fragmented, 
federalistic and as being federalisistic “Chinese style” (Huang 1996; 
Qian/Cao/Weingast 1999c; Qian/Roland 1998; Qian/Weingast 1996, 1997). Huang 
(2003:144ff.) goes even further, by explaining the transformation from administrative 
to economic decentralisation, whereupon privatisation is a form of it (see also Zhang 
Weiying 1999).  
 
The decentralised economic structure in China is identified by the transfer of fiscal 
authority and ownership to local governments. Fiscal authority classifies the tax base 
between the central and local governments corresponding to administrative levels. 
Ownership is categorised through control and revenue rights, whereupon central 
enterprises belong to the central government, and regional enterprises belong to local 
governments (Huang 2003:143). Qian and Roland (1998) argue that the devolution of 
the central government to local government, in particular the decentralisation of fiscal 
authority since 1994, is the key method towards hardening budget constraints in 
China. The reason behind this lays in the fact that competition among the local 
governments serve as commitment device to harden budget constraints. 
 
Huang (2003:144) argues two reasons exist for administrative decentralisation 
between central and local government:   
 
? “Firstly, decentralisation has long tradition in China, going back to 1951. 
Administrative decentralisation is a policy instrument available to the government 
to improve the efficiency of firms within a framework of state ownership.  
? Secondly, knowing the dimension and complexity of Chinese socialist economy, 
the central government found a way to reduce monitoring and supervision, by 
allowing local governments to participate as financial stakeholders in the 
operations of SOEs.”  
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Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (2004) explains that  
 
“Decentralization is a heritage of the Chinese model, explaining the relationship 
between the centre and the periphery.” 
 
Zhang Weiying (1999) argues that the decentralisation policy has contributed 
significantly to privatisation, as a consequence of cross-regional competition. This 
explanation comes from the fact that local governments are concerned with total 
revenue of location, which includes tax revenues and profits 57  generated by the 
enterprise58. In general, enterprises are the major tax payer at the local level. The 
increase in discretionary power over the decision making jurisdiction of local 
governments and the emergence of local autonomy resulted in intense research by 
scholars (Oi 2003; Yep 2004; Wedeman 2003; Walder 1995). Wedeman (2003) calls 
this newly acquired authority local protectionism, and explores strategies and 
methods of local protectionism applied by local governments.  
 
Decentralisation also involved the transfer of state-owned assets to local governments. 
As a result of the 16th Communist Party congress, Jiang Zemin once again placed 
emphasis on the transfer of SOE ownership to local governments, including the 
transfer of authority. In the 1990’s, as a result of the increasing number of loss-
making SOEs, the government started to transfer small-size SOEs to lower-level 
governments, namely to the provincial, town and county level in order to avoid the 
growing fiscal burdens (Yao 2003). Guthrie (1997) shows that the controlled transfer 
of the majority of enterprises to local authorities represents an important trigger for 
harder budget constraints and increased autonomy under the enterprise reform. As 
local authorities possess only limited financial resources, SOEs have had harder 
budget constraints imposed on them, which has lead to more efficiency. 
 
 
57 Generally, profits are depended on market share and profit margin.   
58 As product markets become more competitive, local governments only incentive to motivate managers, is through 
privatization. Effectively, this is also a method to harden budget constraints. 
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Local governments now administer about 90 per cent of China’s SOEs (OECD 
2004b:18)59. In literature there is often the misconception that state ownership reflects 
solely central state ownership. Indeed, the term is often associated with sub-national 
jurisdictions, and not with the central government. Putterman (1995:1052) argues that 
the state does not represent a relevant actor on any level; instead state control means 
control by specific persons and groups of persons whose actions are constrained by 
particular organisational structures and rules. In contrast to theoretical reasoning, 
government agencies at local levels are not homogenous units, which are acting in the 
outright interest of the central government. Much more central–local fiscal relations 
are a matter of the principal-agent problem, where local levels obtain an information 
lead over the central government, and possess discretionary power. The problem is 
due to missing institutions that combine the interests of national legislation with the 
interests of local agencies acting on behalf of local governments (Krug et al. 2005). 
Therefore they pursue their own economic goals and make arrangements with local 
enterprises - on the one hand to minimises tax payments to national tax collecting 
agencies (Wong 2002; Bernstein/Lü 2003), and on the other hand to maximise levies 
to their own local administration (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 1999; Bai et al. 2003; 
Wedeman 2003; Krug/Hendrischke 2003; Walder 1995).  
 
Before 1994, under negotiated revenue-sharing contracts, provinces were obliged to 
transfer a certain amount of locally collected revenues to the central government, and 
in return received a certain amount of subsidies from them. The fiscal contract system 
did not represent the rule-based governance that is necessary for a market 
environment, as it lead to bargaining over intergovernmental transfers between 
central and provincial governments (Shirk 2007). As Wang (1997) points out, 
provinces had to hand over remittances to, or receive subsidies from, the central 
government according to the old revenue-sharing contracts. In the end, no one knew 
what constituted real central revenue and local revenue. Therefore the central 
government’s aim of successfully hardening the budget constraint has failed. In her 
article on the relationship between fiscal reform and local industrialization Christine 
Wong (1992) describes the shift of control over total revenues in favour of the 
 
59  Chinese sources claim that in 2003, 56.7 per cent of the state-owned assets of industrial and commercial 
enterprises where under the control of the central government, and 43.3 per cent enterprises under the control of 
local governments (People Daily 2004). 
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provinces and localities as a “problem of sequencing the reform” in the wake of the 
tax reform.  
 
In 1994, the central government promulgated China’s Enterprise Income Tax Law. 
By introducing two models of tax administration the government was aiming to 
increase the central portion of tax revenues and at the same time to take over the role 
of appropriating funds to the provincial and township level. The government changed 
from the former budget-system that was primarily dependent on state-owned 
enterprises to the tax-collection system. In the course of reform, the government 
relinquished financial management of public services to a local level. 
Kornai/Maskin/Roland (2002:30) argue that decentralisation of the government does 
not necessarily harden the budget constraints of regional governments. On the 
contrary, they argue that giving regional governments’ discretion over expenditure 
allows them to distort the composition of this expenditure in the hope of attracting 
funding from the central government, again to subsidise loss-making enterprises. The 
decentralised economic structure empowered local governments concerning budget, 
investment decisions and the distribution of land family planning and taxation. Along 
with the decentralisation of fiscal authority, local governments have also acquired 
authority over their own local economies. However, decentralisation has also imposed 
a multitude of obligations on local governments such as the provision of public goods 
and services like education, social insurance, infrastructure and health. Consequently 
it was up to the provinces and townships to define by themselves additional sources 
of income to be able to finance public services in their community. Wong (2005) 
argues that fiscal decentralisation in the form of the introduction of the tax sharing 
system was rather a strategy of muddling through – by transferring responsibilities to 
lower levels, defaults on government obligations can be hidden and blamed on local 
conditions. 
 
In fact in China a dual track tax system exists, where taxes are divided into central 
government taxes, local government taxes and taxes shared between the central and 
local governments. Central taxes are those needed for protecting national interests and 
undertaking macroeconomic regulation. Shared taxes are those directly related to 
economic development. Local taxes are those that are suitable for collection by local 
governments. A detailed analysis and compilation of the different tax forms and the 
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reform of the fiscal equalisation scheme at the central and local level is provided by 
Hauff (2002:200). The dual track tax system combines two tax systems in the country. 
The first is authorised by national legislation, which defines the tax rate and tax base. 
Taxes are levied by national tax agencies as well as by local tax offices. The second is 
not authorised by national legislation, but defined by local governments only. 
Provincial governments, city governments, county governments and township 
governments levy fees, surcharges and taxes which are not submitted to the central 
government and which are not registered as local taxes. This kind of source of income 
is also called extra budgetary revenue (预算外资金) and is used by local jurisdictions 
only. Therefore local governments are residual claimants of local taxes and fees. A 
second revenue source for local governments are off-budget revenues (Wong 2002; 
Eckhaus 2003), which refer to the revenue local governments realise by selling land 
or by receiving dividends from half-privatised incorporated companies (Krug et al. 
2005). Both categories, extra budgetary revenue and off-budget revenue, cannot be 
found in official statistical data60. The attempt of the central state to harden the budget 
constraint, by fiscal devolution, actually resulted in the situation that local levels 
turned entrepreneurial, by embarking on business activities outside the reach of 
bureaucratic control (Krug et al. 2005).  
 
Administration 
Level  
National Tax System Local Tax System 
Central State Administration of Taxation 
(SAT) 
 
Province Provincial State Tax Bureau  Provincial Local Tax Bureau 
City City State Tax Bureau City Local Tax Bureau 
County County State Tax Bureau County Local Tax Bureau 
Township  Township Local Tax Bureau 
Figure 6: State administration of taxation, PRC 
Source: www.chinatax.gov.cn 
 
The disequilibrium in the allocation of financial resources and expenses for public 
services increased as the central government curtailed allocated financial resources to 
local levels, although they had taken over additional financial burdens at the same 
 
60 Since 1997, the extra-budgetary revenue of local governments does not include the intra-budgetary government funds (Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook 2008). 
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time. As a consequence, the local population was faced with a non-transparent tax 
system, where local government offices acted arbitrarily. The central government 
then introduced the Tax-for-fee reform, which has the goal of relieving the rural 
population from taxes (Oi 2003:5-6; Yep 2004; Li 2005; Li Changping 2003). In the 
course of reform a high number of local taxes and fees have been prohibited and there 
now exist just two taxes, namely the Agricultural Tax and the surcharge of 20 per 
cent based on the Agricultural Tax. 
 
Krug et al. (2005:23) argues that 
“The devolution of power is subsequently less an attempt to introduce (fiscal) 
federalism than a political expedient measure that enables aligning the interests of 
the legitimate local political agents with the reform policy as defined by the political 
centre.” 
 
As regards tax policy for enterprises in China, regardless of a company’s legal form, 
the 10th National People's Congress enacted the new Enterprise Income Tax Law 
(EIT), which unifies the income tax levied on domestic and foreign enterprises, which 
has been effective since January 1, 2008. The unified tax structure will introduce a 
single tax rate of 25 per cent, replacing the existing two-system tax, which allowed 
foreign investment enterprises to receive significant tax preferences principally due to 
lower tax rates, tax holidays and other provisions. The new tax rate is lower in 
comparison to the average tax rates of neighbouring countries in an effort to push the 
competitiveness of enterprises and to boost China's attraction of foreign investors.  
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Enterprise form SOEs Domestic Chinese 
Enterprises 
FIEs 
Former tax rate 33 % 33 % 15% to 24%*) 
Former  
provisions 
  Tax holidays with full tax exemption of 
two years, 50% exemption for the next 
three years, and other tax reductions. 
In local regions: exemption of local 
surcharges, 3% tax exemption of taxable 
income. 
Tax rate, since 
Jan. 2008 
25% 25% 25% 
The tax rates will gradually increase: 
a. 18% 
b. 20% 
c. 22% 
d. 24% 
e. 25% 
Note:  
*) Enterprise tax of 15 per cent in special economic development zones, 24 per cent in coastal regions 
and all provincial capitals. 
Figure 7: Unified tax structure for enterprises in China 
Source: Peoples’s Daily 2007, State Council Circular 39 
With the new Enterprise Income Tax Law, the central government has changed its 
incentive policy from supporting investments in specific geographical regions in the 
past, to industry- and sector-specific investments, like infrastructure, environmental 
protection, research and development, energy and agriculture. On December 26, 2007, 
the State Council released a Circular on the Transitional Preferential EIT Rate61, 
Circular 39 for short, and its Circular on the Transitional Preferential Tax Treatment 
for the Newly Established High- and New-Tech Enterprises in the Special Economic 
Zones and Shanghai Pudong New District62, also known as Circular 40 (PWC 2008). 
Established enterprises that obtain the title of being high- and new-tech enterprises63 
will benefit from a preferential tax rate of 15 per cent. The unified corporate income 
tax legislation has been installed to support the government's financial revenue needs 
and with the aim of keeping China's tax environment internationally competitive. 
According to the Ministry of Finance, dual income tax rates have incurred growing 
 
61 The first circular is Circular 39 which mainly addresses the grandfathering treatments available to Old FIEs.  It 
provides the detailed rules on the phasing-in of the CIT rate of Old FIEs which are currently enjoying an income tax 
rate of lower than 25 per cent under the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax (FEIT) regime to the statutory rate of 25 per 
cent within the five-year period as stipulated in Article 57 of the CIT Law. 
62 Circular 40 clarifies that the specific regions refer to the five special economic zones (namely, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan) and the New Area of Pudong ("5+1 Zones") and the tax incentive applies to HTNEs 
established in the 5+1 Zones on or after January 1, 2008. 
63 High- and new-tech enterprises must possess their own core proprietary intellectual property rights, engage in 
high- and new-tech sectors encouraged by the state, and fulfill the criteria of high- and new-tech products service 
income, research and development (R&D) expenditure, R&D personnel, and others.  
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complaints from domestic enterprises, some of which even disguised themselves as 
overseas-funded ones to receive tax preferences (People’s Daily 2007b), consequently 
the State lost substantial sources of tax income. The new Enterprise Income Tax Law 
also highlights the implementation of anti-tax avoidance rules, with a detailed focus 
on transfer pricing documentation requirements, cost-sharing arrangements, thin 
capitalisation rules, controlled foreign corporation rules and general anti-avoidance 
rules. Furthermore, the state lost overview over the differing tax bases in regions and 
bills receivable. The tax restructuring is consciously designed to meet domestic 
balance requirements thereby concentrating on actual economic, social and 
environmental needs, such as expenditure on ongoing SOE reform, recapitalisation of 
the banking sector, establishment of a social safety net and pension reform.  The 
growth potential in China's tax revenues is jeopardised by tax evasion activities. The 
tax reform aims to close the tax gap in China, the difference between taxes owed and 
taxes paid.  
The actual tax reform is highly linked with corporate governance efforts, as 
legislation attempts to encourage business investment via tax reforms, in particular by 
decreasing the tax burden of selected enterprises. Investment decisions in China are 
primarily taken by the state, which is the main provider of infrastructure projects in 
the country. According to the new law, tax incentives are provided to enterprises 
involved in investment and the operation of certain public infrastructure facilities. 
Enterprises involved in environmental protection and energy and water saving 
projects are exempted from EIT for a three year period, followed by a 50 per cent 
reduction on unified EIT rate for a period of three years. The shareholder, which is 
the state, determines these enterprises objectives, and because of this the tax burden 
of the shareholders, which again is the state, will be relevant for investment decisions 
as well. Therefore tax reform includes investment decisions of the state, which is 
highly linked with the current corporate governance structure in the country. As 
previously discussed, investment decisions of state-owned enterprises are determined 
by the shareholder rather than the management. So the state as the controlling 
shareholder considers upcoming investment decisions in the framework of tax reform.  
Corporate tax reform in China is significant, especially in the light of concentrated 
ownership. Weak institutional arrangements and weak corporate governance 
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mechanisms are an incentive to avoid tax payments. In China, the state is not only tax 
collector but also the dominant shareholder in the state-owned sector. As a 
shareholder, the state has to bear the burden of taxes, as they reduce the companies’ 
profits and also the shareholders’ returns. As a tax collector, the state is interested in 
high tax revenues. However, it is in fact the corporate management that controls 
financial results and therefore influence the tax liability of a company. This situation 
presents a classical principal-agent problem, where the interests of the corporate 
management are not necessarily the same as the interests of the state tax agencies. 
The new tax policy tries to go against tax avoidance where managers capture 
enterprise cash flows. International evidence shows that revenues decline with higher 
tax rates in countries with weak corporate governance (Desai/Dharmapala 2007). The 
new tax policy in China makes allowances for that tendency, by having decreased 
corporate tax from 33 per cent to 25 per cent for state-owned enterprises and domestic 
private enterprises. By imposing tax penalties, the state as a tax authority is 
influencing taxpayer behaviour and is enforcing tax compliance. 
Noteworthy of mention is the fact that according to the new Enterprise Income Tax 
Law §46, interest payments on debt are not deductable anymore. According to the 
Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax as 
promulgated by the State Council in 1993, debt was favoured by the tax system 
before due to the deductibility of interest payments. This signifies a shift from 
monitoring of managers by lenders (state-owned banks) to monitoring of managers by 
equity-holders (state). This shift will have significant implications on corporate 
governance, as the state-owned banks will not anymore act as an intermediary 
between the enterprises and the state, but the state will directly monitor the amount of 
debts by means of published debt-equity ratios. This move reduces agency problems 
caused by the use of debt between state-owned enterprises in the role of lenders and 
the state in the role of the shareholder.  
 
An influencing corporate governance measure accessible to tax departments is the 
Chinese corporate governance code. According to §87 “Chinese listed enterprises 
shall truthfully, accurately, completely and timely disclose information” by means of 
quarterly and annual reports. Under the condition that financial information is reliable, 
tax departments can work with the annual reports, where tax information is published. 
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In general, tax authorities require in the course of tax audits an incremental amount of 
documentation on internal processes and business activities. Taking China’s Top 20 
companies ranked by Fortune 2010 into account, annual reports of these enterprises 
include financial data such as profit before taxation, tax payable and the debt-equity 
ratio. Corporate governance systems and measures are substantial as public financial 
statements can produce meaningful information on tax payments. According to the 
new Enterprise Income Tax Law §54, enterprises are required to enclose financial 
statements and other relevant information in accordance with the relevant regulations, 
when they are filing their annual income tax returns with the tax authority. 
Functioning corporate governance regulation and information systems have a positive 
impact on tax behaviour by enterprises, as transparency and control is automatically 
improved.  
 
The state is challenged to fight tax evasion, which would eventually hinder the 
official national policy of expanding health and social programs. Expansion and 
development of social programs represent an integral part in the concept of a 
harmonious society, according to the Communist Party. Therefore, the tax behaviour 
of Chinese state-owned enterprises is also highly linked with corporate social 
responsibility. Therefore, for a harmonious society to exist, requires that enterprises 
pay taxes to ensure public financing. Consequently, the state and the Communist 
Party are aiming towards the same objectives within the framework of tax reform; the 
fair tax payment of by the enterprises. Competition among jurisdiction to attract 
industries will be limited in the future, due to the introduction of the unified 
enterprise tax structure with similar tax treatment. According to the Tieboutian 
paradigm (1956) of tax competition in the state and local context, mobility among 
individuals and enterprises to other regions occurs because of an excessive tax burden. 
Therefore relocating is an attractive alternative as it enables high tax burdens to be 
avoided. The focus of tax incentives has shifted from special economic regions to the 
entire country and from a regional development orientation to an industry 
orientation.  Furthermore, the new Enterprise Income Tax Law indicates a move away 
from an export-oriented to a domestically driven economy. In addition, with the new 
compliance requirements under the Enterprise Income Tax Law, taxpayers also have 
to face new accounting, tax adjustment and reporting requirements, taking into 
account the new anti-tax avoidance measures. The actual tax change has to be seen 
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among other reasons as a commitment to the WTO for equal tax treatment of 
enterprises.  
 
Tax incentives will be bestowed to critical sectors such as environmental protection, 
agricultural development, water conservation, production safety, high-tech 
development and public welfare undertakings. Therefore, benefits for traditional 
industries, such as manufacturing, will be shifted to new industries with a focus on 
environment, innovation, research and development.  
3.2 Conclusion 
The reform of the state-owned sector represents to be a crucial element in corporate 
governance in China. Other elements are the reform of the banking system, the capital 
market and the accounting reform. The introduction of corporate governance in the 
state-owned sector involves corporatisation and decentralisation. Decentralisation in 
China took place in two areas, with the aim of increasing efficiency. Firstly, in the 
1990s small and medium-sized SOEs were transferred to local governments, 
including the transfer of authority. Whereas the central government concentrates on 
the restructuring of strategically important large state-owned enterprises, the 
restructuring of small and medium-sized SOEs has been turned over to local 
governments. Secondly, in 1994 fiscal decentralisation was realised through the tax 
sharing system64.  
 
The relationship between state-owned enterprises and the government changed 
significantly in the framework of reform. Until 1985 the state imposed direct 
influence on state-owned enterprises, having a vertical relationship. From the external 
corporate governance perspective, the relationship between the state and state-owned 
enterprises changed from a vertical relationship to a horizontal relationship (see 
figure 8 and 9). The government and the Communist Party do possess less power now 
for direct interference, and have to share control rights with external players. State-
owned enterprises no longer serve the state alone, but have to fulfil the expectations 
of several interest groups.  
 
64 Before 1994, decentralization efforts have been already undertaken in the form of the tax-for-profit reform (1983-
84), and the fiscal contracting system (1985-93). Hauff (2002) argues that the tax reform was not initiated for 
decentralization reasons, but rather to strengthen the Chinese political centre.  
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Figure 8: Vertical and horizontal relationship between the state and state-owned enterprises 
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Figure 9: Integrated relationship between the state and state-owned enterprises 
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Each interest group, the central government, the shareholders and the Communist 
Party, pursue particular interests, which are subject to social, political as well 
economic constraints. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang 
Zemin, the central policy approach emphasised high GDP growth of the Chinese 
economy. Only shareholder interests and performance targets were of ultimate 
importance, other stakeholder interests where neglected. Certain stakeholder groups, 
involving state departments and Communist Party members, were not integrated into 
the implementation of corporate governance, or if so only to a very small degree. The 
corporate governance concept responds to the reform requirements of the government, 
thereby concentrating on actual economic and political objectives, such as the 
ongoing enterprise reform, recapitalisation of the banking sector, reform of capital 
market, establishment of a social safety net and pension reform. With this approach 
the central government wants to push reforms within state ownership. As far as it 
concerns state-owned enterprises, corporate governance standards help to turn these 
enterprises into much more efficient ones by improving processes and streamlining 
administration. Furthermore these standards are implemented to help to improve 
supervision and transparency within the enterprises. The government adopts a strong 
position for efficiency-orientation. Since the tax reform in 1994, enterprises have 
been required to work under hard budget constraints. Subsidies and subsidised debt 
hinder companies from facing market forces and competition. As soft budget 
constraints conceal the real financial situation of companies, they are contributing to 
poor transparency in the companies. Changes in the corporate system in China can be 
regarded as changes to the institution building process, mainly influenced by the 
central government and local governments. 
 
Since Hu Jintao changed the central policy approach from high GDP growth of the 
Chinese economy to scientific concept of development, policy efforts place stress on 
people-centred development that is comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable. The 
scientific concept of development responds to domestic requirements thereby 
concentrating on actual social and environmental needs.  With this concept, the 
Chinese Communist Party has taken over a mediator role for differing social interests 
and it shows strong commitment to social corporate responsibility. Thereby it has 
adopted a strong position for value-orientation such as social stability, harmonious 
society, xiao kang (small fortune) and political stability. In actual fact the concept is a 
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trust strengthening tool. With this approach the Communist Party wants to legitimise 
its ruling status. Since the Communist Party’s claim to power is not legitimated by 
democratic elections, the Chinese Communist Party is weighing measures and 
strategies of how to tackle the problem of imminent legitimacy loss (Weigelin-
Schwiedrzik 2007). It is necessary to integrate differing social and economic groups 
by making them understand the political values, culture and economic interests of the 
Communist Party. The actual Chinese debate of social responsibility linked with the 
corporate governance efforts indicates that Chinese policymakers did not simply 
adopt a Western model of corporate governance, but instead consolidated the already 
existing Western models to their country-specific needs. Concluding, with broader 
stakeholder participation, corporate governance standards and regulations can be 
implemented more effective and sustainable. Considering the interests of all 
stakeholder groups leads to consensus over the reform process and the introduction of 
co-ordinated market mechanisms, including employee participation and state 
intervention.  
Differing objectives in the course of economic reforms 
Actor  State Shareholder CPC 
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Figure 10: Objectives in the reform of the state-owned sector 
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China’s one-party regime needs to respond to major interest groups, such as the urban 
working class, if political stability and the immediate survival of the political 
leadership are to be secured (Hu/Opper/Wong 2006:85). For that purpose, the 
Communist Party needs to involve several interests groups, which on one hand share 
overall goals and on the other hand pursue their own interests. The government is 
aiming to increase efficiency and transparency in state-owned enterprises and banks, 
and at the same time the Communist Party is taking over responsibility for social 
objectives (Xinhuanet 2007), which would otherwise lead to social-political 
destabilisation. The controlling shareholder wants profitable companies which are 
competitive in the domestic and international market. As the main investor, it requires 
that companies undertake cost reduction programs which have a positive effect on 
cash flow and performance. The challenge regarding the implementation of corporate 
governance in China is to align and to consolidate all of these differing objectives.  
4 Financial Market Reform 
Financial markets work under a mechanism which allows economic actors to trade, 
normally governed by the theory of supply and demand. Thereby scarce resources are 
allocated through a price mechanism. The financial market plays a key role in 
pushing forward a market-based allocation mechanism instead of state-regulated 
resource allocation. The control function of financial markets is crucial, as investment 
decisions are based on published quarterly and annual company information. In 
general, a healthy financial sector makes a significant contribution to macroeconomic 
stability, economic development and growth.  
 
Different institutional arrangements in Western developed countries lead to different 
roles of the banking sector and the capital market in corporate governance. So far 
scholars did not find a consensus concerning related advantages and disadvantages of 
each corporate governance regime (Classens 2006; La Porta 1997, 1998, 2002; Fama 
1991) in financial markets. In the United States and Anglo-Saxon countries, 
corporations rely primarily on equity financing on the capital markets, based on liquid 
capital markets, dispersed ownership and large stock exchange. In Continental Europe 
and Japan, corporations rely primarily on debt financing from bank institutions. 
Banks are holding voting rights in trust of smaller shareholders and bank-enterprise 
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relations are traditionally strong, where banks are an important source for financing. 
Roe (1997) states that banking and tax laws in the Anglo-Saxon countries discourage 
relational investments by banks in industrial enterprises, and encourage them in 
Germany and Japan. Thus, in Germany and Japan, banks and other corporate 
investors share a degree of control over enterprise decisions.  
 
This chapter does not attempt to analyse the specific features of Western models of 
corporate governance in financial markets, but will pay attention to the role of 
corporate governance in the banking sector and the capital market in China. In China, 
the financial market is undergoing a transition from socialism, so the underlying 
conditions for the system will be analysed, by looking at the internal and external 
corporate governance framework in Chinese banking sector and the capital market.  
 
Corporate financing in China is driven by the loan policy based on the macro policy 
of the state. Today, Chinese corporations rely rather on long-term credit financing and 
retained revenues (see chapter 4.1.4, table 10)65, where financing from the capital 
market plays a subordinated role only. So far, the capital market does not possess 
such a strong role compared to the banking sector in China (see chapter 4.1.4). Large 
commercial banks primary favour in their lending decisions enterprises where the 
state owns a large portion of shares, or where they own shareholder rights. In the 
following the role of differing interest groups in the financial market reform, namely 
the state, the Communist Party, state-owned enterprises and banks and national and 
international investors will be examined. Financial market reform is accompanied by 
the implementation of corporate governance standards, as the controlling shareholder 
as well as international investors’ demands efficiency and transparency in the banking 
sector as well as in the capital market.  
4.1 Banking System  
The Chinese banking system is in a situation of transition as it has emerged from a 
central planning economy to operate in a socialist market economy. Among all other 
industries in the domestic economy, the banking sector in China is characterized by 
the highest level of state regulation and supervision. State intervention in the form of 
 
65 In the framework of corporate reforms (starting 1994), the capital market played an important role for refinancing, 
by turning state-owned enterprises into corporations. 
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public ownership or the lender of last resort in the banking sector is not a unique 
phenomenon, but is also observed in other countries such as France, Germany, Italy 
and Japan (La Porta et al. 2002). Bank nationalisation is regarded from two 
perspectives. In some countries bank nationalisation is regarded as control tool with 
the aim to monitor the business landscape such as in China, Russia and South 
America. In other countries, bank nationalisation is regarded as temporary support 
program during severe economic crises, where banks are saved from insolvency, such 
as in France, UK, Sweden, Germany and USA66. Within the shocks of the financial 
crises, governments take measures by taking control over banking institutions. 
Government bailout’s in the banking sector aim to stabilize the health of banks, 
public confidence and trust, and expansion of lending.    
 
La Porta et al. (2002) tries to explain the role of governments in the financial sector, 
where it is distinguished between two prevailing views. The first view is the development 
view associated with Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), who focuses on the necessity 
of financial development for economic growth. According to this approach, the state 
can develop and support strategic industries through both direct ownership of industries 
and ownership of banks, by channeling savings into specific industries. The second view 
is the political view, where the state and politicians pursue control over investment by 
firms, but emphasizes political rather than social objectives. This view is associated 
with Kornai (1979), and Shleifer and Vishny (1994), where governments acquire 
control of enterprises and banks in order to provide employment, subsidies and other 
benefits to supporters, who return the favor in the form of votes, political 
contributions, and bribes. La Porta (2002) concludes that the attraction of such 
political control over banks is presumably the greatest in countries with 
underdeveloped financial systems and poorly protected property rights, because the 
government does not need to compete with the private sector as a source of funds. In 
fact, in the Chinese case, state interference arises from a mixture of both implications, 
and allows the state and Communist Party to have control over the selection of project 
finance and resource allocation. In contrast to the enterprise sector where competition 
through the private sector has been introduced during the reforms, the banking sector 
 
66 Since the world financial crises in 2008, several commercial banks have been nationalized or partly nationalized 
through government bail-outs, such as the 25 per cent stake in Germany's Commerzbank, nationalization of Hypo 
Real Estate, partly nationalization of Citigroup and Royal bank of Scotland (Source: publicly available information). 
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in China is subject to limited and constrained competition and liberalisation 
regulations, with the objective to maintain stability in the country.  
 
According to the Oxford Handbook of Banking (2010), banks perform several roles 
in the economy:  
“First, they ameliorate the information problems between investors and borrowers by 
monitoring the latter and ensuring a proper use of the depositors’ funds.  
Second, they provide intertemporal smoothing of risk that cannot be diversified at a 
given point in time as well as insurance to depositors against unexpected 
consumption shocks. Because of the maturity mismatch between their assets and 
liabilities, however, banks are subject to the possibility of runs and systemic risk.  
Third, banks contribute to the growth of the economy.  
Fourth, they perform an important role in corporate governance. The relative 
importance of the different roles of banks varies substantially across countries and 
times but, banks are always critical to the financial system.” 
 
Understanding the many roles that banks play in the Chinese financial system, might 
be helpful to get a picture of the current situation of the Chinese banking sector. In 
the following section, the historical background and the current situation of the 
banking reform will be elaborated upon and an overview of actual corporate 
governance efforts in the banking sector will be provided.  
4.1.1 Historical Background of the Banking System Reform 
In a centrally planned economy, the banking sector’s main role is to work on behalf 
of the centrally organised administration. Banks play a rather passive role, which is 
integrated into the system in order to control the fulfilment of predetermined plans 
and market constraints are nearly not known. In China, the banking system was 
consciously adapted to the needs of the socialist framework of the economy. Under 
the leadership of Mao Zedong, China’s economy can be described as a non-monetary 
economy, where the currency was a tool for measuring the planning agencies in order 
to control the effectiveness of the working units, especially the state-owned 
enterprises (Zhu Jia Ming 2010). In a monetary economy the price is determined by 
demand and supply and therefore is the dominant mechanism for distribution. Further, 
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money is not only a means of exchange on markets, but also, and primarily, a means 
of payment between creditors and debtors. In a non-monetary economy, price is not 
the mechanism for distribution. In the allocation of resources, interest rates play no 
role, as funds are allocated following the central plan of lending. As state-owned 
enterprises benefit from government guarantees, creditworthiness is neglected. When 
a command economy is prevailing, like it was in China until 1978, the economy is 
closed; the planning board fixes wages and prices and sets production and 
employment targets. Firms do not compete for resources but fulfil the predetermined 
plan targets. The centrally planned economy was characterised by egalitarism, a lack 
of interest in economic results and a low sense of economic and legal responsibility. 
Each financial institution, like the banking system, the stock market and the value of 
the currency (and prices) are under the control of the government (Zhu Jia Ming 
2010).  
 
Following the idea of Lenin and the Soviet model, China established a mono bank 
system. According to Lenin, the banking system should represent the core of the 
administrative apparatus of the socialist state.  
 
Lenin noted: 
“Without big banks, socialism would be impossible. The big banks are the “state 
apparatus” which we need to bring about socialism, and which we take ready-make 
from capitalism…A single state bank, the biggest of the big, with branches in every 
rural district, in every factory, will constitute as much as nine-tenths of the socialist 
apparatus. There will be country-wide bookkeeping and country –wide accounting of 
the production and distribution of goods”. (Lenin 1961) 
 
In all socialist countries, both in Eastern Europe as well as in Asia, banks were 
integrated into a mono bank system. The mono bank’s role was (People’s Bank of 
China) to implement the central credit plan that was made up by the State Council 
and the Ministry of Finance. State-owned banks in socialist countries were in charge 
of credit allocation and coordination of investment finance on every level in the state-
owned sector. In China, state banks transferred household deposits by means of credit 
allocation to state-owned enterprises. A high rate of household savings was resulting 
from low household consumption activities. So households’ deposits served in first 
 129 
place as a financial provision for the industrialisation process in the country (Zhu Jia 
Ming 2010). In general state-owned banks were characterised by directed credit 
lending, minimum banking supervision and poor accounting regulation.  
4.1.2 Reform of the Banking System 
Since 2003, policymakers were successful in their effort to restructure the banking 
sector from the bad debt problem in the system, but with the constraint, that further 
market reforms are not implemented and financial discipline is not enforced. Reform 
efforts are limited where Party and state related important interest groups support 
partial reform activities, which preserve the traditional soft lending policy in the 
country. The banking system remains the most unreformed and troubled economic 
sector in China (Pei 2006; Shih 2009). Nevertheless, even with almost no structural 
change in the banking system the Chinese economy realized durable high growth 
rates since 1994. Bank executives are challenged by adhering to government 
directions in continuous lending policies and at the same time working profitable.  
 
The Chinese state-owned banking sector’s core activity is still to provide financial 
resources to state-owned enterprises and private consumption; financing of the private 
business and entrepreneurs for growth is nearly non-existent. According to the 
evaluation of reform measures undertaken by Pei (2006), reforms in the banking 
sector have failed. Neither the state’s nor the Party’s control and intervention has 
been reduced, nor has competition improved in the sector. Competition has not been 
introduced as the structure of the banking sector still shows the dominant monopoly 
position on financial intermediation of the state-owned banks. Since state-owned 
enterprises started to obtain credit from the banks in 1994, and do not receive any 
more budgetary disbursements, the banking system is an integral part in realising 
policy and political purposes on behalf of the Communist Party and the state. State 
regulation is actually the root problem of the creation of the huge amount of non-
performing loans and the ongoing recapitalisation activities. By decentralising credit 
allocation decisions to banks, policymakers had initially aimed to discipline the 
financial activities of the state-owned enterprises. Reform efforts in the banking 
sector mainly focus on moving closer to international best practices within the 
framework of economic liberalisation by maintaining the state’s control. Until 1984, 
the People’s Bank of China served both as central bank and commercial bank. In 
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1984, the Chinese government transferred some commercial operations to four former 
branches of the central bank: the Agricultural Bank of China for the rural sector, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China for the industrial sector, the Construction 
Bank of China for long-term investment and the Bank of China for foreign exchange 
business (Annual Report, BOC 2008). These four banks compete for financial 
resources, therefore enterprises and private individuals are allowed to open accounts 
with more than one bank. Additionally, regulations impose restrictions on state-
owned banks concerning their scope of activities and monitoring capability in which 
different industry they can engage. Although the market share of the four commercial 
banks has slightly declined over the years, the structure of the Chinese corporate 
banking sector has remained unchanged to this day. These four banks continue to 
keep their leading market share in terms of assets (see table 6) as well as profitability. 
Although in 2003 these four banks were unprofitable, in 2007 they accounted for 55 
per cent of profit after tax of all banking institutions and in 2008 for 61 per cent of 
profit after tax of all banking institutions (Annual report CBRC 2008). 
 
in %  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008 
 Large commercial banks   58 57 56 55 53  52 
Other bank institutions   42 43 44 45 47  48 
 
Note:  
Other banking institutions include policy banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city 
commercial banks, rural commercial banks, rural cooperative banks, urban credit 
cooperatives, rural credit cooperatives, postal savings banks,  foreign banks, non-bank 
financial institutions. 
Table 6: Market share of the four state-owned commercial banks in total assets. 
Source: Annual report CBRC 2008 
 
 
All four state-owned commercial banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
Construction Bank of China, Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China) have 
changed from a wholly-owned state bank structure to a shareholding state bank 
structure. Other shareholders besides the Chinese government are now allowed to 
hold shares in these banks, thus the state remains their largest shareholder. 
 
Today the Peoples’ Bank of China, which works under the guidance of the State 
Council, supervises and regulates the banking institutions in the financial market 
amongst other responsibilities. By 2008, there existed 5,634 legal banking entities, 
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including 4 state-owned commercial banks 67 , 3 policy banks 68 , 12 joint-stock 
commercial banks69, 4 financial asset management companies, 136 city commercial 
banks, 22 urban credit cooperatives, 4,965 rural credit cooperatives, 22 rural 
commercial banks, 163 rural cooperative banks, 91 village and township banks, 6 
lending banks, 10 mutual credit companies, 84 finance cooperatives of enterprise 
groups, 32 foreign banks, 57 trust and investment companies, 75 finance companies, 
12 financial leasing companies, 9 auto finance companies and 1 postal savings banks 
(Annual report CBRC 2008). The introduction of these differing small and medium 
sized banking entities resulted from the Decision on Financial System Reform 
promulgated by the State Council in 1993. The objective of this reform step was to 
create a competitive commercial banking sector where state banks co-existed along 
side with other forms of banking entities.  
 
The State Council stated:  
“…The goals of the financial structure reform are:…to set up the financial 
organisation system that separates policy finance from the commercial finance, 
makes the state-commercial banks principal part and different financial institutions 
coexist…” (State Council 1993) 
 
The decision on the separation of policy financing from commercial financing 
promoted competition within the Chinese banking sector under state ownership. 
Through a new and diversified ownership structure, banking institutions offer 
banking services to households and firms, mainly in urban areas. In 1996, the first 
non-state bank, China Minsheng Bank70, was founded, with stock mainly being held 
by non-state investors. In 2001, in accordance with WTO’s accession that the banking 
sector should be liberalised, entry barriers for foreign banks were relaxed. Since 2003, 
foreign banks have been allowed to give loans to Chinese companies in selected cities, 
by 2006 all regional and other restrictions ceased to exist and foreign banks were able 
to offer their product portfolio without limitations (Mahlich/Zhu 2005:78). 
 
67 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (中国工商银行), Agricultural Bank of China (中国农业银行), Bank 
of China (中国银行), and Construction Bank of China (中国建设银行). 
68 China Development Bank, Agricultural Development Bank of China, Export and Import Bank of China. 
69 Among others: Bank of Communications (交通银行), China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
Industrial Bank (中国中信集团公司), China Everbright Bank (中国光大银行), and Hua Xia Bank (华夏银行).  
70 In 2000, China Minsheng Bank(中国民生银行) listed its shares at the Shanghai Stock Exchange, with 70 per 
cent private shares (http://www.cmbc.com.cn, 2008). 
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Regulations in the scope of foreign bank competition are regarded as control 
mechanism to prevent undesirable behaviour which would lead to a conflict of 
interest. The potential presence of foreign banks might decrease the state’s control 
over the economy. It is estimated that multinational foreign banks will mainly 
penetrate urban areas with high growth expectations, whereas rural areas will remain 
unattractive for market penetration. Regardless of this, foreign banks have opened 
branches or representative offices, but their activities can be regarded as limited. The 
financial system reform introduced diversified ownership in the banking landscape. 
All these banking institutions compete for household and enterprise deposits and 
savings in the Chinese banking sector. Policymakers recognised the need to separate 
policy financing from commercial financing in order to allow reform efforts to 
become successful. In the following, the progress of reform efforts with regard to the 
internal and external corporate governance framework in state-owned banks will be 
examined. 
4.1.3 Internal Corporate Governance and Institutional Change in State-owned 
banks 
In 2004, the CBRC (Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission) promulgated ten 
guidelines for corporate governance in a pilot programme for two Chinese state-
owned banks, the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank. State-owned 
banks reform is based on three cornerstones: the recapitalisation of banks, the 
establishment of corporate governance principles, and the public listing on the stock 
market. In the following, the internal corporate governance framework of Chinese 
state-owned banks is examined, with regard to the question to which degree the 
guidelines and recommendations of the corporate governance code are applied and 
where they meet limitations in the Chinese context. The code consists of ten parts, 
and is written down in the Guidelines on Corporate Governance Reforms and 
Supervision of Bank of China and Construction Bank of China. In the meantime, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China as well as the Agricultural Bank of China 
have also participated in the pilot programme. Beside the implementation of the 
corporate governance guidelines, all four banks were recapitalised.  
 
 133 
Changes in the regulatory environment involved the development of the nation’s 
financial regulatory system, strong focus on risk management, enactment of new rules 
and regulations as well as the introduction of stricter auditing and accounting 
standards which are in line with the states approach of efficiency and transparency 
improvement within the state sector. In 2009 the China Banking Association (CBA) 
introduced guidelines on corporate social responsibility for the banking sector in 
China. Its objective is to promote comprehensive corporate social responsibility 
programs within Chinese financial institutions (China Banking Association 2009). 
The guidelines are in line with the Communist Party’s national policy of promoting a 
harmonious society and sustainable development in the state-owned sector. The 
corporate social responsibility guidelines address the active protection of 
stakeholder’s interests such as consumers, employees and the community and 
mention the economic responsibility of corporate governance compliance within the 
corporate banking sector. 
4.1.3.1 Corporate Governance Structure 
Article §§ 4 requires a clear corporate governance structure comprising the 
general shareholders meeting, a board of directors, a board of supervisors 
and an executive management, with all the necessary checks and balances. 
The two state-owned banks undertaking the pilot reform are required to 
establish standard corporate governance structures, so as to ensure scientific 
decision-making and efficient enforcement and supervision in line with the 
principle of segregation of responsibilities combined with effective cross-
supervision.  
 
Taking China’s top banks ranked among the China’s Top 20 companies by Fortune 
2010 into account, the corporate structure and the relationship between the executive 
board and the Chinese Communist Party and the central government is analysed. The 
board of the large commercial banks is composed beside of directors and executive 
directors, also of nonexecutive and independent directors. The results prove that in all 
four state-owned banks (Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China) a general shareholders 
meeting, a board of directors, a board of supervisors and an executive management is 
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installed, and that Communist Party members assume top management positions. 
Consequently, Communist Party members in the corporate board directly influence 
corporate decision making in credit lending and capital allocation. Priority in funding 
projects is given to recommendations of the State Council and the Central Committee. 
Senior officials and board members benefit from the alignment with the Party, as in 
the long run they will be considered in promotion decisions (Pei 2006; Shih 2009). 
The corporate structure in these state-owned banks, whose headquarters are all based 
in Beijing, shows the same unique feature of corporate governance as in state-owned 
enterprises. New corporate bodies exist next to old corporate bodies, which remain 
powerful in most of the Chinese banks and continue to play an influential role. 
Although formal corporate governance standards have been introduced, old business 
practices may not have changed. This model of corporate structure is mostly 
challenged by balancing the interests of differing networks of trust relationships. In 
almost the same manner as in state-owned enterprises, the new corporate bodies 
cannot act independently, which has to a certain degree a negative effect on corporate 
governance. The old corporate bodies promote and protect the position of the state 
and the Communist Party. Through these corporate bodies, the state as well as the 
Communist Party can directly influence investment decisions of the board by 
approving or withholding funds and credit allocation. Consequently political 
intervention in the banking sector is still maintained and with the objective of 
financing the industrialisation process in the country. The anticipated 
commercialisation of Chinese banks is line with the reform activities by the state to 
turn Chinese banks into healthy and efficient enterprises. The Communist Party is 
supporting the state in maintaining control over finance, since deliberated resource 
allocation for the industrialisation process is crucial to the stability of the country.  
4.1.3.2 Involvement of Strategic Investors 
Article §§ 5 encourages the selection of domestic and foreign strategic 
investors to form synergy. Strategic investors from China and foreign 
countries with solid financial strength and superb management skills will be 
invited, based on fairness and equity, to take stakes in the two banks as an 
effort to improve their equity structure, capital base and management. 
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In accordance with the WTO accession in 2001, authorities allow more foreign 
participation in the existing banks. Beijing agreed to open gradually up its banking 
system to foreign investors by the end of 2006, over a five-year period. Opening up 
its banking system to foreign investors also demands for more commercial orientation 
and elementary reform of Chinese state-owned banking institutions. Up until now, 
foreign banks have had limited access to China’s domestic banking business. If 
multinational banks become shareholders of Chinese state-owned banks, then 
according to international regulations for corporations, shareholders can have a strong 
influence on the system although they are not in the majority. Although the state does 
show sympathy for the idea of foreign participation in existing Chinese banks, this 
only extends to a certain degree. From the point of view of the Chinese government, 
the function of the foreign bank should be primarily concerned in mobilising of 
capital but not in obtaining of a strategic majority. In 2004, foreign equity stakes in 
Chinese banking institutions were approximately 2 per cent of total banking capital. 
In an international perspective, China is in last place, and more in line with other 
Asian emerging countries, where the share of foreign banks is usually 10 per cent or 
less. On the contrary, the foreign banks’ share of Hong Kong banks is 33 per cent, 
and in Malaysia is 24.4 per cent. In Eastern Europe, foreign banks’ had a 48.3 percent 
share of the Czech Republic’s banks in 2001. In Poland this was 68.8 per cent in 2001 
and in Russia 8.1 per cent in 2003 (OECD 2005b:151).  
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Chinese Bank Year 
since 
Foreign investor Price  
in USD 
Stake in % 
China Everbright Bank  1996 Asian Development Bank 20 million 2 
Bank of Nanjing 2001 International Finance Corporation 
BNP Paribas 
27 million 
87 million 
5 
12.6 
Bank of Shanghai 
 
2002 
 
British HSBC 
    Shanghai Commercial Bank (HK) 
International Finance Corporation 
133 million 
n/a 
 
8 
3 
   7 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
2003 Citigroup 72 million 5 (option of increasing its 
stake) 
China Bank of 
Communication 
2004 British HSBC 2.25 billion 20
China Construction Bank  2005 Bank of America 
Temasek 
Reca Investment Limited 
Fullerton Financial Holdings 
3 billion 
2.4 billion 
n/a 
n/a 
9 (option of increase stake) 
5.9 
0.34 
5.65 
China Industrial Bank 2005 Hang Seng Bank 
International Finance Corporation 
GIC Special Investment of Singapore 
208 million 
52 million 
65 million 
12.78 
3.2 
4 
China Minsheng Banking 2005 Temasek 
International Finance Corporation 
n/a 
23 million 
5 
0.93 
Bank of China 2005 Royal Bank of Scotland 3.1 billion 10
  Temasek a 3.1 billion 10
Industrial & Commercial 
Bank of China 
2005 Goldman Sachs 
American Express 
Allianz Investments 
3 billion 
n/a 
n/a 
10 
0.4 
1.9 
Hangzhou City Commercial 
Bank 
2005 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
Asian Development Bank 
78 million 
30 million 
19.9 
4.9 
Bank of Beijing 2005 ING Group 
International Finance Corporation 
215 million 
54 million 
16.7 
4.04 
Chinese Guangdong 
Development Bank 
2006 Citigroup 
IBM 
n/a 
n/a 
20 
4.74 
Xi'an City Commercial 
Bank 
2009 Scotiabank (Canada) 155 million 20
Qilu Bank 2009 Commonwealth Bank of Australia n/a 20 
Hua Xia  Bank 2010 Deutsche Bank 2.3 billion 19.9
     
Xi'an City Commercial 
Bank 
2009 Scotiabank (Canada) 155 million 20
Note:  
a  Currently, the biggest foreign player in China's banking sector 
Table 7: Foreign stake in Chinese banks 
Source: Compiled by the author (Publicly available information at Citigroup, Bank of America, HSBC, 
IFC, Bank of China, and other sources) 
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Although, the Chinese government does not want to give up ownership, as they do 
not want to lose control over banks, in 2003, the CBRC raised the limit from 15 per 
cent to 20 per cent for the stake a single foreign investor can hold in a domestic bank. 
It increased the limit further to 25 per cent for two foreign shareholders (China Daily 
2005), and foreign involvement in domestic institutions is under government control 
and ownership limits for foreign investors have been installed in Chinese banks, at the 
moment capped at 20 per cent per investor and 25 per cent combined foreign 
ownership (China Daily 2005). Stringent ownership regulations are regarded as 
control mechanism to prevent undesirable behaviour in financial institutions which 
would lead to a conflict of interest. High presence of foreign investors might decrease 
the state’s control over the state-owned banks. The opportunities implied by China’s 
continued economic growth, combined with China’s vast population and high 
national saving rate, provide an intriguing market for foreign financial institutions. 
For both sides there is a win-win situation, as China benefits from having foreign 
investors buy in and foreign investors benefit from being there.  
Acquiring equity stakes in big state-owned commercial banks has its strategic 
advantages (Hui 2006): Firstly, there is an opportunity to operate a huge distribution 
network in China. For example, Bank of America’s business partner China 
Construction Bank has 14,500 bank branches and 12,500 ATMs across the country, 
and has 136 million retail accounts – a number close to half the size of the population 
in the United States. Secondly, there is a vision of serving a growing group of 
multinational clients who do business in China. For instance, Bank of America and 
China Construction Bank co-introduced a free wire transfer service between the Bay 
area on the U.S. west coast and several big cities in China including Beijing and 
Shanghai. Thirdly, foreign banks can conduct certain business practises through their 
Chinese partners, which they are not allowed to do under Chinese law. Recently, 
Bank of America entered the Chinese credit card market by working with its partner 
China Construction Bank, even though foreign banks are banned from issuing bank 
cards independently in China. The anticipated outcome promises to improve the 
governance of the banking landscape and its operational efficiency. According to 
Anderson (2005:12) the purpose of selling to foreigners is never to get money only. 
Instead, the government found that overseas investors provided a one-stop shop for 
enterprise reforms. Global management consultants, human resources and investment 
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banking firms take the reins of the restructuring process, identifying and stripping off 
unproductive assets, clarifying pension liabilities, carrying out audits and redefining 
governance responsibilities.  
 
The result by selling off stakes in large banks is more profitability and transparency 
within the state-owned banking sector, which is in line with the state’s approach of 
efficiency orientation. Allowing foreign banks to acquire shares in Chinese banks has 
undoubtedly had its advantages. But from the point of view of the Chinese 
government, the function of the foreign bank should be primarily in bringing fresh 
investment capital into the banking sector and helping to undertake necessary reforms, 
but again not in obtaining a strategic majority. In December 2006, the CBRC has 
approved regulations which allow wholly-owned foreign banks to obtain a licence for 
offering banking services and retail business (CBRC 2006). Since 2003, the foreign 
banks’ total assets grew steadily, and overall market share accounts for 1.83 per cent 
in 2010 versus 1.7 per cent in 2009 (PWC 2011:4). Summarising, the Chinese 
banking sector is characterised by a highly monopolistic structure and ownership is 
more or less restricted in the national banking landscape.  
4.1.3.3 Performance-Based Strategy 
Article §§ 6 demands the setting out of clear-cut strategies. The two banks 
must develop a market-oriented perception to identify development strategy 
based on comprehensive analysis of each bank's core business competence 
and market competition advantage. The two banks need to produce their core 
business development plan compatible with their operational performance 
targets and will at the same time set a detailed enforcement timeframe for 
such a plan. 
 
The Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC 2004) determined seven 
benchmarks to develop a performance based culture for state-owned banks. Key 
performance indicators support the definition and help measure the progress towards 
organisational targets. Key performance indicators assess the actual situation of 
activities and prescribe milestones for operational target achievement. Reform 
progress will be reviewed on a quarterly and annual basis, based on key performance 
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indicators such as net return on assets (ROA), net return on equity (ROE), 
cost/revenue ratio, non-performing asset ratio, capital adequacy ratio (CAR), large 
exposure and loss provisioning coverage ratio. Performance indicators are 
successfully implemented in the state-owned commercial banks and are reported on a 
regular basis in quarterly and annual reports. Performance figures prove that 
commercial banks have been transformed into profitable enterprises, which is in line 
with the state’s strong position for efficiency-orientation within the state-owned 
sector.  
 
   Indicator           KPI ICBC BOC CCB ABC 
Profitability 
Return on average assets (%) 1.21 1.02 1.31 0.84 
Return on average equity (%) 19.43 14.55 20.68 -- 
Cost to income ratio (%) 29.84 37.59 36.77 44.71 
Asset quality Nonperforming loan ratio (%) 2.29 2.65 2.21 4.32 
Capital 
adequacy 
Capital adequacy ratio (%) 13.06 13.43 12.16 9.41 
Table 8: Key performance indicators 2008 for Chinese state-owned commercial banks 
Source: Compiled by the author (Annual reports 2008 ICBC, BOC, CCB and ABC) 
 
All four banks are ranked among the Fortune’s 2010 Top 20 enterprises in China. 
According to the global ranking of the world’s largest 500 corporations, Industrial & 
Commercial Bank of China with revenue of USD 69.3 billion is placed on 82 
(Previous rank 2008: 92), the China Construction Bank with revenue of USD 58.4 
billion is placed at 116 (Previous rank 2008: 125), the Agricultural Bank of China  
with a revenue of USD 49.7 billion is ranked at 141 (Previous rank 2008: 155), and 
the Bank of China with a revenue of USD 49.7 billion is placed at 143 (Previous rank 
2008: 145). In this regard, the state-owned commercial banks do not follow only 
internal performance requirements of their controlling shareholder but also follow 
latest developments in the global market which has enhanced their international 
competitiveness and presence. At the moment the large commercial banks are 
targeting a broader global presence. At the end of 2008, the 5 large commercial banks 
set up 78 tier-one overseas operating entities located across Asia, Europe, America, 
Africa and Oceania. Furthermore, acquisition and investments in 5 foreign banks 
involving investment capital of approximately USD 7.13 billion have been realised 
(Annual report CBRC 2008). Overseas activities are in line with governments 
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anticipated strategy to encourage Chinese companies to expand globally. Thus, 
reform efforts in the banking sector have successfully resulted in moving towards 
international best practices. 
4.1.3.4 Risk Management and Information Technology 
Article §§ 7 requires the establishment of sound decision-making process, 
internal controls and risk management system. The two banks are required to 
put in place relevant systems to assess and control credit risks, market risks 
and operational risks. Moreover, concrete measures will be taken to 
effectively identify measure, monitor, control and defuse risks, and establish 
clear accountability arrangement. 
 
Article §§ 11 requires the building of an up-to-date management information 
system. The two banks must speed up construction of their information and 
technology supporting systems to improve business management, risk control 
and financial services. 
 
Both articles aim to improve transparency and information disclosure in state-owned 
banks. Against the background of change in the corporate credit culture in state-
owned banks, appropriate systems to monitor risk elements have been implemented, 
including the 10-plus loan classification system. Further plans have been set up to 
implement the internal rating-based loan systems in order to comply with Basle II and 
Basel III regulations. The Chinese government shares the vision of the good 
governance represented by the Basel Committee, as it is regarded as a commitment to 
stability in the banking sector and in the economy. Risk management and the 
implementation of Basel II and Basel III requirements are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4.3. 
4.1.3.5 Organizational Structure 
Article §§ 8 encourages the adoption of reduced layers of hierarchy and a 
streamlined business structure. In 2004, the two banks will strive to reform 
the existing decision-making and information management system and start to 
introduce a sound, independent and highly efficient business operation system 
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and institutional framework. Institutional layouts will be rationalised and 
business lines will be vertically organised to improve resource allocation and 
business efficiency. 
 
In 2003, the government amended the Law on the People’s Bank of China and the 
Commercial Banking Law, resulting in the foundation of the Chinese Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC). The commission is charged with the objective of 
strengthening financial regulations and monitoring the non performing-loan ratio. 
Before this, the banking sector was solely overseen by the central bank, and no 
independent regulatory agency existed. This initiative signified a first attempt to 
establish a property rights system within the banking landscape by indicating which 
state department holds ownership over Chinese banks accompanied with rights and 
responsibilities. Initially, the central bank reluctantly accepted the idea of the creation 
of an independent regulatory agency, with some components even opposing it. At that 
time the central bank shifted the debate to a wide range of alternative proposals in the 
other direction, ranging from the consolidation of all financial regulations under the 
People’s Bank of China to the establishment of an independent regulatory agency 
under the leadership of the People’s Bank of China (Shih 2005:38). Further, in 2003, 
Central Huijin 71  Investment was established which operates as an investment 
company owned by the Chinese state. The company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
China Investment Corporation with a corporate board of directors and board of 
supervisors. The members of the board of directors and board of supervisors are 
appointed by and are accountable to the State Council (Central Huijin Investment 
2010). The principal shareholder rights of Central Huijin Investment are exercised by 
the State Council. The purpose of Central Huijin is to create an organizational 
structure by which the state can operate as a shareholder for the large big four 
commercial state-owned banks and other financial institutions. Through the board of 
directors, the state can directly influence investment decisions and allocation of 
financial funds, as well as strategic decision-making in financial institutions. 
Therefore the state possesses clear control over capital allocation, corporate 
governance activities and initiation of reforms in the banking sector. By 2009, Central 
Huijin is holding a 67.5 per cent stake in Bank of China, 48.2 per cent in China 
 
71 Central Huijin Investment 中央汇金投资有限责任公司 also possesses shares in insurance and security 
companies.  
 142 
Construction Bank, 35.4 per cent in Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and 50 
per cent in Agricultural Bank of China. Further, Central Huijin is holding a 49 per 
cent stake in China Development Bank and 71 per cent in China Everbright Bank 
(Central Huijin Investment 2010).  
4.1.3.6 Human Resource Management and Personal Training 
Article §§ 9 deals with the introduction of accountability and motivation. The 
two banks are required to create a market-based human resources 
management system as adopted in modern financial institutions, which is 
characterised by effective incentives and disciplines. Under such a system, 
employees will be recruited based on the agreed contract and no lifetime 
employment is guaranteed. An employee will also be rewarded or punished 
based on performance. 
 
Article §§ 12 states the importance of underpinning staff training plus talents 
recruiting. Competent people hold the key to the success of modern financial 
institutions. The two banks should make comprehensive plans to strengthen 
staff training and recruit competent people to fill the key posts. 
 
Initiatives in human resource management focus on the standardisation of processes 
and refinement of the organisational structure for regulatory purposes in state-owned 
banks. More focus is put on staff training, by means of career design and training 
programs. It is anticipated that the change will result in the selection and appointment 
of executive members according to performance assessment criterion, which should 
see a reduction in the appointments made directly by government authorities. Further, 
training programs focus on the improvement of the professional ability of bank 
employees and supervisors in risk management and credit appraisals which includes 
the assessment of the various risks that can impact on the repayment of loans. As 
outlined above, this shift in culture will be hard to achieve as cadres and directors 
working for state-owned banks are still selected according to their loyalty to the 
Communist Party, therefore not only their professional ability but also their political 
will is necessary in this process of change management.   
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4.1.3.7 Accounting and Transparency 
Article §§ 10 deals with accounting practices and transparency. The two 
banks must start with the process of gradually adopting international 
accounting practices now as they are required for a modern financial 
institution or a share-holding company. Additionally they must establish a 
prudent accounting system and transparent information disclosure 
arrangement. The annual reports of the two banks must be subject to auditing 
by an internationally accepted intermediary institution and proper 
information disclosure arrangement must be established. 
Disclosure and transparency requirements in the light of the ongoing accounting 
reform are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
4.1.3.8 Restructuring 
Article §§ 13 Giving a full play to the professional consulting services. The 
two banks need to take advantage of the professional services offered by the 
intermediary institutions in the market through commissioning the 
internationally accepted accounting (auditing) firms, financial or legal 
advisory agencies to conduct external auditing, assessment and due diligence 
investigation so as to steadily push ahead the share-holding transformation 
process. Based on progress made in this area, the two banks will be allowed 
to use supplementary capital to boost their capital base following 
international practice.  
 
Restructuring efforts aim to transform the state-owned banks into commercial 
operating banks. Reforms steps taken include recapitalisation of commercial banks; 
internal restructuring and stock listing. Besides structural restructuring, policymakers 
are also taking measures for the financial restructuring of the banks. Financial 
restructuring aims to solve the non-performing loan issue in the country, but the 
introduction of further restructuring programs are delayed or hardly existing, which 
include efficient financial intermediation, establishment of supporting institutions 
following the principles of private property rights, competition, and prudent 
regulation. Reforms resulted so far in a two-tier banking system with four commercial 
state-owned banks replacing the monobank. Further, specialized banks have been 
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created which are no longer sector-restricted, and a limited number of private banks 
were allowed to enter the market due to liberalization. Enterprise reform and 
restructuring efforts also included the establishment of four financial state-owned 
asset management companies, with the aim to transfer bad debt to China’s asset 
management companies (see chapter 4.1.4.3).72 Reforms did not terminate sector-
specific lending provided by policy banks and state commercial banks. Further, the 
government did not formulate any plan for state-owned bank privatization. Guided by 
the scientific concept of development strategy, the People’s Bank of China, the 
Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission and other administrative authorities 
encourage commercial banks to adapt their lending to specific borrowers in light of 
relevant government industrial policies; loan growth is restricted administratively. 
Encouraged industries include enterprises with cutting-edge technology, market 
recognition and competitiveness; national key construction or infrastructure projects 
such as urban power grid development, railway, airport and highway network 
construction; small and medium enterprises; technology upgrading projects, merger & 
acquisitions; ecological and environment-friendly projects; construction of rural 
infrastructure, medical and sanitation facilities, and elementary and high school 
premises; building of low-rent houses and affordable houses for urban low-income 
residents; post-disaster reconstruction (CBRC 2008). Thus, monetary policy remains 
tailored to domestic macroeconomic conditions. In response to the global financial 
crises, lending was increased following an investment plan being part of stimulus 
measures in the country. With the view to support competitiveness of large state-
owned enterprises, ten strategic sectors were announced to be strengthened: 
shipbuilding, petro-chemicals, light industry, equipment manufacturing, non-ferrous 
metals, textiles, electronics and information technology, autos, iron and steel and 
logistics (OECD 2010).  
 
Interest rates are subject to benchmarks with limits around these benchmark rates, and 
banking institutions must set their rates within the limits. The Chinese case proves 
that ownership and control over financial resources allows the government to channel 
investment decisions in the banking sector to achieve its strategic objectives. 
Resource allocation toward politically desirable projects follows credit policies, 
 
72 In return for bad debts, China’s banks received ten year bonds paying a taxable 2.25 per cent per annum (State 
Council 2000). 
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which are in line with national industrial policies. Reforms in the Chinese banking 
sector are tackling competition in the market and prevailing informal relationships, 
which hinder institutional change and market allocation of resources. Even though 
structural reforms have taken place to a certain degree, but effective banking 
restructuring fell short and continuous extension of soft loan credits is permanent. 
Bank reformers are challenged to strengthen financial discipline on the domestic 
market by improving risk management and credit quality while adhering government 
directives to support growth in the country at the same time. It can be stated that the 
central government has taken an active role in bank regulation. 
 
4.1.4 External Corporate Governance and Institutional Change in State-
Owned Banks 
Bank loans are the main source of financial investment in the state-owned sector. As 
of 2009, bank loans accounted for 83 per cent of total funds raised by the domestic 
non-financial sector, up from 76 per cent in 2001 (see table 10). The share of 
government securities in financing has remained more or less the same, from less than 
1 per cent in 2001 to 2 per cent currently. Enterprise bonds on the other hand have 
seen a slight increase from less than 8 per cent in 2001 to 9 per cent during the same 
period. The share of equity financing fell slightly by 1.5 per cent to 6 per cent, which 
is attributed to the ongoing reform in the stock markets. These figures prove that 
policymakers continue to rely on the banking sector for financing. 
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 in % 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
                  
Bank loans 76 80 85 83 78 82 79 83 
Equity financing 8 4 4 5 6 6 13 6 
Government securities 1 1 1 1 6 7 4 2 
Enterprise bonds 8 4 4 5 6 7 5 9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Notes:  
1. Equity financing in the table does not include financing by financial institutions on the stock market.  
2. Government securities financing in 2007 does not include RMB 1.55 trillion of special government 
bonds.  
3. Enterprise bonds include bonds issued by enterprises, short-term financing bills, medium-term notes, 
and corporate bonds. 
Table 9: Percentage of financing to the domestic non-financial sectors (2001-2008) 
Source: People’s Bank of China 2009 
 
Allowing lending decisions to be taken according to commercial criterion would 
hinder the state as well as the Communist Party in financing the state-owned sector 
and projects following national policies. Compared to other financial systems, the 
banking sector plays a crucial role in risk sharing. Bank deposits mainly derive from 
household savings, and by holding the majority of assets in banks, the state is 
regarded as guarantor that savings are protected from risk. Even though, the number 
of small investors in the Chinese financial market is steadily increasing, but in the 
United States as well as Anglo-Saxon countries, the proportion of individual 
households are holding assets in equities is much higher, and therefore are much more 
exposed to risk.  
 
Bank loans in China consist of a mixture of short-term and long-term repayment 
periods. At the end of 2008, short-term loans amounted to RMB 12.9 trillion, an 
increase of 12.3 per cent compared to 2007. Medium and long-term loans were RMB 
16.4 trillion, a rise of 20.2 per cent versus the previous year. In 2003, the share of 
medium and long-term loans was about 40 per cent of total loans. In 2008, the share 
of medium and long-term loans was 51 per cent. The increase in medium and long-
term loans is the result of government construction projects, which are often financed 
by long-term loans with terms of 20 years or more (Shih 2009).  
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  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008 
 in %   
 Short‐term loans   51.5 48.2 44.1 42.7 42.8  40.2 
 Medium & long‐term loans    39.6 43.0 44.9 47.4 49.9  51.3 
 Other loans    8.9 8.9 11.0 9.9 7.3  8.5 
Total loans  100 100 100 100 100  100 
Table 10: Percentage of short-term and long-term loans of banking institutions (2003-2008) 
Source: Annual report CBRC 2008 
 
Infrastructure projects involve investments in sectors such as transportation, 
warehousing and postal services, electricity, gas, water production and supply, water 
conservation, environmental protection, public facility management and the 
manufacturing sector. National growth is mostly financed by granting public-sector 
loans. Policy lending is possible, as differing interest groups are interested in rent 
protection. Policy lending implies that investments do not necessarily go to high 
quality projects which results in soft budget constraints. Even when banks themselves 
are subject to hard budget constraints, lending policies of banks following national 
policies can result in bad debt problems and consequently in soft budget constraints.  
4.1.4.1 Delay of Institutional Change and Path Dependence 
In the framework of the transformation process, Chinese state-owned banks did 
undergo the process of institutional change to a certain degree. Institutional change 
involves the building of new governance institutions and the solving of the solvency 
crises of the state-owned banks that dominate financial intermediation. Currently, the 
institutional framework of the banks involves the coexistence of old and new 
corporate institutions, characterized by informal institutional arrangements. Chinese 
policymakers chose to empower state agencies for enterprise and bank restructuring. 
Thereby, reform priorities became more focused on effective monitoring, concerning 
credit growth, restructuring costs of banks, the need for repeated bailouts, and the 
soundness of bank supervision. Institutional change in the banking sector is heavily 
marked by path dependence and lock-in effects. This situation is regarded as reform-
reluctant and hinders in depth institutional reforms. Path dependence is apparent due 
to the exertion of influence against widespread reforms, as the government as well as 
the Communist Party adheres to their policy that Chinese state-owned banks’ core 
activity is to provide financial resources to state-owned enterprises and infrastructure 
projects according to national policies. Further, they did not retreat from their 
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dominant position in the sector, thereby assuring their exclusive control over finance 
(see chapter 4.1.2, table 6). Many financial institutions are facing lock-in effects 
resulting from the inability of enterprises to pay down loans. Before reforms were 
introduced, bank behaviour on lending decisions was passive following the 
requirements of the plan. Since reforms were introduced, and banks were transformed 
into commercial banks with the objective to improve credit quality and investment 
decisions, lending behaviour needed to change. Reform efforts center on the ability of 
the state to impose gradually a new set of rules based on governance standards with 
the objective to improve transparency and efficiency. The emphasis of the reforms is 
on the ability of the state to act strategically toward certain sectors and regulate the 
economy so as to induce state agents to act in the interest of the state. Policymakers 
are challenged to the extent that old and new corporate bodies with differing levels of 
power need to be translated into an institutional coherence targeting a consistent 
economic policy.  
 
In developed countries, institutional change would be based on strong economic 
incentives working best in mature financial and banking sectors. In the Chinese case, 
market-based incentives are not necessarily adequate for the Chinese model of 
institutional change, where regulations and policies follow political and strategic 
reasoning of the state and the Communist Party. In the financial restructuring process, 
the state as well the Communist Party are facing the dilemma to be in the necessary 
situation of effectively changing behaviour and build new institutional capabilities by 
diffusing policymaking power, balancing the divide between state and society, and to 
pursue their strategic interests in legitimization. By viewing institution building in 
China as a gradual process in developing public capabilities, gaps in objectives 
between transparency and efficiency orientation of the state, on the one hand, and the 
value-orientation of the Communist Party, on the other, can be identified in the 
governance process. Transparency and efficiency orientation in the banking sector is 
supporting the state in its efforts of industrialisation in the country. Value orientation 
in the banking sector reflects the Communist Party’s commitment to social and 
environmental reforms in the country. In China, institution building is a gradual process, 
in which relevant political and economic actors learn with new roles and rules to solve 
common problems of interest. It can be stated, that the Chinese approach in the 
financial sector reform involving path dependence does not support privatisation 
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activities and led to an expensive solving of the bad debt problem (see chapter 4.1.4.3), a 
stable banking sector with increased lending capability, and a strong state supervisory 
authority. Change of bank behaviour mainly targets the state objective to improve 
authorities monitoring capabilities and to learn to deal with new corporate rules that can 
change behaviour in the state-owned sector.  
4.1.4.2 Transformation related Agency Problems 
In the same manner as in the enterprise reform, the introduction of the banking reform 
did not show intention to abolish state ownership, but rather to increase efficiency in 
the banking sector with special regard to the increasing non-performing loan problem. 
In banking, several agency relationships problems appear, such as asymmetric 
information problems, free rider problems, moral hazard and high transaction costs. 
Informational problems occur as the debtor is ex-ante better informed as the creditor 
about his willingness and ability to pay back a credit and the debtor is ex-post better 
informed as the creditor about his willingness and ability to pay off debts. Banks are 
playing a central role in Chinese economy, as they are holding corporate information 
on enterprises, on which they are approving and holding loans. Traditionally, 
enterprise-bank relations in China are very strong and Chinese enterprises rely on 
loans from banking institutions to cover their financing needs. In turn, banks have 
effective control over enterprise access to working capital and can influence 
enterprise activities. This puts banks into a preferred position with the competency to 
monitor enterprises and to execute control. Since the state is the largest shareholder of 
the state-owned banks, at the same time the state is also the largest debtholder of the 
enterprises. As already observed in the chapter on the state-owned enterprise reform, 
shareholder concentration in the state-owned sector is high, so that the state and the 
Communist Party have a large incentive to monitor corporate management and 
corporate decision-making through the board. In China, the market for corporate 
control is inactive, due to the imperfection in the capital market. Compared to the 
United States and Anglo-Saxon countries, the frequency of merger & acquisitions and 
hostile takeovers is low. Therefore in China, management selection is resulting from 
poor performance applied as a control mechanism, dependent on the capability of the 
largest shareholder to monitor management. Chinese large banks are acting as an 
intermediate between the state and the Communist Party and the state-owned 
enterprises, having a diversified portfolio of projects for which they provide finance. 
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Although Chinese state-owned enterprises rely to certain extend on high rates of 
internally retained revenues for financing, but banks have enough control over 
enterprises by dealing with external finance sources such as bank loans. Bank 
monitoring influences financing decisions whether financial resources are allocated 
into safe or risky projects, and whether money would be invested into risky projects 
at all.  
 
In China, corporate control mechanisms are functioning, as the state is able to 
monitor corporate management in large enterprises. Chinese state-owned banks are 
given a very effective monitoring role over enterprises internal management 
behaviour as well as external financing behaviour. This involves the magnitude and 
the length of a bank loan, the reputation of banks, as well as the number of lenders. 
Monitoring and controlling the quantity of credit is regarded as a reliable control 
mechanism for macroeconomic stability. Prices are not controlled by state anymore, 
and they are regarded as a less reliable control mechanism due to their volatility in a 
constant changing environment and especially in times of crises and recession. 
Asymmetric information problems and high transaction costs associated with external 
finance, apparent in agency relationships can here be mitigated due to traditional 
informal relationships between the state, the Communist Party, the banks and the 
enterprises. By restoring state-owned banks solvency, moral hazard problems of 
expectations of further bailouts were limited as well as adverse selection problems of 
banks declaring additional financial aid although not needed. The experience proves 
that close enterprise-bank relationships have a positive impact on growth rates in an 
economy. Gerschenkron (1962) argues that economic growth in Germany results 
from the bank-based system and close relationships between the industrial and the 
banking sector, whereas the market-based system in Anglo-American countries 
cannot show the same results. Having the capability to monitor the overall financial 
situation of enterprises, banks are also in the position to monitor revenues raised by 
enterprises which is meaningful information with regard to future tax incomes for the 
state. Under the assumption that Chinese state-owned banks exclusive role is to be the 
corporate monitor institution on behalf of the state, this role would be weakened if 
demand for bank loans would decrease. The actual situation of the underdeveloped 
capital market strengthens the state’s power in monitoring and controlling enterprises 
and the reform process as a whole. Corporate governance practices are applied in the 
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banking sector so that agency problems can be solved, by improving banks’ 
capability to monitor enterprise behaviour. In the last years, Chinese state-owned 
enterprises show continuous improvement in efficiency and profitability. Since 
banking institutions are the monitoring device for enterprise behaviour, it can be 
concluded that the state uses its control rights and presence on the board to govern 
and influence corporate management towards efficiency and profit maximisation.  
4.1.4.3 Transformation related Soft Credit Constraints 
In the previous chapter, it was illustrated that the corporate governance role of banks 
is characterised by the involvement of traditional close and long-term relationships 
between several interest groups in the banking landscape. On the one hand these 
relationships show their advantages by reducing informational problems, but on the 
other hand close relationship trigger further issues having a negative impact on 
corporate governance in the banking sector. Close ties of bank-enterprise relations 
can lead to conflicts of interests, especially when it comes to question of credit 
quality and subsidisation. Soft credits in the banking sector are a form of soft budget 
constraint (Kornai 1980), where banks pour financial resources into poor projects as 
they have no incentives to make productive investments in the enterprise sector ex 
ante, as they know that they will be bailed out ex post. In a socialist state, like it was 
the case in China and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe soft subsidies, soft 
taxation, and soft credits were all sources of soft budget constraints. In order to 
overcome the soft budget constraint in the socialist state, a shift from government to 
bank financing of state-owned enterprises was undertaken. The main issue with soft 
lending derives from the fact that it hinders market-driven allocation of financial 
resources through the financial market. Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny (1996) and 
Berglof and Roland (1997) argue that competition in conjunction with the entrance of 
new enterprises providing projects with high quality, would terminate soft lending on 
poor projects.  
 
As already mentioned before, in China credit lending is still sector-oriented and credit 
approvals are following recommendations from state agencies. There are several 
motives, supporting the maintenance of the soft loan system. State-owned banks are 
playing a crucial financing role in enterprise restructuring. Sound restructuring 
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demands high financial resources, especially as among the restructured enterprises, 
there exist a number of enterprises with low performance. Especially for loss-making 
enterprises, restructuring would unlikely be successful without banks involvement. In 
a market-driven environment, those enterprises would be closed and declared for 
bankruptcy. During the reform poor performance by enterprises did lead to bailouts 
by the state through continuous soft lending with the aim that they can survive. 
Therefore the government possess a controlling influence in the restructuring process 
instead of choosing privatization or liquidation of enterprises. Soft credits are 
regarded as a legacy of the socialist economy, and became a serious challenge for the 
transformation economy. The persistence of the soft loan system is maintained as it is 
regarded as a control of credit allocation by the state and Party, which remained after 
1978; and is still active. During the transformation process, new corporate institutions 
have been introduced in state-owned banks as well as in the state-owned enterprises 
with the aim to replace old institutions within the enterprises. The analysis of the four 
commercial state banks (Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China) has shown which are all 
ranked among the Fortune’s 2010 Top 20 enterprises in China, that the majority of 
the top management still holds close ties with the Communist Party, as they are party 
members and hold high level positions in the Communist Party. In the socialist 
market economy these links between the state and the economy are still present. Also 
in the reform period the preservation of these informal relationship and ties is 
maintained which allow selective access to scarce resources, where formal 
institutions cannot become effective. As already mentioned in chapter 2.5., a weak 
institutional environment and poor enforcement of the rule of law, allow the 
coordination function of the central system still to function. As reforms failed to 
dismantle old structures, the state and Communist Party will maintain the soft loan 
system in favour of strategic industries, which does not only guarantee the realisation 
of national industrial policies, but also the support of economic interest groups at the 
national and local level in the country. Additionally to the financing role, state-owned 
banks are playing an important role in the social and political stability of the country. 
Large loss-making enterprises and dominant employers in remote regions are 
beneficiaries of soft loan policies, thereby these enterprises are prevented from 
liquidation or closure. Mass layoffs are an unpleasant alternative to the state and 
Communist Party, since unemployment goes against the anticipated social stability in 
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the country. Even though, enterprises might not bring an income, but workfare 
encourages long-term employment in the community, where individual income is 
created that generates taxes for local governments. It can be stated, that soft lending 
policies do not necessarily generate an economic return on investment, but do 
generate a social return on investment. Government intervention in capital allocation 
ensures projects for which social returns are the highest, concerning questions of 
employment, avoidance of spillover effects, environmental issues and the social 
function of state-owned sector. Policymakers are sensitive about this social return, 
which are demanded by stakeholders in the reform process. Even though, soft lending 
policies make banks more vulnerable from an economic point of view, but their social 
function in the economy cannot be denied. The state as the owner of state-owned 
enterprises and is consequently interested in high economic returns on investment. 
Investments into projects with social returns are of high interest for the Communist 
Party, which are the beneficiaries of the soft loan system and do not show interest in 
losing access to soft credits. Losing access to soft credit would also entail a loss in 
political credibility and control over resource allocation. The state and Communist 
Party are challenged to balance economic and social investment needs as well as to 
assure a healthy banking sector in order to sustain growth and stability in the country. 
 
Market liberalization in the Chinese banking sector is marginal, so borrowers mainly 
depend on the state-owned banks for their access to credit. As banking institutions are 
working according the central government macroeconomic policies, soft lending 
continues and low quality project will not be squeezed out of the market. Therefore 
moral hazard problems occur in combination with non-performing loans, as 
borrowers expect to be bailed out in the future, regardless of the investment risk. 
Biased resource allocation might be also the reason why private enterprises and 
farmers are still lacking credit access to commercial banks and other formal lenders, 
and rely much more on informal financial facilities. According to IFAD (2001), credit 
is of normally obtained by farmers from the informal market at a cost estimated to be 
more than four times that of credit obtained from official credit institutions. From the 
farmers' perspective, therefore, the informal credit market is far more important than 
the official credit market (IFAD 2001). Under the assumption that private business 
would come up with projects for financing with high returns, state-oriented banks 
might withdraw from financing poor projects with low returns and bail out of already 
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given projects, and turn to project with highest returns. According to a survey by 
Beijing’s Central University of Economics, in 2007 informal lending reached RMB 2 
trillion (USD 290 billion), or 28 per cent of total bank loans. Much of the lending is 
funded by bank deposits channeled into the informal sector (OECD 2010:90). 
Although lending to small and medium enterprises has been encouraged by 
authorities, but access to bank and capital market finance remains limited. According 
to a banking survey on the mainland banking landscape (KMPG 2010:14), there exist 
several reasons for the reluctance of banks to provide bank financing to small and 
medium enterprises. Bank lending is linked with risk and most small and medium 
enterprises lack of land use rights, property or real estate to put up as collateral. In 
rural areas, the situation is even more complex, since in the past land was used for 
farming and very often owned by the collective. Since the property rights system is 
still developing, entrepreneurs in the rural area cannot put up their land as collateral. 
Further, banks are still limited in their ability to price for risk. Additionally to these 
challenges, small and medium enterprises need to improve their quality of financial 
information, which also includes the tracking of credit records.  
 
The Chinese government took several measures to tackle the bad debt issue. First, in 
the last years, all commercial state banks were recapitalized, and the costs of bad debt 
restructuring through recapitalization were assumed by state. The same measures 
were witnessed in Western countries during the financial crises in 2008, where banks 
were recapitalized. In China, restructuring was chosen for troubled banks as the only 
option, as they are too large to fail. Their bankruptcy would have entailed the risk of a 
systemic crisis in the national economy. Recapitalisation was made along with 
improvement of the bank’s management and operational efficiency, and with the aim 
of improving the capital adequacy ratios (CAR) in the banking sector, which in turn 
allowed the four banks to write down their non-performing loans faster. Credit losses 
and write downs came directly out of retained earnings, which are part of a bank’s 
common equity base. The accumulation of bad loans had a negative impact on the 
profitability of the banking sector, and the assessment of the bank capital assets was 
difficult. Additionally, the poor quality of the loans reduced revenues of the banks, 
and fiscal income for the state were not assured. At the end of 2008, the CAR of the 
Bank of China stood at 10.81 per cent, China Construction Bank at 10.17 per cent, 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China at 10.75 per cent and Agricultural Bank of 
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China at 8 per cent. Since 2003, the People Bank of China alone has already spent 
over USD 100 billion on recapitalisation and bad loan write-downs, with more still 
coming from bank’s own profits and government tax breaks (Anderson 2005:9). In 
fact in the past the percentage of nonperforming loans of the total volume of credit 
has been reduced. 
 
Second, a substantial amount of non-performing loans were transferred to asset 
management companies. The burden of restructuring the nonperforming debt was 
shifted to asset management companies, which in turn, will seek repayment with high 
interest rates of past obligations from borrowers or selling off the rights on bad assets 
on the market. This measure might be regarded as a kind of factoring “Chinese style” 
as bad debt is transformed into new liabilities for enterprises, which makes 
enterprises effectively responsible for recovering past obligations. According to needs 
of the national economy and sustainable development, Chinese banks allocated credit 
to specific industries and enterprises, without appropriate assessment of 
creditworthiness. Thereby Chinese banks are operating in favour of the Communist 
Party in financing the realisation of reform programs, such as the construction of a 
harmonious society and the scientific concept on development. Loans have not been 
dealt according to economic criteria, but rather according to political criteria, which 
are regarded as policy loans (政策贷款 ). As state-owned enterprises are not 
independent from policy lending, the non-performing loan issue became urgent. In 
the past, due to lending under the credit plan and administration of interest rates, 
state-owned commercial banks accumulated a bulk of nonperforming assets. In 1999, 
four state-owned asset management companies - China Xinda Asset Management 
Corporation (中国信达资产管司)73, China Huarong Asset Management Corporation 
(中国华融资产管理公司)74, China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation (中
国长城资产管理公司)75, and Orient Asset Management Corporation (中国东方资
产管理公司)76 - were established to take over bad assets from banks then manage 
and resell them. The Chinese asset management companies are financed through four 
financial sources, following government regulations, such as through Ministry of 
 
73 Corresponding to the China Construction Bank 
74 Corresponding to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
75 Corresponding to the Agricultural Bank of China 
76 Corresponding to the Bank of China 
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Finance equity, borrowing from the People’s Bank of China, and commercial 
borrowing from other financial institutions and asset management company’s bonds 
(State Council 2000). By holding huge shares on enterprise debt, these asset 
management companies possess a powerful control instrument over enterprises on 
behalf of the state. So beside state-owned banks, the asset management companies 
play a role in corporate governance based on ownership rights. China’s non 
performing loan market size is extensive. According to data provided by the Chinese 
Banking Regulatory Commission (Annual Report 2008), the share of non-performing 
loans in the four commercial banks was reduced by nearly 15 per cent within five 
years. Restructuring efforts are not limited to the four big banks alone, but also 
include other types of banking units. The takeover of non-performing loans by the 
asset management companies was necessary with regard to the restructuring process 
and the preparations for stock market listing of the four commercial banks. 
 
in %  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Share in total loans    17.9 13.2 8.9 7.5 6.7 2.4 
 Substandard   2.7 2.4 2.2 1.5 1 1.1 
 Doubtful    9.4 6.8 3.4 3.1 2.4 1.1 
 Loss    5.7 4 3.4 2.9 3.3 0.2 
Table 11: Percentage of non-performing loans of major commercial banks (2003-2008) 
Source: Annual report CBRC 2008 
 
One measure was not taken into considerations, such as the closing of insolvent banks, 
where the burden of the bank restructuring costs would have been shifted to suppliers 
of credit, which are in the Chinese case the shareholders and depositors. So far the 
Bankruptcy Law in China has not been very effective due to political-economic 
constraints. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China, which 
was adopted at the 23rd meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National 
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, came into effect on June 1, 
2007. It is China's first Bankruptcy Law since 1986, which was applied only to state-
owned enterprises, and many of the provisions were inadequate for China's market-
socialist economy. Having in mind, that the modern Bankruptcy Law is still very 
young and bankruptcy courts lack of practical experience, bankruptcy proceedings do 
not represent to be an appropriate alternative for restructuring in the moment. So as 
the state obtains majority ownership over state-owned banks as well as enterprises, it 
plays two roles in soft lending activities; as capital owner as well as capital borrower. 
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As already described in chapter 3.1.5 savings derive from several sources, such as the 
individual households, the government and state-owned enterprises. All these 
depositors have trust in the state-owned banks that their deposits are safe and liquid. 
Closing of banks in China would lead to the situation that depositors would have an 
incentive to withdraw their deposits from their accounts, which would lead to 
systemic crises in the national economy and to the potential collapse of the vulnerable 
banking system. Confidence in the banking system would be lost and system bank 
runs would follow with the aim to safeguard deposits, because deposit guarantee is 
not given anymore. Ownership of banks enables the government both to collect 
savings and to direct them toward strategic long-term projects (La Porta 2002:3). 
Actually, this is the case in China where financial resources are channeled to meet the 
demand of state-driven and politically motivated investments in strategic important 
industries in the domestic market. Therefore, the state is naturally concerned not to 
lose funds and knows about the prompt responsiveness of depositors to bank failure 
and entailed loss of confidence in the system. The banking sector is vulnerable to 
instability and under the assumption that a large number of banks are technically 
insolvent, they will be kept alive through government support. In 2010, a book has 
been published discussing in an article “Why Chinese banks do not go bankrupt” (中
国银行业为什么没破产?) (Jinqian tongzhi 2010), which addresses the phenomenon 
in Chinese banking sector, that the financial market are not cleaned from weak and 
insolvent banks so far. Several reasons are described supporting the approach that 
state ownership in the banking sector contributes to financial stability and long-term 
growth in the domestic market. Additionally, it can be stated that an increase of 
profitability in the banking sector leads to a strong position of the institutions and 
reduces automatically the risk of bankruptcy. Even when the interest rate in Chinese 
banks are low, individual and institutional depositors consider their deposits 
implicitly guaranteed by the state, which results among other reasons in the highest 
saving rate in an international comparison. Currently in China, the introduction of 
deposit insurance77 is under discussion, which would represent a strong contribution 
to the financial safety net especially to household depositors. The Chinese 
 
77 Deposit insurance aims to achieve the following: (1) to protect the small depositor, who is normally not privy to 
information about the management of financial institutions; (2) to keep the financial system stable and make the 
financial industry and financial transactions more efficient by averting bank runs; (3) to provide a fair and 
competitive market for financial institutions that differ widely in size, regional concentration, nationality, and other 
respects; and (4) to clarify the responsibilities and rights of depositors, financial institutions, and the government 
and to minimize the burden on the taxpayer in case of bank failures (www.bis.org). 
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government is keen to prevent any banking crises in the domestic market, which 
would have a negative impact at the expense of the households and the whole 
domestic economy. Such a crisis would lead to additional costs for support programs 
and government bailouts and would seriously endanger the ongoing reform and 
restructuring process. The restoration of state-owned banks solvency limits moral hazard 
problems and adverse selection problems, which would lead to additional costs and 
indirect taxes, thereby suppressing domestic demand. Soft credit constraints are 
possible, since financing of the state-owned sector does not only matter from an 
economic point of view, but also from a political and social viewpoint. Loss of public 
trust in the financial and macroeconomic stability of the country might lead to social 
unrest and public discontent, which concerns the state and the Communist Party.  
4.1.4.4 The Role of Banks and Credit in Enterprise Restructuring  
The transformation from a planned to a market–based economy did not change the 
relationship between the state and the state-owned banks. The vertical, reciprocal 
relationship is still maintained. Banks main function on behalf of the state, as the 
main shareholder, is monitoring of enterprise behaviour acknowledging the existing 
conditions in the transformation country. Corporatisation of state-owned banks was 
initiated with the aim to improve efficiency and transparency in the banking sector. 
While during the enterprise sector reform, the state aims to retreat from its dominant 
position to a certain degree, in order to assure that market mechanism works, in the 
banking sector the situation is different. The state does not show a tendency of 
retreating from its dominant position and from its overall control function in order to 
assure that state control continuous to work. State control over financial resource 
allocation is crucial, since during the transformation process immense social and 
restructuring costs occurred, which need to be financed. Chinese banks are playing a 
crucial role in corporate governance in China, due to fact, that they are holding a big 
share of enterprise debt, which allows them to possess a powerful control instrument 
over enterprise revenue and cost, and the reform process as a whole. Due to the 
traditional enterprise-bank relationship, the state and the Communist Party possess 
information about management, enterprise financial situation and future projects; at 
the same time giving them the ability to implement preferred strategies in relevant 
industries. The nature of restructuring activities depends from industry to industry, 
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which requires in any case investment. Investments in enterprises derive either from 
equity or debt. In general, corporate governance literature extensively analyses 
different governance modes of monitoring and control in Anglo-American countries 
compared to the ones in Continental Europe and Japan. Thereby agency issues should 
be solved how to motivate agents to act in the interest of the principal, so that 
investment decisions are based on all information available and finance is protected. 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) discuss in their article, that equity as well debt holders 
can monitor either actively or passively. Active monitoring involves hands-on 
evaluation of a firm’s operations, investment decisions, and capacity and willingness 
to repay. Passive monitoring involves collateral on securities, where before a lending 
decision is made, the value of the enterprise collateral is evaluated rather than 
operations of the firm. Baer and Gray (1995) describe in their working paper the 
experience of Hungary and Poland with debt as a control device in restructuring for 
medium and large enterprises. Dittus and Prowse (1995) describe the experience of 
Russia, where banks are playing an important role since debt represents to be a 
powerful control instrument over enterprises. Further the analysis in their working 
paper shows the role of banks in corporate governance based on ownership rights. By 
comparing existing systems of corporate governance, several examples show that 
banks are playing a major role in the governance mechanism through the ownership 
of enterprises. La Porta et al. (2000) describe several cases of government ownership 
of banks around the world, like in Asia, Africa and South America, with the objective 
of possessing direct ownership over strategic industries and control over finance. By 
holding enterprise equity or debt through investments, state-owned banks are playing 
an influencing role in corporate governance based on ownership rights. In China, the 
investment company Central Huijin, makes equity investments in the large 
commercial banks on behalf of the state, and exercises ownership rights and performs 
obligations as an investor with the aim of profit maximization of state-owned assets. 
At the same time, the large commercial banks apply the money for further equity 
investments in state-owned enterprises. Ownership rights based on debt are executed 
by the asset management companies, which are holding huge shares on enterprise 
debt on behalf of the state.  
 
Bear and Gray (1995) argue that effective credit monitoring requires information, 
market oriented incentives for creditors and a developed legal framework for debt 
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collection. In China, active monitoring is predominant by the main shareholder in the 
banking sector, with lower importance to the equity market as well as institutional 
investors. Still, the state as the owner of the banks depends on a supportive general 
framework, such as legal conditions for restructuring and liquidation, adequate 
disclosure and accounting standards, in order to be able to overcome information 
shortcomings. Formal information channels on enterprises might be poor due to the 
lack of adequate accounting standards and the absence of independent auditing (see 
chapter 5). Investment and lending decisions require reliable information and high 
levels of uncertainty counters the reforming process in the economic environment. 
Still the monitoring competence of the state is functioning, since missing corporate 
legal and institutional requirements on financial accounting and disclosure are 
adjusted through informal network channels. Long-term enterprise-bank relationships 
have a significant value in the Chinese business landscape, since they have a big 
impact in resolving information asymmetries in credit lending. Further the state-
owned banks are playing an influencing role in the realisation of efficiency and 
profitability objectives in state-owned enterprises, as they are highly interested in debt 
repayment. Debt monitoring is especially important since equity monitoring still 
needs time for development due to an underdeveloped capital market, and shareholder 
rights and disclosure is still not functioning. The state, as the owner of the banks and 
the enterprises, does not only have an interest in debt information borne by banks but 
also by tax and social security offices. Until today, state-owned enterprises have a 
strong interest in limiting information in enterprise performance and take advantage 
from weak tax enforcement regulations. Especially in times of financial crises, 
overdue tax and social security arrears are favored channels of financing. Since 
adequate disclosure following the requirements of the socialist-market economy is 
still evolving, the state has the possibility to monitor management behavior and 
enterprises economic situation through the regular review of bank credit portfolio as 
well as through the extension of credit conditions. In February 2010, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC 2010) issued two regulations that aim to 
tighten banks' lending and risk management controls. The new regulations target the 
introduction of lending quotas and improved risk control after granting loans as well 
monitoring of repaying capabilities of borrowers. Both regulations support the state 
with a control mechanism for examining the state-owned banks compliance and 
behavior with directives on lending restrictions.  
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New and strong revivals of policy lending might lead to an unavoidable increase of 
bad loans, as projects following the national policies will not necessarily follow 
prudent credit assessments. The bad debt ratio of Chinese state-owned banks is very 
likely to increase in the future, especially as the government is taking measures 
towards pushing investment activities in urban and rural areas in order to avoid a 
slowdown in economic growth in the country. Within the framework of the reform 
program of the construction of a socialist new countryside, financial institutions have 
adjusted industrial credit policies according to the state’s macro-economic industrial 
policies. The Agricultural Development Bank of China published in its 2008 annual 
report, which details regarding the launch of various products that are in line with the 
objective of supporting sustainable and the healthy development of China’s 
agriculture sector. Banking products that have been launched include the Green Home 
Loan and Jin-Yi-Nong (Benefiting the Farmers). Moreover, a series of distinctive 
products and services were launched such as Company and Farmers guaranteed loans, 
working capital loans for farmer’s specialised cooperatives, seasonal loans for leading 
agricultural enterprises, Six- Party Cooperation and Insurance loans and cross-
guaranteed farmer loans. Financial services such as the Kins Payment Express and 
Farmers’ Insurance Express were also created (Annual report 2008, Agricultural 
Development Bank of China). National policies support infrastructure programs such 
as the development of Western China and Central China and the revitalisation of the 
old industrial bases in Northeast China. An increase for loans granted is observed in 
infrastructure construction in medium and large-sized cities in the Western, 
Northeastern and Central Chinese areas. Selected key industries, operating in the 
agricultural and rural economy will receive exclusive support by means of corporate 
loans with a lower focus on risk management requirements.  
 
The banking sector is facing a dilemma at the moment, as a response to conflicting 
government demands. The reduction of bad loans improves banks’ efficiency and 
profitability, but the global financial crises requires state banks to contribute to 
economic stimulus packages that lead again to an increase of bad loans. The CBRC 
(2008) states in its latest annual report that with economic slowdown, credit risk has 
increased and several industries are suffering from the pressure of non-performing 
loans rebounding. Furthermore, the newly acquired risk control capability of Chinese 
banks will be challenged, especially as demand for commercial loans and subsidised 
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loans are growing rapidly. In the Chinese case it can be concluded that so far credit is 
the primary mechanism for channelling financing into the transformation economy. 
Bank finance is the preferred financing channel, as the state persists in maintaining 
financial control over the economy. Since no market of corporate control with a 
leading role in corporate governance and finance exists so far in China, therefore debt 
is representing to be a substantial control device in the framework of the restructuring 
of the state-owned sector. Control over credit lines, capital and credit allocation is 
important for the state in order to maintain the ongoing reform process with the aim 
of economic progress in the country. Profitability improvement in the four state-
owned commercial banks proves that the state did not retreat from its efficiency 
orientation within the state-owned sector, thereby pushing the banks to operate 
globally. The state requires banks to work profitable with the aim of generating an 
economic return of investment and tax revenues for the state. By supporting the state 
in maintaining financial control over the economy and the reform process, the 
Communist Party is pursuing the realisation of its policy of the construction of a 
harmonious society and the scientific concept on development with the aim of 
generating social return on investment. The Communist Party is assisting the state in 
its efforts in the ongoing reform process with the aim of political and social stability 
in the country.  
4.2 Capital Market 
Beside the banking sector reform, corporate governance also involves the reform of 
the stock market in China. Here again, corporate governance efforts are targeting the 
improvement of efficiency and transparency in this area.  
 
China’s first stock exchange was founded in 1891, namely the Shanghai Share 
Broker’s association, and was renamed in 1904 to the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
From 1911-1949, Shanghai was an important international financial centre in the 
region. In 1918, the Beijing Securities Exchange was established. After the 
foundation of the People’s Republic of China, in 1949, both stock exchanges were 
closed, as they represented a symbol of the capitalist economy. The Chinese stock 
market in the post-Mao-era does not have a very long tradition as the stock exchange 
in Shanghai was reopened in 1990 and the one in Shenzhen in 1991. While many 
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developed markets have a single-exchange structure, China’s market structure is 
different. The original purpose of the Chinese state in allowing the issuance of 
securities was to raise capital, rather than establishing a trading market for security 
holders. The purpose, which was politically motivated, was to mobilise the high 
private saving rates of Chinese households for investments in the state sector and the 
domestic economy (Heilmann 2001). Besides the primary market, a secondary market 
evolved, which stimulated black-market trading and over-the-counter transactions. 
Eventually the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were established. At the end 
of 2008, China’s mainland stock market had 1625 listed companies and more than 
152 million investor accounts (CSRC, Annual report 2008). The transformation of 
Chinese SOEs into corporations facilitated listings on the stock exchange and has 
empowered Chinese companies to raise funds through initial public offerings. In 2008, 
the global financial crisis hit China’s equity market dramatically. At the end of 2008, 
the total market capitalisation of the companies listed on the two stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen was RMB 12.1 trillion, representing a decrease of 63 per cent 
from the end of 2007.  
 
 
Table 12: Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP (1998-2008) 
Source: Compiled by the author, CSRC Annual report 2008 
 
The market capitalisation of the stock exchanges at 2008 year-end accounted for 
about 40 per cent of China’s GDP in 2008. The stock market has been characterised 
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by significant growth over the years, with total market capitalisation increasing from 
RMB 1.9 trillion in 1991 to RMB 12.1 billion in 200878. 
4.2.1 Current State of China’s Stock Market      
In comparison with other international markets, China’s stock market is characterised 
by its own unique features.  
 
Firstly, China’s stock market is mainly dominated by state-owned enterprises. Today, 
70 per cent of Chinese listed enterprises are characterised by substantial government 
ownership (Zhu Jiaming 2010) compare to 80 per cent in 2004 (DB Research 
2004:6). The stock market represents an effective alternative for financing SOEs 
expenditures, in addition to the existing investment fund channels like bank loans, 
fiscal grants and subsidies. Although the capital market is less developed compared to 
financial institutions, it is still regarded as an important source for raising funds. The 
central government understands that a functioning stock market facilitates the 
mobilisation of private savings to finance SOEs and to diversify investment risks that 
are otherwise concentrated in the state-owned banking system (Wong 2006:396). The 
development of the stock market is to be seen under the condition that state 
ownership and monopolistic control over the financial sector remains dominant. In 
contrast, collectively owned companies and TVEs are prohibited to go public, as at 
the inception of the stock market, local governments tended to focus on initiating 
share issuance with collective enterprises only. As a result, in May 1990, the State 
Council issued a regulation that restricted share issuance to SOEs only. By doing so, 
the government reserved the stock market as a fund raising vehicle for SOEs only, 
thereby maintaining monopolisation over the uses of funds even after the stock 
market had emerged (Wong 2006:396).  
 
Secondly, another unusual feature of China’s stock market is that after an initial 
public offering the Chinese government retains a majority ownership in the firm. 
Only a small proportion of shares are traded on the stock market, and the majority of 
the capital stock remains in public ownership, the so called split share structure (股权
分置) (CSRC 2005). Up until 2005, this structure divided shares into tradable and 
 
78 Total market capitalization refers to the market value of all shares issued by China’s listed firms. 
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non-tradable shares. Only one-third of the stocks are traded, which are sold to private 
shareholders and openly traded on the market. The other two-thirds of the equity 
capital are under the control of state asset management agencies or SOEs themselves. 
These non-tradable shares are not exchanged on the open market, but outside of the 
market. It has to be taken into consideration that the issuance of shares to private 
person would create private ownership in the long run. It can be stated that the market 
is highly segmented, based on regulations. By keeping state property untradeable the 
state tries to maintain control, and by implementing the split share structure the state 
also manages to raise external funds. In 2005, China’s stock market started to reform 
the split share structure (CSRC 2005) with selected pilot companies, by reducing the 
volume of non-tradable shares and increasing the amount of fully tradable shares.  
 
Domestic and international investors face a system of differing share classes. The 
limited volumes of traded stock is again divided into A shares, which are restricted to 
domestic investors and B shares, in USD denominated shares for domestic and 
foreign investors. In total, share issuance of publicly traded companies is divided into 
six different types of shares (China Statistical Yearbook 2008):  
 
A-shares: denominated in Chinese RMB, are available for trading for domestic 
private and institutional investors. In 2002, the central government opened the A-
share market to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII).  
B-shares: denominated in USD, available for trading for foreign investors. In 2001, 
the central government opened the B-share market to domestic individual investors.  
C-shares: denominated in Chinese RMB, are available to state-owned legal persons 
(e.g. state-owned companies, banks). 
H-shares: are shares of Chinese companies, floated and listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. 
N-shares: are shares of Chinese companies, floated and listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
L-shares: are shares of Chinese companies, floated and listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. 
 
The B-share market’s total market value is only 2.4 per cent of the A-share market’s 
value (DJI 2002:12). In comparison to the A and B shares, the Hong Kong listed H-
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shares and the New York listed N-shares only play an insignificant role on the 
Chinese stock market. With respect to ownership, stocks are grouped into state-
owned shares, legal person shares, social public shares, employee’s shares, etc. State-
owned shares account for the dominant proportion of all shares, and are owned either 
directly or indirectly by the state. The small percentage of traded shares and the high 
influence of the government are not consistent with good corporate governance.  
 
Year National 
Listed 
Companies 
Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
Shenzhen 
Stock 
Exchange 
A Share 
Only 
A & H  
Share 
A & B  
Share 
B Share 
 Only 
1990 10 8 2 10        
1991 14 8 6 14        
1992 53 29 24 53   18   
1993 183 106 77 183 3 34 6 
1994 291 171 120 227 6 54 4 
1995 323 188 135 242 11 58 12 
1996 530 293 237 431 14 69 16 
1997 745 383 362 627 17 76 25 
1998 851 438 413 727 18 80 26 
1999 949 484 465 822 19 82 26 
2000 1.088 572 516 955 19 86 28 
2001 1.160 646 514 1.025 23 88 24 
2002 1.224 715 509 1.085 28 87 24 
2003 1.287 780 507 1.146 30 87 24 
2004 1.377 837 540 1.236 31 86 24 
2005 1.381 834 547 1.240 32 86 23 
2006 1.434 842 592 1.287 38 86 23 
2007 1.550  860  684  1.396  45  86  23  
2008 1.625 864 761 1.459 57 86 23 
Table 13: Number of listed companies in China (1990-2008) 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2009 
 
On November 5，2002 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the 
People's Bank of China (PBOC) introduced the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor) program as a provision for foreign capital access to China's A-share market, 
and to allow foreign investors to invest in treasuries, convertible bonds and corporate 
bonds. In this way, foreign fund management institutions, insurance companies, 
securities companies and other asset management institutions that met the stipulated 
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requirements 79  were allowed to invest in China's securities market as QFII. On 
August 24 ， 2006, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the 
People’s Bank of China and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
promulgated the new Administrative Rules on the Onshore Securities Investment by 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII). Regulations on QFII define 
investment limitations on the sum a single QFII, and all QFII together can invest in a 
single Chinese listed company. Administration concerning the approval and 
investment quotas is done by the CSRC and the SAFE. The CSRC is in charge of 
deciding which foreign investors qualify for the programme; the SAFE is in charge of 
QFII quotas distribution. Apart from the few institutional investors that are defined as 
QFII investors, foreigners are prevented from trading on the Chinese stock market. 
Foreign investors can only freely trade in Hong Kong. In turn, Chinese investors are 
holding off in so far as Chinese currency accounts are not yet convertible. 
Participation of institutional investors in the Chinese stock market anticipates on one 
hand the inflow of foreign capital, and on the other hand the improvement of 
corporate governance practices.  
Good corporate governance practices align the interest of a firm’s management with 
its owners, namely the shareholders. In Western countries corporate governance 
identifies a conflict of interests between the management and ownership, also known 
as the principal-agent problem. Another kind of conflict, which is applicable for 
China, concerns the majority shareholder and minority shareholder. In China the 
dominant majority shareholder is the state. The state does not necessarily have the 
same objectives as the minority shareholder. In fact, the state is not only a majority 
shareholder, but also the legislator and strongly influences the capital market 
(Mahlich/Zhu 2005:84). As a result conflicting interests are inevitable. In China, 
minority shareholders represent mainly individuals, who are the main investors in the 
stock market, rather than institutional investors. Individuals do not represent a danger 
to the government of losing control of ownership, as they do not have the power to 
influence ownership. In the past, the Chinese stock market has not been in very good 
condition was in danger of collapsing (Economist 2009). State and administrative 
interference in market coordination have prevented a collapse. The dilemma is that 
every time the state shows an inclination of selling shares of state-owned enterprises, 
 
79 Detailed requirements for QFII see: Pißler 2002.  
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the stock market prices collapses due to the fear that the market will be flooded with 
newly tradable shares. The only way to prevent a collapse of the Chinese stock 
market is by capitalisation.  
 
The issues the government has to face up to can be divided into two questions: What 
will be the price of the non-tradable shares? And who might be the potential buyers? 
Answering the first question; like other economic phenomenon, the valuation of a 
stock market is dependent on the equilibrium of supply and demand. A sudden 
increase in supply – in this case, the availability of tradable shares - inevitably leads 
to a drop in price if demand fails to increase accordingly. Faced with an explosion of 
shares, any market would be at risk of a collapse. Up until now, the Chinese stock 
market has responded negatively to the anticipation of a huge increase in the supply 
of shares. Answering the second question, it is obvious that foreign investors, like 
multinational companies and institutional investors, can be considered as potential 
buyers. According to international regulations for corporations, this type of 
shareholders can have a strong influence, even they do not hold a majority stake. This 
would result in the state losing control and influence. To summarizing,  it can be said 
that the government currently faces  a dilemma as on the one hand the state is aware 
of the fact that a deepen reform of the Chinese stock market is necessary to prevent it 
from a collapse and on the other he government does not want to lose ground and 
control to foreign investors.  
 
Besides the challenges mentioned above, an observation on the structure of the 
market is also necessary. China’s stock market lacks truly blue-chip stocks and so is 
dominated by a large number of smaller capitalisation stocks, giving it a pyramid 
structure. By contrast, developed markets tend to be dominated by a small number of 
large blue-chip stocks, giving them a funnel-shaped structure (DJI 2002:24). Blue-
chip companies generally share four characteristics: (1) large market value; (2) low 
volatility; (3) high liquidity; and (4) solid shareholder base. Normally they represent a 
high percentage of the total market value. Chinese blue-chip companies, like HSBC 
and China Mobile, are mainly listed outside of China, in Hong Kong, Singapore and 
New York. There are several reasons why Chinese blue-chip companies prefer to be 
listed outside of China. The Hong Kong stock market is much more attractive for blue 
chip companies as the market is much more mature and has a very good reputation. In 
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addition the trading environment is very good, as more banks are tied to the stock 
market and the market demonstrates lower volatility. By contrast, China’s stock 
market demonstrates exceptionally high volatility, as it has experienced several bear 
markets in the last decade.  
4.2.2 The Split Structure Reform of the Stock Market 
The Chinese government is aware of the issues of the Chinese stock market. 
Recently, measures have been taken to prevent a collapse of the stock market. At the 
end of 2003, foreign investors were allowed into the A-share market.  
 
In October 2006, the CSRC adopted a standard to allow the conversion of non-
tradable shares into freely tradable shares, by announcing Administrative Measures 
on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies. The realisation of the new 
regulations required the approval of the CSRC and a two-thirds majority of the 
outstanding shareholders with tradable shares. The deadline for all companies to 
comply with the regulations was scheduled for December 2006 (CFA 2007:4). 
According to CSRC (2008), by the end of 2007, 1298 companies listed on Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges had either initiated or completed the process of 
floating the non-tradable shares, accounting for 98 per cent of the total listed 
companies that were subject to the reform. 
 
Under the reform, the owners of non-tradable shares negotiated a compensation plan 
and various agreements with tradable shareholders in order to convert their shares 
into tradable ones. Protection of the interests of tradable shareholders is essential to 
safeguard investor confidence. Ongoing efforts to make non-tradable shares tradable 
increases the free float and reduce the presently high price-earnings ratios. This new 
regulation represents a move towards a more dispersed ownership structure in China, 
away from concentrated government ownership. The elimination of non-tradable 
shares in initial public offerings allows the broader access of minority shareholders 
and institutional shareholders in the Chinese stock market. At the same time, rules 
regarding the purchase of non-tradable shares by foreigners have also been relaxed.  
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The government strictly regulates initial public offerings. By selecting qualified 
companies, the government does not primarily focus on the performance of the 
company or economic indicators, but rather takes into account individual interests and 
political considerations. The domestic stock market is controlled by the government 
through its quota system on initial public offerings. This kind of selection process has 
a negative impact on the stock market as a healthy stock market needs healthy 
companies. The government sets the quota for new listings each year and selects 
qualified companies based on provincial and sector allocation, and – up until 2001 – 
even determined where the new stocks would list. China is the only country in which 
the government completely controls the size of the stock market, the pace of issue and 
the allocation of resources (DJI 2002:22). China’s stock market does not operate 
primarily for privatisation but rather as a capital-raising tool for state firms. As the 
companies have been chosen on the basis of non-commercial criteria rather than by 
economic criteria, corruption and bribes were often tied up in the process. Statistics 
show that at the end of 2004 among all 1377 Chinese listed companies, 987 are 
controlled by holding companies, accounting for 71.7 per cent (OECD 2005b). 
Financial oversight over the capital market is essential for the government, thereby 
avoiding losing ground and control of SOEs to foreign investors. Authorities are 
determined to improve the functioning of the stock markets, but access to the market 
by financial institutions is still heavily restricted. Besides the improvement of 
profitability of the companies and the development of the market structure, the 
government does not show a willingness to promote high ownership diversity in the 
national economy.  
4.3 Basel Capital Accord and Rating in China  
Since China's commitment under the WTO to open its commercial banking sector to 
foreign competition by January 1, 2007, Chinese policy makers are keen to put into 
practice the implementation of Basel requirements, following the international bank 
capital standards. The Basel II and Basel III implementation has to be seen in the light 
of the ongoing corporate governance efforts in the banking sector. The Basel capital 
accords are a standardized approach for risk management, strong supervision and 
disclosure standards that support sound corporate governance. Risk management 
objectives target the value maximisation of shareholders. The term Basel II and Basel 
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III 80  implies the initiative of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that 
creditor banks have to follow stringent international requirements concerning the 
credit approval process. The Basel Accord is based on three pillars: minimum capital 
requirement, supervisory review and market discipline. Therefore, creditor banks 
have to hold capital reserves of 8 per cent when approving commercial loans, subject 
to the creditworthiness of clients. When the creditworthiness is better, the capital 
reserves held will be lower, and consequently the loan will be cheaper. In this context, 
rating procedures and rating agencies are becoming relevant, as an in-depth analysis 
of the company helps to make a statement about the capability of a company to pay 
back its commitments in due time. Against the background of change in corporate 
financing, moving away from the classic bank loan to equity financing on capital 
markets, ratings are gaining immensely in importance. Enterprises have to be 
prepared to achieve optimal credit ratings, which have an impact on favorable credit 
terms and access to international capital markets. Two rating approaches exist, which 
assess the creditworthiness of debtors. The first approach applies an external rating 
procedure measuring the risk of a borrower. It is also called standardised approach 
and is undertaken by private public rating agencies such as Standard & Poor`s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch. The second approach applies an internal rating procedure, which 
is carried out by commercial banks internally. It is called an internal rate based 
approach (IRB), which is a tool that supports banks in applying their own risk 
estimation systems, in accordance with certain criteria and information disclosure 
requirements. The foundation of efficient capital allocation is through modern risk 
assessment mechanisms, which allow for a price policy that is oriented on the 
effective measurement of risks. An influencing corporate governance measure 
concerning the risk management in the state-owned banking sector is the Chinese 
corporate governance code for state-owned banks. According to Article §§ 7: “Each 
pilot bank shall adopt a system of risk management, which covers the credit risk, 
market risk and operational risk, and is effective in identifying, measuring, 
 
80 According to principles of the Basel I Capital Accord, which came into effect in 1998, creditor banks had to held 
capital reserves of 8 percent when approving commercial loans, but the creditworthiness of clients did not play a 
role. Basel III refers to a new update based on Basel II (came into effect in 2004). The revision to the Basel Accords 
(came into effect in 2010) is anticipated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to update their guidelines 
for capital and banking regulations in response to the financial crises in 2008 (Bank for International Settlement 
2010, www.bis.org).  
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monitoring and controlling risks”. All banks81 listed in China’s Top 20 ranking by 
Fortune 2010, mention in their annual reports risk management activities having a 
clear focus on Basel II implementation and the construction of an internal rating 
system to improve credit risk measurement under the guidance of Basel II and 
regulatory requirements. Corporate governance systems and measures are substantial 
as public financial statements can produce meaningful information about the activities 
of the banks to the state. In all the banks mentioned above, the risk management 
framework comprises the board of directors, a risk management committee under the 
board, an internal control committee and a risk management department.  
In 2007, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) published the 
Guidelines on the Implementation of the New Basel Accord by China’s Banking 
Sector. According to CBRC, the implementation of Basel II is scheduled as followed 
(CBRC 2007b):   
? In 2008, supervisory rules regarding Basel II implementation were issued and 
the existing capital regulation requirements were subject to modifications and 
amendments by the CBRC.  
? In 2009, a Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) was conducted by the CBRC with 
the aim of evaluating the impact of the Basel II implementation on the capital 
adequacy of banks.  
? Chinese banks that are required to implement Basel II standards shall start the 
adoption process in 2010, under specific conditions implementation can be 
postponed to 2013 at the latest. The rest of Chinese banks can choose to 
undertake the Basel II implementation after 2011, on equal terms as those 
banks that are required to implement Basel II standards.  
? A bank that is planning to adopt Basel II should make an official application 
to the CBRC at least six months prior to the adoption. The CBRC started to 
accept such applications at the beginning of 2010.  
 
 
81 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (中国工商银行), Agricultural Bank of China (中国农业银行), Bank 
of China (中国银行), and People’s Construction Bank of China (中国人民建设银行). 
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Increased convergence and harmonisation activities among regions have lead to a 
general adoption of the Basel capital accord in Asia Pacific (Deloitte 2005). Japan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea intend to implement Basel standards, as well 
as emerging banking markets including India, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. All 
these countries agree on their commitment on adoption, but vary concerning the 
timeframe of targeted reforms. Claessens et al. (2006) criticizes the fact that the 
reform of the international financial architecture, including the Basel capital accord, 
excludes relevant inputs from developing countries. This leads to costly domestic 
financing, increased capital costs and a reduction in access to external financing for 
developing countries. 
 
Capital adequacy ratios and risk management capacity are regarded as useful risk 
prevention tool for influencing the actions of banks. In February 2004, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) promulgated the Administration of Capital 
Adequacy Ratios of Commercial Banks Procedures, following approval from the 
State Council. Simultaneously, the implementation of the supervisory review and 
market discipline is required under Basel II. Early in 1995, the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Commercial Bank82 already stipulated that it was necessary to 
build up capital reserves of 8 per cent for credit transactions. The capital adequacy 
procedures can be regarded as a concrete mechanism for calculating financial 
reserves. These procedures are based on the 1988 version of the Basel I capital accord 
but also take into account the new Basel II capital accord83. The capital adequacy 
ratio refers to the ratio between the capital, which is held by a commercial bank, and 
the risk-weighted assets of the commercial bank. According to the provision, the 
capital adequacy ratio shall not be lower than 8 per cent, and the core capital 
adequacy ratio shall not be lower than 4 per cent. Thus, the provision complies with 
the 8 per cent capital adequacy ratio set by the Basel II capital accord.  
 
Given capital management activities published in the annual reports, all banks listed 
in China’s Top 20 ranking by Fortune 2010 meet the Basel II requirement of 4 per 
cent concerning the core capital adequacy ratio. At the end of 2008, the core capital 
 
82 Article §§ 39 when granting a loan, commercial banks shall abide by the following provisions on the control of 
assets-liabilities ratios: (1) the capital adequacy ratio may not be lower than 8 per cent (CBRC 1995). 
83 The principles of the Basel II Capital Accord came into effect in May 2004, under the light of the Asia financial 
crises and the need for a revision of financial supervision (Bank for International Settlement 2010, www.bis.org). 
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adequacy ratio of the Agricultural Development Bank of China was 8 per cent 
(Annual Report 2008, Agricultural Development Bank of China), whereas China 
Construction Bank Corporation's stood at 10.17 per cent (Annual Report 2008, 
China’s Construction Bank). In 2008, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
had a core capital adequacy ratio of 10.75 per cent (Annual Report 2008, ICBC) and 
the Bank of China had a core capital adequacy ratio of 10.81 per cent (Annual Report 
2008, Bank of China). Following the reserves requirements is crucial for prudential 
supervision, as this measure goes against excessive lending by banks and reduces the 
risk of bankruptcies. Currently, the China Banking Regulatory Commission is 
working on establishing an internal-rate-based approach in accordance with Basel 
capital accord requirements. Furthermore, the commission aims to improve the risk 
management capabilities for domestic banks. In fact, all banks that implement the 
internal-rate-based approach are also involved in increasing the capital base, in order 
to raise the capital ratio to required levels.  
 
According to the Basel II capital accord, overdue loans are assessed with a higher risk 
weight, depending on the provision made for the outstanding amount of the loan. As 
discussed earlier, Chinese banks are still facing the massive problem of 
nonperforming loans. Over the last few years, AMC’s were established to take over 
the burden of the non-performing loans. Consequently, Chinese banks have been 
recapitalised and shifted the ultimate risk-influencing factor to the AMC’s, which 
allows for better risk assessments. In the Chinese case, it is worth contemplating 
whether loan allocation following the Basel II Accord criteria will be realistic in the 
near future, or not? The state is in control of financial allocation to make sure that 
economic reforms can be realised. Chinese banks have also been challenged with 
improving market discipline through better disclosure of information, improved 
governance effectiveness and the promotion of prudent risk management. Corporate 
governance and international accounting standards have been introduced, but 
enforcement remains weak. The following Chinese banks received capital injection 
by the state over the past few years: 
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Year  Chinese Bank Capital injection  in USD
2009 Agricultural Bank of China 30 billion 
2008  China Development Bank 20 billion 
2008 Agricultural Bank of China 20 billion 
2007 China Everbright Bank 2.64 billion 
2005 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 15 billion 
2004  Bank of China 22.5 billion 
2004 China Construction Bank 22.5 billion 
   
Table 14: Capital injection to Chinese banks 
Source: Compiled by the author and based on various sources (China Daily 2004b, Asia Times 2006, 
International Harald Tribune 2008) 
 
In fact, the measurement of potential credit risks is a method to mitigate the risk of 
non-payment that always influences bank-lending decisions. According to Basel II 
capital accord, interest rates for loans will be dependent on how much financial 
reserve banks have to put aside. Enterprises with a high creditworthiness will benefit 
from low interest rates and enterprises with a low creditworthiness will be burdened 
with high interest rates as the banks themselves face high costs of equity capital. So 
far, as a result of the government’s control of interest rate policy, loan rates do not 
reflect risk (Pei 2006). According to theory, regulation and supervision is essential 
because of the existing asymmetric information problem between the depositor and 
the bank. More transparency in information disclosure is crucial for the Chinese state-
owned sector, as Chinese enterprises and banks are interested in receiving financial 
resources from national and international investors and Chinese stock markets want to 
work on an international level. Currently, all Chinese banks are listed on the stock 
market. Implementing Basel II helps them gain a good reputation in the stock market 
and builds up investor confidence. Furthermore, Chinese large banks aspire to expand 
overseas. Overseas subsidiaries are required to comply with Basel requirements. As a 
result, the adoption of international accounting standards and compliance with Basel 
capital accords is in line with corporate governance mechanisms, which responds to 
the needs of international rating agencies.  
 
At the moment, four external credit rating agencies exist in China, which are 
authorised by the People’s Bank of China to rate publicly issued corporate bonds: 
China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd. (中诚信国际信用评级有限责
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任公司), China Lianhe Credit Rating Co. Ltd. (联合资信评估有限公司), Dagong 
Global Credit Rating Co., Ltd. (大公国际资信评估有限公司) and Shanghai Far East 
Credit Rating Co., Ltd (上海远东资信评估有限公司)84 . These agencies work 
according to international rating criterion such as global credit rating agencies like 
Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, all of which have established offices in China. 
Besides the rating agencies mentioned above, there are also around 50-60 regional 
Chinese credit-rating agencies. They have been established by the central bank and 
the major banks in China, but they do not work according to international standards 
and do not have high acceptance in the market (Ballreich 2008:64).  
 
Although Chinese credit-rating agencies exist and have gained operational experience 
over the years, little attention is paid to their credit ratings. Chinese bonds are only 
rated after the approval of the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) and the State Council, resulting in consequent AAA ratings, which does not 
provide confidence to investors (Kennedy 2003:37). Therefore, observers assume that 
these ratings do not reflect the actual performance situation of Chinese enterprises 
and question their credibility. Kennedy (2003:39) argues that Chinese credit-rating 
agencies face the difficulty of obtaining reliable financial information from listed 
enterprises they can work with. Furthermore, Chinese credit-rating agencies lack 
experienced rating professionals who can provide appropriate analyses. Finally, it is 
assumed that Chinese credit-rating agencies, which work under strong competition, 
are interested in gaining market share in the domestic market and are ready to hand 
out AAA rating to keep their customer portfolio. Chinese credit-rating agencies have 
to respond to the public’s interest in providing relevant and accurate market 
information and transparency, otherwise they run the risk that their ratings will be 
classified as irrelevant.  
 
From an international perspective, large Chinese banks are gradually moving towards 
establishing operations in global financial markets. Consequently, they have to abide 
by international governance regulations and comply with Basel capital accord 
requirements. The obvious challenge for Chinese banks is to integrate rating 
 
84 In 2003, Shanghai Far East Credit Rating Co., Limited was admitted to the Association of Credit Rating Agencies 
in Asia (ACRAA). It is the first credit rating agency in China to join the association. Since 2003, Shanghai Far East 
Credit Rating Co., Limited is a subsidiary of Xinhua Financial Network (Xinhua Finance). 
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mechanisms in their operational business and for them to become a relevant part of 
their risk management activities. Large banks, mostly in developed countries, which 
apply the IRB approach, have substantial competitive advantage (Claessens et al. 
2006). Reform pressure for the implementation of corporate governance standards 
and a developed credit culture comes from the international capital markets, where 
state-owned banks are exposed to global competition for scarce financial resources 
and market forces. In order to comply with international standards, the state is 
promoting stringent capital adequacy requirements, which entail an increase in credit 
costs for domestic enterprises and households.  
The improvement of risk management and an adequate credit culture in China’s 
socialist market economy is significant, especially in the light of dominant ownership. 
Weak market of corporate control and weak institutional arrangements are an 
incentive for high-risk taking and low credit quality. The major cause for banking 
problems is directly related to lax credit standards and poor portfolio risk 
management. By strengthening regulations in risk management, the central 
government has changed its credit policy to a certain degree with the aim that credit 
risk exposure is reduced or at least maintained within acceptable parameters. The new 
rules of risk assessment might not be able to capture all relevant information, taking 
socio-political considerations into account. The Basel capital accord requirements 
support the state in its efforts to measure, monitor and control credit risk as well as to 
determine that state-owned banks hold adequate capital levels against potential risks. 
Corporate governance asks for a new definition of the role of the state in the banking 
landscape, but in this area, the state cannot retreat from its dominant position. By 
keeping control over credit allocation and interest rates, the state is able to maintain 
financial control over enterprises and the reform process. It is assumed, that it is the 
state’s responsibility to deal with risk that might cause bank bankruptcy and therefore 
it is the state, which has to assume significant risk related to the costs in case of 
failure. The implementation of the Basel capital accord including the foundation of 
the internal rate based approach is limited since objectives in risk management need 
to consider domestic requirements, such as expenses for enterprise restructuring, for 
recapitalization of the banking sector, for establishment of social safety net and 
pension system. Strengthening of credit risk management and prudent loan growth 
strategy is strongly connected to the state’s corporate governance efforts in efficiency 
and transparency improvement in the financial sector. As already outlined before, 
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investment decisions following economic, social and environmental needs are 
determined by the state. The state is not only dominant shareholder, but also creditor 
in the state-owned sector. As a shareholder, the state is interested in credit allocation 
for reinvestment resulting in high revenues and dividends. As a creditor, the state is 
interested in secured credit allocation and a healthy credit culture. Corporate 
management of enterprises influences credit quality as they are much better informed 
about the ability and willingness to pay off debts. In order to solve this classical 
principal-agent problem, the state aims to influence management behavior by the 
installment of risk management regulations. The introduction of strong capital and 
liquidity standards accompanied by better risk management and supervision have 
significant implications in corporate governance, as it allows the state to be in the 
position to directly monitor the accumulation of debt in the state-owned sector, and at 
the same time strengthening the resilience of its banks and the banking system. 
Further, the maintenance of capital adequacy ratios supports state-owned banks in 
their efforts of standardization in capital allocation, as well as of enhancement in 
capital cost effectiveness.  
 
The state and the Communist Party are challenged that economic and social reforms 
become successful. From the financial point of view, it is critical that the 
transformation process is accompanied by improvements in supervision, risk 
management and governance, as well as greater transparency and disclosure. The 
financing of economic and social reform programs is an integral part of the realisation 
of the scientific concept of development and the harmonious society, and therefore is 
highly linked with efforts in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. 
In order to be able to allocate resources effectively, according to the financial needs 
of the differing economic, social and environmental reform programs in the country, 
investment risk must be transparent and information about investment type must be 
disclosed. The state as well the Communist Party, both share the same interest in 
exclusive financial resource allocation, which allows them to respond to domestic 
requirements in regard to economic growth, employment and environmental issues. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The reform of the financial sector is a significant element in the transformation 
process, in order to allow policymakers to develop the necessary infrastructure for a 
sound financial system within state ownership. The transformation from a central 
planned economy to a socialist market economy requires institutional reforms, since 
financial institutions played a very limited role under the system of central planning. 
Institutional change is still not completed in the financial sector and this might be a 
significant reason why protection of this sector is more important than in others. In 
the banking sector, institutional change is anticipated to solve collective problems of 
financing and monitoring by improving institutional capacities. The introduction of 
corporate governance transformed state-owned banks into corporations with the state 
as main shareholder, where new institutions are replacing existing ones. In the reform 
process, state-owned banks are playing various roles, thereby corporate performance 
and financial resource allocation is controlled and monitored by the government and 
the Communist Party. Most East-Asian countries85 are characterised by ownership 
concentration whether it is family-based or government–based 
(Claessens/Djankov/Lang 1999b).  
 
The relationship between state-owned banks and the state did not change in the 
framework of reform. Figure 11 gives an overview of the vertical relationship 
between state-owned banks and the government in the financial system. The vertical 
relationship between the institutions has not altered over time. The state and the 
Communist Party continue to impose direct influence on state-owned banks by 
holding the main part of control rights, and state-owned banks continue act as 
intermediary between the state-owned sector and the state. They are regarded as a 
control instrument on behalf of the state, by providing a clear picture about the 
financial needs of the differing reforms steps and the transformation process. Large 
commercial banks are mobilizing and allocating savings, thereby they heavily rely on 
funds from individual households and enterprises. On the other hand, they provide 
financing to borrowers, such as the government, the state-owned sector and 
households.86 High saving rates resulting from low consumption in the economy, 
 
85 Apparent in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Korea. 
86  Domestic credit to the private business sector is still limited in China (see chapter 4.1). 
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made resources available for investment. The availability of resources, in the form of 
extensive credit programs and investments are possible since the public has 
confidence in the bank system and deposit their income in the banks instead of 
consumption.  
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Figure 11: Vertical relationship between the state and state banks 
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The reform of the financial sector is delayed and the financial sector remains 
unreformed, since the state as well as the Communist Party does not retreat from their 
dominant position in financial resource allocation. In fact, reforms did not change the 
role of the government in the financial sector, and the separation of policy lending 
from commercial business activities as required by corporate governance has not been 
very effective so far. Restructuring efforts were successful in turning the state-owned 
banks into profit-oriented enterprises with a solid capital base, but the cleaning of bad 
debts from the books of the commercial banks might not be enough to countervail 
future debt in the long run. The banking sector does not assist the growing small and 
medium business sector and the agricultural sector in their needs for credit provision, 
but serves primary the financial needs of the state-owned sector and individual 
households. So far, financial institutions and commercial banks are not in the position 
to allocate freely savings toward profit-generating investments and the private sector 
which would cover their cost of intermediation. In the private sector, credit is 
obtained from the informal market, official credit institutions are of less importance.  
 
Chinese state-owned banks are facing the same governance challenges that are faced 
by state-owned enterprises in terms of defining the appropriate relationship with the 
state and the Communist Party. Thereby the original role of the banking system to 
support, monitor and control financial resource allocation on behalf of policy 
objectives has not changed over time. The transformation process requires high 
amounts of financial resources for enterprise restructuring, recapitalisation of the 
banking sector, establishment of the capital market and the introduction of a social 
safety net and a pension system. The establishment of corporate governance standards 
following market-oriented principles is hindered since decisions on credit lending do 
not necessarily consider risk management requirements, but rather political and social 
objectives. Reforms are pursued by the government within state ownership, thereby 
maintaining centralised control over access to the banking sector, printing of money, 
determination of credit rates and credit allocation. The Chinese case shows that bank-
dominated financing is not transparent, as a high level of acceptable information 
disclosure is missing. Corporate governance standards support the state by improving 
efficiency in the state-owned sector as well as transparency and supervision with 
regard to its financial situation. Corporate governance systems and measures are 
substantial as public financial statements produces meaningful information for 
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investment decisions. Standardized accounting standards, disclosure of financial 
statements and functioning information systems have a positive impact on enterprise 
behaviour, as transparency and control is automatically improved. As long as the 
capital market in China remains underdeveloped, policymakers will rely on the 
banking sector for financing. The financial sector plays a key role, as credit allocation 
to defined state-owned industries is resulting into profitable revenues, which 
safeguards fiscal revenues for the state in the long run. Negative aspects such as the 
high economic costs of the unreformed banking system resulting from non-
performing loans and inefficiency are tolerated.  
 
At the time, when reforms were introduced to the country, the central policy approach 
emphasised high economic growth of the Chinese economy, and financial funds were 
channelled to the state–owned sector with the objective to receive high returns of 
investment on behalf of the shareholder only. Corporate governance standards were 
introduced with the objective to improve the monitoring and control capability of 
state agents within the framework of the state-sector restructuring. Control over 
finance, allows the state to push for industrialisation in the country, and transparency 
within the state-sector allow the state to prove progress in its industrialisation efforts. 
Since the central policy approach changed to the scientific concept of development 
and the harmonious society, the interest of other stakeholders needs to be taken into 
consideration, which require financial resources for social and environmental reforms. 
A stable financial infrastructure and environment is an essential prerequisite for the 
realisation of ongoing reform programs with regard to the scientific concept of 
development and the harmonious society. With the Communist Party’s commitment 
to corporate social responsibility, the Party has taken over a mediator role for 
different social interest groups. Since its claim to power is not legitimated by 
democratic elections, it has to respond to demand for social returns on investment 
coming from differing interests groups; otherwise its ruling status would be in danger. 
By assisting the state in maintaining control over finance, social reforms and the 
support of economic interest groups at the national and local level in the country are 
credible. Financial fragility of the banking system with regard to bank runs and 
systemic risk is a vivid threat to the legitimisation of the Communist Party, as well as 
to its monopoly position in the political system. China is the country with the highest 
saving rate in the world, and through means of state control, the household deposits 
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are safeguarded. Credit allocation relies on household deposits, and the state acts as a 
guarantor for the security of household deposits in the banks. Moral hazard problems 
are obvious, since the Communist Party would not let allow bank failure in order to 
ensure a healthy financial sector, which would lead beyond doubt to social instability 
in the country. Letting market forces freely determine monetary policy could result in 
a collapse of the economic balance, by slowing growth and increasing social 
instability. In addition weaknesses in the financial infrastructure justify continuing 
state authorities’ intervention, as the possibility of a domestic banking crisis is a 
threat to the country’s economic and political stability. A domestic banking crisis 
would result in a fundamental confidence loss of the Chinese public and the 
international community in the banking system and would have an immense negative 
impact on investment and economic growth. Beside the monitoring and control 
function of state-owned banks, the rationale behind high levels of state regulation in 
the Chinese banking sector can be explained among other reasons with threat of 
banking instability, depositor protection and social instability. The Communist Party 
is supporting the state in its efforts maintaining control over finance in the country 
with the objective to guard against those threats, which would undermine the 
Communist Party’s monopoly position as well as its legitimisation in the political 
landscape of the country. The introduction of corporate governance linked with 
corporate social responsibility in the financial sector entails a consensus over capital 
allocation involving state control and broader stakeholder participation in the reform 
process.   
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Actor  State CPC 
Goals   
Control over credit line 
Control over credit allocation and interest rates 
Control over capital flows and capital allocation 
Control over recruitment 
Control over household deposits, as credit lending is based on the deposits 
Banking system is a control device over debt 
Banking system is a tool for funding national policies 
Confidence of the Chinese public in the stability of the banking sector 
Successful realisation of reform programs in transformation economy 
 
 
Industrialisation  
Economic and financial stability 
 
 
Legitimate one-party claim 
Political and social stability 
 
Role  Guardian of the interests of the Chinese 
public in order to maintain economic 
stability in the country. 
Mediator and spokesperson of differing 
social interest groups in order to maintain 
political and social stability in the country. 
Figure 13:  Objectives in the banking sector 
 
The Chinese financial market is characterised by monopolist behaviour and 
protectionism due to government regulations. The banking sector and the capital 
market are also facing reform pressure from international investors and requirements 
from international capital markets. Compliance with corporate governance and with 
the Basel capital accord are internationally accepted standards for enterprises working 
globally. As the state is pushing state-owned banks to operate overseas and to become 
global players, they need to respond to the demands of the international community. 
Since state-owned enterprises are working in an environment of imperfect 
competition, international exposure is a good measure for their performance. Being 
competitive in the international markets might be a good indicator of the health of an 
enterprise as well as of the long-term performance. The same is applicable for the 
capital market. The state requires that the stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
attract international investors’ capital. Compliance with corporate governance is 
regarded as a trust strengthening tool for international investors, where corporate 
information disclosure and transparency is managed in a standardised and uniform 
way. 
 
In the future state-owned banks will be challenged by the ongoing implementation of 
Basel II and III rules. The implementation of corporate governance will be carried on 
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but combined with further policy lending, which hinders effective corporate 
governance. Policy lending will continue due to four reasons: 
 
Policy lending to large state-owned enterprises continues 
Policy lending to large state-owned enterprises will continue since the 
restructuring process is ongoing and still not completed. But policy 
lending will be much more restricted and only exclusive industries 
will benefit from soft credit approval processes. Further, selected 
large state-owned enterprises are defined to be the mainstay of the 
national economy. Chinese policymakers are interested in supporting 
and strengthening the domestic market to guarantee further economic 
growth in China. In the past, China focused on export growth. In 2004, 
China overtook Japan as the world's third largest exporter, just behind 
Germany and the United States. Now, since international markets 
have been saturated and demand is declining, Chinese policymakers 
have turned to the domestic market to sustain future economic growth. 
The Chinese state is the main infrastructure provider in the country. In 
underdeveloped regions of China, the demand for infrastructure is 
high, and industrial enterprises can provide necessary products and 
services to them. Some of these infrastructure projects might not be 
profitable from an economic point of view, but of strategic importance 
to the state. Chinese state-owned banks will continue policy lending 
activities in order to finance these infrastructure projects. Economic 
effectiveness and profitability aspects are not necessarily the 
dominant variable in the decision-making process for credit lending, 
since strategic considerations are also taken into account.  
 
Policy lending to small-and medium enterprises in rural areas continues 
Policy lending and the expansion of financial services in Chinese rural 
areas will increase. In 2006, at the 10th National People's Congress, 
Chinese policy makers announced the construction of a socialist new 
countryside with the objective to improve living standards in rural 
areas. In particular, small-and medium enterprises in the countryside 
and underdeveloped regions will benefit from soft credit approval 
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processes. Here again, the demand for infrastructure is high, and 
industrial enterprises can provide necessary products and services to 
rural areas. 
 
Policy lending will continue in order to avoid spill-over effects 
The economic viability of the state-owned sector and a stable level of 
investments are of utmost priority. State-owned enterprises do not 
matter to the state under a purely economic viewpoint. Both state-
owned enterprises and state-owned banks fulfil a social function in 
Chinese society and play an active role in employment security. The 
threat of a high unemployment rate, social unrest and political 
instability is of concern to the state and to the Communist Party. Soft 
lending is politically desirable since economic returns are not the only 
variable in credit allocation, but also social returns.  
Furthermore, Chinese state-owned banks are deposit-taking 
institutions, not only of individual stakeholders, but also of public 
stakeholders. Problems at the financial market scene, which starts at 
one bank, can trigger a banking crisis which spreads throughout the 
whole national banking system. Such spill over effects can undermine 
the confidence of individual and public depositors in the banking 
system. As a consequence of these crucial risks, banks are subject to 
substantially greater regulatory and state dominated interference, 
having an impact on developing governance structures. 
 
Policy lending will continue since state-owned banks are acting as a 
monitoring and control device on behalf of the state 
Chinese banks are acting as intermediary between enterprises and the 
state. By holding enterprise equity and debt, state-owned banks are a 
control instrument over enterprise behaviour and the reform process in 
the state-owned sector as a whole. Information disclosure and high 
levels of transparency in corporate enterprise information is still 
developing, state-owned banks are so far the only reliable information 
channel to the state to be able to monitor and control corporate 
management behaviour. Efficient use of capital is influenced by 
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decision-making of management. Control over state-banks allows the 
state to maintain its monitoring capacity over corporate boards of 
directors. Since the transformation process requires continuous 
financial funds, policy lending through the state-owned banks will go 
on, and bank executives will be challenged by adhering government 
directions in policy lending while effectively monitoring and 
controlling credit risk. Due to imperfection in the capital markets, no 
alternative financing channel exist, consequently deficits in the 
economy need to be compensated with soft loans and subsidies.  
 
Market–based financing through the issuance of stocks is regarded as an important 
financing alternative for state-owned enterprises, especially for those which need 
external capital rapidly to grow in an international competitive environment. In order 
to get prepared for an initial public offering, enterprises must provide clear 
compliance with corporate governance standards, such as shareholding rights, 
transparent financial disclosure and accounting, and a transparent operating system. 
So far, the capital market in China is still underdeveloped and market discipline 
cannot become effective as state administration is dominant. Furthermore the rule of 
law and regulatory mechanism for investor protection remain poor, and corporate 
governance standards effectiveness is limited. It will take some time to develop the 
capital market, thereby following international standards of disclosure and 
transparency, applicable not only to the state, but also to other stakeholder groups. 
Today, domestic and international investors are facing obstacles in receiving financial 
information and corporate disclosure remains limited. The introduction of corporate 
governance in the financial sector determines the upcoming shift from bank financing 
to direct financing of the capital market and stock exchanges. Despite the strong role 
of the banking sector, financial disintermediation is developing in the Chinese 
financial market, and the traditional credit-lending banking model for financing will 
alter in the course of time. This will signify a shift from monitoring of management 
by creditors (state-owned banks) to monitor of management by equity-holders (state). 
This shift will have significant implications on corporate governance, as state-owned 
banks will not anymore act as intermediary between enterprises and the state, but the 
state will directly monitor corporate management and enterprise behaviour. This 
move will reduce agency problems caused by the use of debt between state-owned 
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enterprises and the state in the role of the shareholder. In order to strengthen market 
discipline, large state-owned enterprises will continue to be pushed to go for initial 
public offerings. Thereby state-owned enterprises will be in the situation to receive 
finance from external channels, and reliance on traditional bank financing will be 
reduced. Policymakers will expand the scope for qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFIIs) and qualified domestic institutional investors (QDIIs) in order to 
bring in fresh capital to local stock exchanges. In particular foreign funds of qualified 
foreign institutional investors are important as it is highly linked with the build-up of 
foreign exchange. In particular in a time where export trade is declining, having a 
negative impact on the balance of trade. In general, the introduction of institutional 
investors to capital markets has a positive impact on risk management, on the 
improvement of governance structure of domestic listed companies, as well as on 
institutional reform.  
 
China’s stock market needs to deepen the reform of its tradable shares. In 2005 pilot 
activities have been undertaken for reform. Reforms tackle the problem of the 
separation between tradable and non-tradable shares. On the stock market, non-
tradable shares have a negative impact on the pricing mechanism. The question is 
how stock prices will develop while maintaining the stability of the market. The 
realisation of fully tradable shares on China’s stock market is of sensitive nature and 
will take some further time. Summarising, it can be said that the government is 
currently in a dilemma as on the one hand the state is aware of the fact that a deeper 
reform of the Chinese stock market is necessary to prevent it from a collapse. On the 
other hand the government does not agree to lose ground and control to foreign 
investors.  
 
In the financial market reform, the Communist Party and the state need to respond to 
the financial needs of the reform process and major interest groups at the national as 
well local level. The government is aiming to deploy financial resources resulting in a 
profitable state-owned sector and stable economy, but at the same time the 
Communist Party has to assure the availability of financial resources for social and 
environmental reform programs, as requested by differing interest groups. The key 
challenge of the Communist Party and the state in the financial market reform are not 
particular policies per se, but who has the authority in capital allocation since every 
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interest group wants to get a piece of the cake. Under the assumption that financial 
capital is scarce, the balance of differing interests between the state, the Communist 
Party and all stakeholder groups is necessary with the objective to find a consensus 
over effective resource allocation in the reform process.   
5 Accounting reform 
Part four of the thesis presents the actual situation and measures taken towards the 
reform of the accounting system in China, as traditional Chinese accounting methods 
are no longer appropriate for the socialist market economy. The socialist market 
economy requires a financial infrastructure essential for a modern state, where 
creditors and debtor are informed about the outcome of their investments in 
enterprises. Today financial information does not only serve for economic decision-
making, but also possesses a social function. The vital importance of this area, 
internally as well internationally, is recognised by the state as well as the Communist 
Party in China, especially in the framework of economic reforms. Financial 
statements and financial information are the basis of financial management decisions 
and are a crucial element in the effective running of the state-owned sector and the 
reform process which is looking for improved decision-making. Policymakers 
recognised that the improvement of corporate governance is essential for the creation 
of sound companies, financial market integrity and an attractive investment climate. 
Among its key recommendations, corporate governance identifies a full adoption of 
international financial reporting standards for listed companies as a critical ingredient 
for improving transparency. Corporate transparency is a particularly important 
component of good governance by means of shareholder protection. Domestic and 
international shareholders and investors require accurate and reliable information in 
order to take well-considered economic decisions. In a centrally planning economy, 
the accounting system served as an information and control tool over the fulfilment of 
pre-determined plans. Today the accounting system has to address the requirements 
of differing shareholders and stakeholders, who have an interest in the financial 
situation of the listed enterprises operating in the socialist market economy. 
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5.1 Terms and Definitions 
5.1.1 Definition of International Accounting Standards 
Discussion on international harmonisation of financial accounting standards is the 
result of differing financial accounting practices among different countries. 
Harmonisation of reporting standards does not only implicate transparency and rising 
information needs among international investors and the public, but it also reduces 
the costs of raising capital by enterprises. Bushman/Smith (2001) defines “the 
governance role of financial accounting information as the use of externally reported 
financial accounting data in control mechanisms that promote the efficient 
governance of corporations”. Rajan/Zingales (1998b) demonstrate a positive 
relationship between financial accounting information and economic performance. 
 
Since the 1980’s, measurement of harmonisation, related to compatibility and 
comparability between the existing accounting standards at the national and 
international level has obtained importance among academic research (Nobes 1983, 
2004; Archer/McLeavy 1995; Ding et.al 2007). Experience has shown that 
differences in the accounting rules of the different countries have caused investors to 
make wrong decisions, due to a lack of accurate information or a lack of explanations 
by the auditors of a certain country with respect to financial statements of such 
countries as compared with international accounting principles (Archer/McLeavy 
1995; Ding et.al 2007). In the beginning, the differences in accounting practices 
identified were attributed to environmental factors, like differences in culture and 
economic systems (Davidson/Kohlmeier 1966; Nobes 1998). Later other factors that 
have an impact on accounting practices were considered, such as the historical 
development of a nation’s economy, development of capital markets (Nobes 1998), 
differences in legal systems including accounting laws, differences in the nature of 
property rights, the structure of companies within a country and institutional factors 
(Ball et al. 2000). As a result of increased globalisation, capital markets recognise the 
consequent need for relevant and reliable accounting information on an international 
basis. International accounting harmonisation aims to achieve uniformity in 
accounting practices. Therefore, security exchanges demand multi-national 
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companies to provide financial statements according to international accounting 
standards (IAS).  
 
In 2001, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was created and 
started its operations with the following objectives, concentrating on the process of 
international harmonisation: 
 
? Develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable 
and international financial reporting standards for general-purpose financial 
statements.  
? The IASB co-operates with national accounting standard-setters to achieve 
convergence in accounting standards around the world. 
 
The IASB replaced the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 
standard setting. The IASC issued international accounting standards (IAS) and one 
of the primary reasons for its creation was to advance the international harmonisation 
of financial accounting standards. Uniformity of accounting standards and 
international harmonisation is still an ongoing process, including the implementation 
of IAS/IFRS in different countries. Harmonisation involves the formulation of 
accounting regulations, which are applicable in a similar way in capital markets, 
which have become increasingly globalised. The IASB wants all countries worldwide 
to adopt international accounting standards, as it is the easiest way of promoting 
harmonisation. Since 2005 in the European Union, listed enterprises have been 
obliged to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS), which also contain the international accounting standards 
(IAS). Beside implementation of IAS/IFRS on a worldwide basis, compliance with 
IAS/IFRS in the differing countries will be of ultimate interest for research in the 
future. In fact, developed and developing countries are differently affected by the 
implementation of IAS/IFRS, therefore the International Accounting Standards 
Committee Foundation recognised the “need to have an understanding of the impact 
of IFRS as they are adopted in particular regions” (IASB 2004).  
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5.1.2 Definition of Transparency and Financial Disclosure 
Strong disclosure of a company’s financial information and transparent practices 
contribute to the market integrity of the company and its shareholders, as well as to 
the domestic economy of a country. Bearle and Means (1932) argue that due to 
separation of ownership and the control function of management, the management 
might be in a position to take actions for personal gain which could be 
disadvantageous for the owner. Therefore, an urgent need for reliable information 
exists, which protects the interests of shareholders as well as provides them with a 
tool to assess managerial performance. The early work of Bearle and Means explains 
the necessity of publishing accounting reports containing information about financial 
conditions and performance results of operational business. Companies that are 
interested in accessing the securities market have to provide this kind of information. 
Coase (1937, 1960), and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) developed the contract theory 
as an approach to reducing and mitigating agency problems respectively. Accounting 
plays a critical part in contract building activities, as lending arrangements between 
the enterprise and the creditor include accounting-based debt covenants. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986:196) bring forward the argument that “if accounting is an 
important part of the firm’s contracting process and agency costs vary with different 
contracts, accounting procedures have the potential to affect firm value and/ or the 
manager’s compensation”.  
Both the standards of corporate governance of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the international accounting standards deal with 
transparency and financial disclosure. By fulfilling disclosure requirements 
companies are responding to the needs of the capital markets. A strong disclosure 
regime that promotes real transparency is critical for market-based monitoring of 
companies and is central to shareholders’ ability to exercise their ownership rights on 
an informed basis. 
 
According, to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
corporate governance framework should ensure timely and accurate disclosure on all 
material matters, including financial situation, performance, ownership and 
governance of the company (OECD 2004a). Insufficient or unreliable information 
results in markets not perfectly functioning, an increase in the cost of capital and the 
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poor allocation of resources. Generally, the objective of disclosure is to provide 
information on events or uncertainties known to management that would have a 
material impact on reported financial information. Disclosure standards assist 
domestic and international investors in understanding a company’s financial situation, 
changes in financial condition and results of operations. 
5.2 Historical Background of Accounting Reform 
This chapter offers an examination of the accounting functions and the status of 
accountants for a better understanding of the system in a centrally-planned economy. 
Reform efforts need to consider the changing role of the plan, the market and the 
institution of state finance. Before 1949, the accounting model was following the 
same principles as required in the international financial community. During the 
period 1949-1978, the accounting function was reduced to a simple comparison of 
planned and actual data, and served as an information and control tool of state 
bureaucracy for the fulfilment of the predetermined plan. The main function of 
accounting was twofold. On one hand accounting was a tool to observe and 
coordinate annual budgets provided by the state according to plan. On the other hand 
accounting served to monitor enterprises’ revenue generation which was directed 
straight to the state. In a command economy, the budget represented the key tool in 
managing state and financial discipline over state-enterprises, where state ownership 
dominates. As economic planning and control was centralised, state budgets served 
for redistribution of finance and provided a substitute to market mechanisms. From 
the period 1949-1993 the central government directed state budgets to state-owned 
enterprises, therefore the central government had direct access to the state-owned 
enterprises, as it received their profits. Government savings were not generated 
through taxation, as there was practically no tax imposed on households. Therefore 
Chinese accounting system was characterised by a fund-orientation, where the state-
owned enterprises paid their surplus to the state and received a share of fund 
allocation in return. Revenues of state enterprises were mainly plan–determined, and 
served likewise as a plan and control figure for the state, and did not result from the 
market driven by demand and supply.    
The profession of certified public accountants was first introduced to China in 1918. 
Before 1949, when China turned into a central planned economy, public accounting 
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firms and accountancy profession existed. Large private and state-owned enterprises 
applied double-entry bookkeeping like in Western countries. In 195387, following the 
Soviet accounting style, China adopted a unified socialist accounting system. 
Accounting regulation in China has been strongly shaped by political ideology 
discourse, as under Mao Zedong accounting was condemned as a capitalistic class 
tool that had the purpose of controlling and monitoring enterprise profits by the ruling 
class. Profit realisation was regarded as capitalist by exploiting the labour class in the 
country. The dominant political ideology under Mao’s regime was characterised by 
class struggle primacy, public ownership and central planning. The class struggle 
primacy which was orientated from the Marxist leading thought of class struggle 
generated explicit debates on accounting practices in China.88 Under central planning, 
accounting practices were highly influenced by the Soviet accounting practices 
(Ezzamel et al. 2007). Under Deng Xiaoping the role of accounting changed to a 
neutral technology and a science within a socialist market economy. Now under Hu 
Jintao, accounting is rather viewed as a technical and ideological-free tool, providing 
information not only to the state and the Communist Party, but also to outside 
shareholders and stakeholders.  
 
The model of the Soviet accounting system primarily served the needs of central 
planning, providing statistical information and standardised, uniform information. 
Financial information was cumulated for the primary purpose of being available to 
the state. In general, the state, including local governments and government agencies 
were the user of financial information. The entire legal framework in the Chinese 
socialist economy determined what information should be available, in which way, 
and to whom it should available.  
 
State-owned enterprises were regarded as administrative institutions under the control 
of the state, local governments and relevant government bodies. The accounting 
system, adopted from the Soviet Union, was a highly centralised administrative one 
(Nayaran/Reid 2000). Specific and strict government control over financial matters 
existed, relating to sourcing, production and marketing activities. There was a vague 
 
87  By 1955, all private ownership was transformed into public ownership, as state-ownership or collective-
ownership.  
88 See detailed discussion on political ideology and accounting change in China (Ezzamel et al. 2007). 
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distinction between accounting, finance, taxation and profits since the government 
was the sole owner of enterprises. In fact, accounts were prepared according to the 
needs of finance and tax regulations. The sole purpose of the accounting system was 
to maximise state revenue, which was considered necessary for sustaining and 
legitimising central planning, protecting public ownership (Ezzamel et al. 2007:680), 
financing bureaucracy and granting public services in the country. The role of 
accounting was assumed to be subordinate to the interests of the state, especially in 
the light of soft budget constraints, which is in contrast to the hard budget constraint. 
In Western countries, accounting is applied as tool for companies working under a 
hard budget constraint, where resource allocation is dependent on profitability and 
efficiency.  
 
Through the process of economic reforms the accounting system has been made more 
adaptive to the socialist market system, thereby accounting for the changing role of 
the central planning and the state budget. With the introduction of market 
mechanisms and an orientation towards decentralisation in the economy, state-
enterprises are compelled to work profitable and to find sources of financing. Because 
of this the demand for more sophisticated financial management and financial 
accountability became urgent. With the introduction of the accounting standards for 
business enterprises (ASBE) in 1992, the Ministry of Finance constituted 
conservatism as a relevant principle in accounting. Furthermore the Ministry of 
Finance promulgated multiple industry-specific and ownership-specific uniform 
accounting systems89, predicated on the accounting standards for business enterprises 
and accounting standards.  
 
In 2000, the Ministry of Finance adopted an Enterprise Accounting System, serving 
all industries and thus replacing the industry-specific and ownership-specific 
accounting systems. At that time conservatism in accounting was permitted to a 
degree comparable to that in Western countries, but building secret reserves90 was 
still not accepted (Ezzamel et al. 2007:691). The introduction of market elements in 
 
89  There existed 13 industry-specific accounting systems, as for manufacturing, merchandising, transportation, 
railway transportation, aviation transportation, agriculture, postage and telecommunication, real-estate development, 
construction, financial institution, insurance, tourism, and joint ventures with a foreign partner. There also existed 2 
ownership-specific accounting systems: one for shareholding enterprises (1992) and one for enterprises with foreign 
investment (1985) (Ministry of Finance 1992, 1993).  
90 Building secret reserves was regarded as a tool for covering surplus revenues and accumulating capital.  
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the economy and greater decentralisation in the state-owned sector led to the 
accounting reform, where the role of accounting was newly defined – from fund 
accounting to capital accounting. The changing economic environment broadened the 
scope of users of corporate financial information like non-state bodies, outside 
shareholders, stakeholders, oversee-investors, and creditors etc.. Further accounting 
regulations were adapted, following the requirements of the system of socialist 
market economy.  
5.3 Accounting Reform in China 
Accounting reform in China has been extensively investigated by many scholars 
(Chen et al. 2007; Chen/Cheng 2007; Xiang 1998; Wang Yaotang/Zhang Li/Zhao 
Ziye 2004; Huang Yujia/Zhang Yongji 2007; Pang Bixia 2007; Qu Xiaohui/Gao Fang 
2006). Xiao et al. (2004) argues that in the Chinese case political interference is an 
influencing factor, where the central government assumes an active role in the 
implementation of international accounting standards. In contrast, in countries with a 
developed capital market, market forces influence the development of accounting 
standards, although the government might be involved in the operational enforcement 
of accounting standards.  
 
The legal basis for accounting in China relies on the Accounting Law of People’s 
Republic of China, adopted at the 9th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth 
National People’s Congress in 1985, and revised in accordance with the Decision on 
Amending the Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China in 1993, and again 
revised by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress in 1999. 
This law is relevant for all enterprises, regardless of company’s legal form. The State 
Council issues administrative laws and regulations on accounting matters. The 
accountancy system is based on the accounting standards for business enterprises 
(ASBE), promulgated in 1992 with the aim of bringing China’s accounting practices 
in line with international accounting standards. The ASBE, promulgated by the 
Ministry of Finance, is relevant to domestic companies. The ASBE are based on 
international accounting standards and include adoptions to local conditions. 
Amendatory requirements for listed companies are imposed by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission.  
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On February 16, 2006, the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China 
adopted a new basic standard and 38 new Chinese accounting standards that are in 
line with international financial reporting standards91. Since January 2007, Chinese 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are required to 
present their accounts based on international financial reporting standards, set by the 
International Accounting Standards Board, which are now in use in more than 100 
countries92. Since 2008, the use of the new CASs has been expanded to all state-
owned enterprises controlled by the Chinese central government, and since 2009 to 
all large and medium-sized companies in China. Accordingly, there is a unified 
accounting framework that is applied to all enterprises in China. The move signals a 
commitment by the Chinese government to create rules and regulations that are 
friendlier to international investors (Jian 2006).  
 
In 1992, the promulgation of accounting standards for business enterprises 
represented the first step towards the standardisation of financial behaviour in China 
and the harmonisation of China’s accounting standards with international practice. 
Soviet-based accounting regulations were replaced, and the planned-economy 
accounting system was transformed into a market-economy accounting system. The 
accounting standards specified the use of double-entry accounting (also used under 
Soviet-based accounting regulations), accrual based accounting (also used under 
Soviet-based accounting regulations), consistency and conservatism. Additionally, the 
CSRS released in March 2003 a directive on quarterly reporting applicable by listed 
companies, including a profit and loss statement, data on total assets and net cash 
flow from operations.  
 
Before the implementation of the ASBE, the representatives of the Ministry of 
Finance were sceptical that the adoption of the conservatism principle and 
manufacturing costing in the ASBE would have a negative impact on government 
revenues and taxation (Xiao et al. 2004:209). Furthermore, ASBE, which is 
 
91 See detailed comparison of the new Chinese Accounting Standards and IFRSs for business enterprises, published 
by Deloitte in Chinese and English, available under; http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0607prcifrsenglish.pdf, 
http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0607prcifrschinese.pdf.  
See Practical Guide to Chinese Accounting Standards CAS 18 Income Taxes in Chinese language, which went into 
effect for 2007 reporting, published by Deloitte, available under: http://www.iasplus.com/china/guidetocas18.pdf. 
92 IFRS adoption and use around the world, see www.iasb.org.  
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categorised as being more conservative compared to the former accounting system, 
was only applicable to joint-stock enterprises and listed enterprises. Thus, limited 
application helped authorities prevent broadening the scope of loss-making 
enterprises (Xiao et al. 2004:209), which would have led to significant problems and 
additional economic and social costs in enterprise restructuring. The new accounting 
system was introduced with the aim of improving the transparency and comparability 
of accounting information provided by Chinese enterprises which influences the 
decision-making process of resource allocation. Accounting reform involves the 
improvement in accounting measurement and disclosure standards, and the 
establishment of regulatory and institutional framework for financial reporting. 
5.3.1 Internal Corporate Governance and Relevance of International Accounting 
Standards in China  
In 2006, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC 2006) issued The 
Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies. According to the 
regulation:  
 
Article §§19 Listed companies have to publish financial reports, following 
their disclosure duties, which include those of annual reports, interim reports 
and quarterly reports.  Furthermore, any information that could have a major 
impact on the investors’ decisions shall be disclosed. The financial reports of 
a listed company shall be audited by CPA firms with qualifications for 
practice in securities- and futures-related business. 
 
According to theory, the release of accounting-related laws, regulations, guidelines 
and standards improve the regulatory framework of corporate governance. Financial 
reporting and information disclosure are decisive means for corporate management to 
communicate enterprise performance and governance to shareholders and 
stakeholders. Corporate disclosure is an essential tool for the effective functioning of 
the capital market. Demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises from 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts between management and investors 
(Bearle/Means 1932). Information asymmetry is negatively related to the cost of 
equity capital. As empirical studies have revealed, in most East Asian countries, 
including China, the simple adoption of international accounting standards is not 
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sufficient to resolve the transparency problem (Ball et al. 2000).  Ball et al. (2000) 
further states that financial information in Asian countries93 generally tends to lack 
transparency, resulting from the fact that “information quality is determined to a large 
part by the underlying economic and political factors influencing managers’ and 
auditors’ incentives, and not by accounting standards per se”. He concludes that 
adopting high quality standards might be a necessary precondition for transparency, 
but it is not a sufficient precondition to guarantee transparency in the long run, when 
institutions are not reformed. 
 
Before 1994, Chinese enterprises generated financial resources mainly for internal 
funding, through a budget provided by the central government, and after 1994 the 
main source for funding is the Chinese banking sector, through commercial credit 
lending. As a result of the non-performing loan problem coupled with increasing 
demand for financial resources, the central government is in the necessary situation to 
receive accurate and transparent financial information in order to have support in its 
decision making capability over efficient capital allocation in the framework of 
economic reforms. Management of the socialist market economy requires constant 
decisions related to investments and the accounts of the state-owned enterprises. 
Budgeting and forecasting processes, as well as decisions in pricing and sales, 
purchase and investment, and salaries require accurate financial information. Since 
the state does play several roles in the domestic economy, financial information is 
required at different levels, and transparency supports the state in his effort for 
effective resource allocation. As a regulator, the central government and state agents 
are interested in the allocation of resources and the regulation of enterprise activities. 
Accurate financial information supports policymakers in order to regulate activities of 
enterprises, determine taxation policies and levy the taxes, and as the basis for 
national income. As a shareholder, the state is interested in information which enables 
to assess the ability of the enterprise to pay dividends. As a creditor, the state is 
interested in financial information that enables to assess the repayment capability of 
debtors with regard to loans and interest. Since bank-based financing is predominant 
in China, so the state has a special interest in the reduction of risk exposure. As an 
investor, the state provides risk capital and is concerned that projects with risks 
 
93 East Asian countries chosen for research are Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
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inherent in will provide a return on investment. Financial information is helpful in 
determining buying, holding or selling decisions. By playing all these roles in the 
domestic economy, the state is facing a multitude of agency problems, characterized 
by different levels of information asymmetry. Corporate governance standards and 
the regulations on information disclosure support the state to mitigate these agency 
problems with the objective to overcome the lack of information. Accuracy and 
transparency in financial disclosure is essential due to the following reasons:  
 
Monitoring role of financial information in the reform process 
The reform of the accounting system serves the state’s interest in efficiency and 
transparency improvement within the state-owned sector. Disclosure of financial 
information in compliance with the recommendations of the corporate governance 
standards is a significant concern of the state, as the dominant shareholder. It is 
necessary for the state to get a clear picture of the performance and financial 
conditions of state-owned enterprises, which is a significant statement regarding the 
progress achieved in the reform and the state ownership policy. The state promotes 
the establishment and improvement of accounting and financial reporting which 
results in useful information for investors, creditors, auditors, rating agencies and 
other users of those financial reports. Since the state is transferring huge sums of 
investment into the reform process, financial statements and financial figures are a 
strong indicator for the progress achieved in the reform process within the state-
owned sector. The accounting reform is highly linked with the implementation of the 
new Enterprise Income Tax Law and the dividend policy. By disclosing key 
performance indicators, the state can evaluate enterprises’ efficiency and profitability. 
The state, fulfilling simultaneously the role of major shareholder and tax collector, 
has an interest in high tax revenues from its enterprises, in order to undertake public 
financing. Corporate governance standards and transparent reporting are regarded as 
corporate control mechanisms which have a positive impact on tax behaviour. 
Transparent accounting regulations support the state in setting tax liabilities and in the 
allocation of tax revenues. As a shareholder, the state is interested in information 
about dividend payment. Generally, annual reports disclose information such as 
earnings per share, cash flow from operating activities and dividends payable to 
shareholders of the company. Financial statements and cash flow statements are 
significant in regard to dividend payments. Since the state is the dominant investor for 
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domestic economic reforms, it now requires – since the enterprises are working 
profitable - a return on investment.  
 
Risk management mechanism in the reform process  
The state as the majority shareholder over state-owned banks obtains a strong 
influence over credit and capital allocation decisions. As a creditor, financial 
information supports the state in the assessment of debtor’s repayment capability with 
regard to loans and interest. Better financial information may contribute to efficient 
resource allocation and risk mitigation. In China, total investment is financed by 
equity or debt and by receiving accurate information about financial conditions, 
policymakers are in a better position to handle complex financial operations, 
involving equity and lending activities. Under the assumption that information is 
imperfect, the state cannot rely on state-owned bank monitoring role only, therefore 
quarterly and annual reports institutions provide useful information on potential risk 
which might impact expected return on investment. Financial information also 
influences corporate management behaviour, because the managers know that 
enterprise performance will be published, therefore inappropriate risks might not be 
taken and diversion of funds for own use might be reduced. Having an overall picture 
of a company’s financial position and results of operations, the state can avoid 
inappropriate strategic decisions and unexpected financial losses. In fact, it can be 
stated that it is the state who assumes a significant amount of financial risk within the 
restructuring process, therefore it is the government's responsibility to implement 
standardised regulations on information disclosure for preventing and dealing with 
the risks associated. Taking accurate financial reporting as a risk management 
mechanism, the principal-agent problem between the state and state-owned 
enterprises and banks can be mitigated.  
 
Corporate social responsibility in the state-owned sector 
Accounting and auditing also possess a social function in the accountability 
framework. The role of accounting has been widened, especially since stakeholder 
demand information on investments in social and environmental projects in the 
reform process. Since enterprises in China have been transformed into corporations, 
they are made accountable to fulfil social and environmental responsibilities in the 
society. The accounting function can capture efforts and commitments in these areas, 
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and provide information to stakeholder groups which are concerned with these 
dimensions. The introduction of the scientific development concept and the creation 
of a harmonious society demand the balance of economic growth with concern for 
social and environmental issues. Generally, listed enterprises report their corporate 
social responsibility activities in their annual reports. Taking into account China’s 
Top 20 ranking by Fortune 2010, all state-owned enterprises publish either a 
sustainable development report or a corporate social responsibility report on an 
annual basis. This is in line with the Communist Party’s approach of value-orientation 
within the framework of economic reforms. By fulfilling a mediator role among 
differing stakeholder groups, the Communist Party emphasises the need for social 
responsibility in the state-owned sector. Having an overall picture of companies’ 
corporate social responsibility activities, the Communist Party is capable of 
monitoring its policy effectiveness. Being accountable to differing stakeholder 
groups, the Communist Party can demonstrate its strong position for value-orientation 
on the basis of the progress in social responsibility and sustainable development in 
the state-owned sector and thereby legitimatise its ruling status in the country.  
5.3.2 External Corporate Governance and the Relevance of International 
Accounting Standards in China 
International capital markets are observing an increasing amount of competition for 
scarce financial resources. As a result, companies are compelled to meet 
shareholders’ and investors’ demands for increasing transparency of a company’s 
critical factors for success and processes for success. In the recent past Western 
countries have undertaken many efforts to meet the necessary requirements. Western 
industrialised economies require listed companies to disclose publicly their financial 
accounts. International accounting standards are introduced to provide shareholders 
and investors with a uniform standard valuation for their assessment. The aim is to 
develop a single set of accounting standards for worldwide acceptance.  
 
In China, policymakers are aware of the importance of accurate financial disclosure, 
as generating both domestic and foreign capital for investments is of special concern 
for the government. Since China’s commitment to become a full member of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, Chinese companies have been required to 
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adopt international accounting practices. However, today China is facing a problem 
of inadequate financial disclosures and a lack of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms, although reliable and quality financial reporting and disclosures are of 
importance for enhancing good corporate governance standard and practices. 
According to theory, the quality of a company’s disclosure will be reflected in its 
stock price and its ability to raise share capital on the capital market. Among other 
reasons, the adoption of a modern framework of corporate financial reporting is a 
reaction to the demand of China’s capital market. According to an assessment of the 
IFC (2006), China still continues to fall below the expectations of the international 
community in the area of corporate governance compared to other emerging market 
countries. Moreover, ongoing reforms on financial reporting are dissatisfying and 
financial disclosure remains weak. In general there are several reasons why the 
implementation of international accounting standards has been pushed forward. 
Activities undertaken by the Chinese government in promoting harmonisation with 
international accounting standards are due to internal considerations and external 
pressure. 
 
Inflow of foreign direct investment  
According to the latest FDI Confidence Index 2010 compiled by A.T. 
Kearney (A.T.Kearney 2010), China is the most favoured destination for 
foreign direct investment (FDI), being placed before India and the USA. 
According to the World Investment Report 2009, published by UNCTAD 
(2009), Chinese inward foreign direct investment flows totalled USD 108.3 
billion in 2008, meaning China retained its position of being amongst the 
largest recipients of FDI in the East Asian region. The adoption of an 
international accounting model facilitates foreign direct investment. As early 
as 1985, the Chinese government has already introduced an accounting 
system for Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures. The Chinese-Foreign Joint 
Ventures also contributed to the establishment of auditing firms (Xiao et al. 
2004). Accounting standards used by companies during the command 
economy were inadequate for foreign investors, causing them to lack 
confidence. Foreign enterprises located in China need to comply with Chinese 
accounting regulations and reporting standards in their parent company. 
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IAS/IFRS provides greater transparency in financial statements, which in 
return attracts increased FDI.  
 
External pressure from international organisations like the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund 
The World Bank undertakes a number of activities to support the 
development and implementation of international accounting and auditing 
standards worldwide94 . These activities include “financial support for the 
relevant international standard-setting organisations; diagnostic work to 
benchmark countries’ financial reporting standards and practices against 
international standards; policy advice and financial assistance to support the 
enhancement of these standards and practices; and participation in 
international discussions and initiatives aimed at strengthening the regulatory 
environment, both nationally and globally, in which international standards 
are applied” (Worldbank 2004). The World Bank and IMF regularly observe 
standards and codes95 related to accounting and auditing regulations in China.  
 
Obtaining an international standing within the financial community 
For large Chinese enterprises wanting to become global players on an 
international level, being listed on international stock markets can be regarded 
as a seal of quality due to the high quality standards of international stock 
markets.  
 
Basel Capital Accord  
Financial statements play a significant role in borrowing transactions. Basel II 
Capital Accord requires rating arrangements, regardless of whether a 
company is listed or not. These arrangements aim to ensure that in the future 
companies have no leeway to elude from ratings. The Basel Capital Accord 
strives to improve upon the existing rules by aligning regulatory capital 
requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face, like the 
credit risk. In fact, banks are demanding more and more detailed information 
 
94 See the Worldbank/ROSC website, including details on core standards for accounting and auditing and country 
modules, http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc.html.  
95 See detailed report of IMF/Worldbank on observance of standards and codes in China and Hong Kong, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/hkg/index.htm#pref.  
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from borrowing companies according to international standards. This is 
because banks are also subject to international regulation and conditions. 
Consequently, management has to convince credit institutions of a company’s 
qualities and has to provide a clear and comprehensible picture of the 
company’s current situation and its future development. Financial information 
is crucial to a company’s risk assessment, in relation with a credit approval 
process. Indeed, the largest Chinese state-owned enterprises and state-owned 
banks have raised money via international borrowings, and applied for ratings 
to international agencies such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Financial 
statements prepared in accordance with IFRS also play a significant role to 
determine favourable credit terms (Bank for International Settlement 2010, 
www.bis.org). 
 
Listing on foreign exchange stock and eased access to equity finance 
International stock exchange listing rules require companies to adopt 
internationally accepted accounting principles and standards. IAS/IFRS 
facilitates the quotation of Chinese company shares on foreign stock 
exchanges. As China’s international exchange activities have increased 
fundamentally since economic reform efforts have been a priority, Chinese 
companies have had to adopt internationally accepted regulations. According 
to the Dow Jones China Offshore 50 Index, in August 2008 56 Chinese 
enterprises had been listed oversees, namely on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ stock market 
(Dow Jones Chinese Indexes 2008).96 The Dow Jones China Offshore 50 
Index represents the largest stocks of companies whose primary operations 
are in mainland China but that trade on the exchanges of Hong Kong and the 
U.S97. These foreign stock markets are of interest as they are bigger and more 
liquid than the two national stock markets. Large Chinese enterprises strive to 
be listed on international stock markets to gain access for equity finance.  
 
96  See detailed list of enterprises assigned to Dow Jones China Offshore 50 Index: 
http://chinaindex.dowjones.com/eng/djchina_offshore.htm. Apart from that, six other indexes are available on the 
homepage: Dow Jones China 88, Dow Jones China Offshore 50, Dow Jones China Broad Market, Dow Jones 
Shanghai, Dow Jones Shenzhen and Dow Jones CBN China 600 indexes. These indexes are representing the largest 
and most liquid stocks traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
97 US stock markets require enterprises to prepare the consolidated accounts in accordance with US GAAP, in order 
to ensure equal treatment of US enterprises and foreign enterprises in regard to capital allocation and scarce 
resources (www.fasb.org).  
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Separation of ownership from control resulting in high managerial autonomy 
Actual separation of ownership from control and increasing managerial 
autonomy has led to relevant principal-agent problems. The Ministry of 
Finance has announced that the use of the new Chinese accounting standards 
will be expanded to all state-owned enterprises controlled by the Chinese 
central government starting in 2008, and then to all large and medium-sized 
companies in China starting in 2009. The new financial reporting 
requirements and the accounting reform can be regarded as an effective tool 
towards mitigating the principal-agent problem. The adoption of the new 
Chinese Enterprise Income Tax Law and the new financial reporting 
requirements are strongly linked to each other, as the government is 
determined to intervene against tax avoidance activities on a national as well 
as a local level (Enterprise Income Tax Law 2008).   
 
Global trend of standardization of accounting standards 
There is a general global trend of accounting standards being standardised, 
due to the development of global financial markets. International financial 
markets require companies to adopt internationally accepted accounting 
principles and standards. Harmonisation of accounting standards is the result 
of the demand for the comparableness of companies’ financial performance, 
and results in an efficient allocation of resources in an international capital 
market. 
5.4 Auditing in China  
During the period 1949-1978, the audit profession was non-existent in China. In the 
early 1980’s, auditing occurred due to the inflow of Sino-foreign joint ventures (Xiao 
et al. 2004). Parallel to this the first accounting firms emerged, followed by the 
issuance of the Chinese public accountants (CPA) regulations in 1986, and the 
establishment of the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) in 
1988 by the Ministry of Finance.  
 
In the framework of reforms, state-owned enterprises were restructured and 
transformed into corporations. In the early 1990s a set of accounting standards was 
 209 
promulgated, applicable to joint stock limited enterprises only. In the early 1990s, the 
establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges triggered an increased 
demand for independent auditing of accounting information due to the listing of 
enterprises from investors. In 1993, the Certified Public Accountants Law was 
promulgated, and in 1995 the CICPA became the setting corporate body for both 
accounting and audit firms. The Auditing Law of 1994, revised in 200698 and 201099; 
and China’s Certified Public Accountants Law of 1993 represent the legal basis for 
regulation of auditing practices in China. The auditing profession has increased 
immensely, since all listed companies including those that issue A- and B-shares are 
audited by Chinese certified public accountants. The Chinese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, both 
exercising a monitoring role to regulate the accounting and auditing market. 
Auditor independence in China is questioned by academic scholars as well as 
practitioners (Yang et al. 2001; Xiang 1998; Tang et al. 2000). Originally, Chinese 
certified public accountants (CPA) firms were founded and administrated by 
government regulatory bodies. Taking into account that most listed enterprises are 
under state-control, it is evident that the government as the major shareholder has an 
interest that financial reporting is accurate. Performance of audits in state-owned 
enterprises is in line with the state’s interest in transparency improvement within the 
state-owned sector. At the beginning of the reform, the central governments 
recognised that most state-owned enterprises were in such bad financial shape that 
neither national nor international investors would lend them money. Although the 
state could legally raise taxes, taxation was limited due to the need for better financial 
information. Consequently, there was an appreciation of an audited annual financial 
statement that could be used to assess an enterprise’s performance and fiscal 
surveillance. The state is interested in monitoring enterprises’ performance, and 
auditing firms are able to deter financial reporting fraud and to report detected fraud. 
Independent auditing can fulfil its function in an effective corporate governance 
environment, where risk assessment and independence in the audit process is given. 
The central government demands audited financial statements from state–owned 
 
98Decision on Amending the Audit Law of the People's Republic of China at the 20th meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the 10th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on February 28, 2006.   
99 Release of revised implementing regulations for audit laws by China’s State Council applicable beginning in May 
2010. The revised rules cover responsibilities and limits of audit offices, audit procedures, and legal obligations.  
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enterprises before providing them with subsidies and contracts for national 
infrastructure projects like construction, manufacturing and other services. Auditing 
in China is challenged, as party members are represented in the executive boards of 
the enterprises, and auditors might face political pressure during the reporting process 
due to vested interests. Addressing this challenge is an essential component in 
assuring audit quality. Audit certificates are important to companies, especially in 
credit approval processes and credit ratings, when risk assessment procedures are 
undertaken. The lack of audited financial statements based on international 
accounting standards might adversely affect enterprises’ credit ratings and 
consequently increase their borrowing costs. At a time when state-owned enterprises 
are facing an increased demand for borrowing for infrastructure and other purposes 
on international capital markets, the state is particularly sensitive towards complying 
with requirements in the international financial community. 
The auditing market in China is highly regulated and entry barriers created by the 
government exist. The Big Four international accounting firms: Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, are all well 
established in the PRC. The first international CPA firms entered Chinese auditing 
market in the early 1980’s, although were only allowed to establish a representative 
office. Later in the mid-1980’s international CPA firms were fully allowed to do 
business in China, but only in cooperation with a Chinese local partner (Chen et al. 
2007). Finally, they have been permitted to merge with local CPA firms (Yang et al. 
2001). Since 2007, according to the Chinese securities market regulations, companies 
that issue A-shares and B-shares are required to publish a financial statement in 
accordance with CAS only. Before they were required to publish two sets of financial 
statements, one in accordance with Chinese GAAP, and one in accordance with 
international accounting standards. Therefore these companies were subject to dual 
audits, as IAS/IFRS based statements were audited by a local auditor or an 
international CPA firm. In fact, the auditing of B-shares financial statements accounts 
for one of the main business areas for the Big Four in China (Chen et al. 2007:5). 
With the introduction of the new Chinese accounting standards in 2007, firms listing 
B-shares are only required to report under the New Chinese Accounting Standards 
(CAS)100, consequently in the future auditing in the B-share market can be done by 
 
100 IAS Plus September 2007 Update: http://www.iasplus.com/country/china.htm#0807 
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Chinese CPAs only. Forbes (2006) reported, citing the Financial Times, that the 
Chinese Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICPA) released a draft policy paper, in 
which it showed a strong willingness to create ten accountancy firms within the next 
ten years. The aim of this is to become globally accepted as a valid and competent 
provider of auditing services in accordance to international standards. This step 
forward indicates that the government wishes to reduce reliance on foreign 
accounting firms, and is highly interested in promoting a robust domestic market, 
even in the accounting field.  
 
In line with the revision of the Audit Law in 2006, the National Audit office issued a 
2006-2010 five-year audit development program with the aim of improving the 
auditing of officials at all government levels, including officials that are members of 
the  Communist Party of China; as well as representatives of state-owned enterprises 
(People’s Daily 2006). The training and the knowledge transfer of the new auditing 
practices are of high importance by those who are concerned with audits in order to 
comply with the new regulations.  
5.5 Conclusion 
China’s accounting reform has turned out to be a transformation from an accounting 
model based on a planned economy to a model based on a market economy. Changes 
in accounting information reflect the need for more transparency required in the 
socialist market economy. The state has taken over the role of reformer in accounting 
and is highly interested in increasing transparency and the disclosure of financial and 
non-financial information. The reform process in China requires high levels of 
transparency in financial information which is a significant element in the 
transformation process, in order to improve effective resource allocation within state 
ownership. The transformation from a planned economy to a socialist market 
economy requires institutional reforms, since accounting played a statistic role under 
the system of central planning. Change in the accounting model is anticipated to solve 
issues such as agency problems, information asymmetry and low monitoring capability.  
 
Improvements in information disclosure is of special interest for the state, since the 
relationship between state-owned enterprise and the state did change in the 
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framework of reform, and the state does not possess direct influence on state-owned 
enterprises anymore. Gradually, control rights have been transferred to corporate 
management, and transparent financial information supports the state in influencing 
corporate management behaviour and enterprise performance. Having an overall 
picture of a company’s financial position and results of operations, the state is in the 
position to influence strategic decisions and resource allocation. Further, due to soft 
lending policies and imperfect competition in the domestic market, the state has only 
limited information on enterprise performance. Accounting principles like 
conservatism have been introduced to accounting standards, which require enterprises 
to estimate economically probable losses and the improvement of risk management. 
Adequate risk management does not only protect shareholder interests, but provide 
meaningful financial information to parties having a stake in the firm. Chinese banks 
are now in the situation to operate as profit-oriented companies like in Western 
countries, thus the consideration of the degree of creditworthiness of potential 
customers, and the allocation of finance with loan agreements is becoming tighter. 
Poor information disclosure is associated with greater investment risks. Market-based 
reporting standards require enterprises to reflect the financial reality. The government 
wants more transparency in Chinese reporting and accounting in order to monitor 
financial results better and to improve and strengthen tax discipline. The reform of the 
accounting system has been undertaken in line with the adoption of the new taxation 
system, which has been realised with the new Enterprise Income Tax Law for 
Chinese enterprises. Financial enterprise statements are meaningful for determining 
tax liabilities; and information on regular tax payments might be meaningful for 
credit approvals and credit risk assessments. Furthermore the government relies on 
accurate audited financial reporting in order to track the progress achieved within the 
framework of economic reforms. Ongoing reforms in financial reporting and efforts 
in the improvement of financial disclosure are also resulting from harmonisation 
ambitions of accounting standards in international financial markets. Large 
enterprises are encouraged by the initiative Chinese Companies Going Global to 
expand overseas. Listing on international stock exchanges requires the compliance 
with international accounting standards, in response to the needs of international 
investors and users of financial information. Under the assumption of imperfect 
information of markets, compliance with international accounting standards and key 
performance indicators is a good measure for enterprise performance. Benchmarking 
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with international enterprises based on international accounting standards and 
financial key figures might be a good indicator of the competitiveness of an enterprise 
as well of the long-term performance. 
 
The model of accountability has been developed and changed in the reform process, 
taking into consideration the expanding role of stakeholders. At the beginning of 
reforms with an emphasis on high economic growth of the Chinese economy, 
financial information was relevant to the state, in order to receive an entire picture 
about financial conditions of the state-owned sector, the costs in the reform process, 
and return on investments. Corporate governance standards and regulations on 
disclosure were introduced with the objective to improve the monitoring and control 
capability of state agents within the framework of the state-sector restructuring. Since 
the central policy approach changed to the scientific concept of development and the 
harmonious society, demand for increased information is coming from stakeholders, 
which engage in investments for social and environmental progress in the country. 
Since corporations are made accountable to fulfil social and environmental 
responsibilities in the society, the accounting function can capture efforts and 
commitments in these areas, and provide relevant information to stakeholder groups. 
The Communist Party is showing a commitment to corporate social responsibility, 
and the regular release of sustainable development reports and reports about activities 
in corporate social responsibility might be regarded as a model of accountability that 
aims to create better relationships and better communication between the Communist 
Party and different interest group in society. The dialogue and debate with society is 
essential since neglect of social responsibility would result in confidence loss of the 
public and social unrest. Information disclosure and improvement in transparency 
does not only involve economic progress of enterprises within state ownership, but 
also progress in social and environmental questions requested by different interest 
groups in the society.  
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6 Conclusion and Outlook 
The introduction of corporate governance in China is influenced by the requirements 
of a transformation economy with the objective to find an adequate institutional 
framework for the socialist market economy. With the implementation of economic 
reforms, the institutional model applied in the central planning economy is not 
working for the socialist market economy. Chinese policymakers did not blindly copy 
a Western model of corporate governance, but instead took relevant elements of 
existing international models in accordance with the Chinese specific needs of a 
transformation economy within state ownership. In this view, the introduction of 
corporate governance and institutional building does not simply pursue the appliance 
of a Western model of corporate governance in China, which is confirmed by the fact 
of substantial proportion of state ownership, and strong state control over the Chinese 
economy and the financial market sector. The key challenge faced by the state and the 
Communist Party is to find processes which are supporting them in the balance of 
collective problem solving among relevant interest groups. Thereby questions about 
the participation of shareholders and stakeholders, authority in policymaking and the 
governance of processes need to be answered. In general, it is questionable that China 
with its socialistic history and legacy can be simply transformed into a country 
working according to a Western model of corporate governance. The thesis analyses 
corporate governance standards that are supportive in collective problem solving 
among relevant interest groups at enterprise level from two perspectives. From the 
internal corporate governance perspective differing interests and power levels need to 
be balanced in the interrelation of old and new corporate bodies within the enterprises. 
From the external corporate governance perspective the balancing of different interest 
groups needs to be assured, since dynamic changes of enterprises’ external 
environment ask for broader stakeholder participation. Additionally, since the 
relationship between the state and enterprises changed, and the state does not possess 
direct control over enterprises anymore, control rights need to be shared with other 
shareholders. As a consequence, domestic and international investors and 
international capital markets became an integrated part of the Chinese business 
landscape. In this view, corporate governance standards are supportive in the adaption 
to international requirements and regulations with the objective that Chinese large 
enterprises become integrated members in the international business community.  
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The development of corporate governance in China has gone through several stages, 
where relevant elements of the existing international models were applied with the 
objective to find an adequate institutional framework for the socialist market 
economy. The thesis analyses the role of corporate governance in a transformation 
economy, and what contribution it makes to the reform process, and where it meets 
limitations, therefore corporate governance in China still faces challenges.  
 
Based on the analysis, it can be summarised that the institutional reform is still not 
completed in the country. Taking into account, that political change is not anticipated, 
the process of institutional change under economic transformation is challenged by 
path dependence and political power concentration. Therefore the establishment of 
institutional, economic and social pillars is still developing. Nevertheless, the thesis 
proves that from an economic point of view, the gradual break out of the central 
planning system was successful, since system-specific conditions have been 
integrated in the market socialist economy. In China, institutional building is a 
gradual process, in which economic and political agents need to learn to get along 
with new roles and rules in order to find a consensus over common issues. In China, 
socialist and corporate institutional foundations coexist in profit-maximising 
corporations within state ownership. Consequently, a clear separation of economic 
activities from the government and the Communist Party hasn’t been achieved so far. 
However, taking the Top 20 Chinese companies according to the latest publication of 
the Fortune 2010 listing of the World’s largest 500 companies into account, the 
analysis proves that efficiency objectives and profit maximisation within state 
ownership have been realised to a certain degree. The experience in the Chinese case 
proves that state intervention is not necessarily in opposition to the functioning of the 
market with high performance of the economy. On the condition that state 
intervention is given, corporate governance standards are fulfilling the function being 
an instrument to have control over corporate management and enterprise behaviour in 
the socialist market economy, which allows policymakers to run the state-sector in a 
more efficient and transparent way. Corporate governance standards help to improve 
and optimise processes within these companies. From this point of view, institution 
building and the introduction of corporate governance is less about the 
implementation of a Western model in the Chinese environment, but more about how 
different interest approaches in the reform process can be balanced in collective 
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problem solving. The introduction of corporate governance supports the state in 
institutional building with the objective of overcoming the trade-off between state 
monopoly and emerging market forces. Institutional reform appears to be 
characterised by gradualism and reform efforts are carried out as to the Chinese 
saying crossing the river by stepping on each of the stones.  
 
The thesis shows that the state acts as the modernisation agent in the economy with 
an orientation for improved efficiency and transparency within the framework of 
state-ownership. The Chinese government possesses several roles in the Chinese 
economy, and is not just a regulator of the legal, economic and social framework 
alone. By playing several roles, which do overlap to a certain degree, the state 
requests efficiency and transparency improvement at different areas of the economy. 
As the dominant regulator, the government is interested in the regulation of enterprise 
activities and effective resources allocation. The state is engaged in setting regulatory 
standards adequate for the socialist market economy. The implementation of 
corporate governance standards demands the selection of an appropriate regulatory 
framework which is based on the recognition of significant information asymmetries 
between the state and the state-owned sector. Compliance with international corporate 
governance standards is still limited as the legal system in China is still not developed 
and enforcement mechanisms remain weak. The introduction of effective corporate 
governance is challenged since the legal system is still underdeveloped. Having in 
mind, that the modern corporate law is still very young and the legislative lack of 
practical experience, it will take some time to become effective in the market-socialist 
economy. International corporate governance models are based on a mature market-
based regulatory framework whereas the Chinese corporate regulatory framework is 
nascent and necessary basic legal principles are still developing. As the dominant 
shareholder and investor, the government is interested in high economic returns on 
investment, including dividend payment and high levels of financial disclosure. The 
state is the main player in the market and is engaged in commercial activities, instead 
of concentrating only on its predetermined role of providing public goods.101 Since 
the beginning of economic reforms in the country, the central policy approach 
highlights high gross domestic product growth of the Chinese economy. Due to rent-
 
101 Such as public services, education, health care, regulation and law enforcement. 
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seeking and opportunistic behaviour of bureaucracy in the state sector, efficiency was 
low at the expense of the domestic economy. With its claim for efficiency and 
transparency orientation within state-ownership, the state anticipates to control 
management behaviour and to change this behaviour into rationale and profit-oriented 
activities. In the past years of economic reform, resources were allocated to strategic 
important industries with the objective of the establishment of sustainable and strong 
domestic economy. Since enterprises are working profitable, the state is demanding a 
return on investment from the companies and since 2008 the controlling shareholder 
requests dividend payments. Turning state-owned enterprises into corporations serve 
the state’s interest in efficiency and transparency improvement within the state-owned 
sector, in order to reflect systematically the implementation process of economic 
reforms in enterprise profitability, in the taxation system and the dividend policy. As 
the dominant shareholder and investor, the government is engaged in efficient capital 
allocation in the state-owned sector. State intervention in the financial market is 
persuasive since the government aims to keep and assure efficient capital allocation 
with the objective of constant stable growth rates in the economy. High economic 
costs of enterprise restructuring, bad loan ratios, recapitalisation of banks and 
repeated bailouts are tolerated in order to finance continuous economic growth. 
Western economic policies claim that the main function of financial market 
liberalisation serves in efficient capital allocation. In the Chinese model, the situation 
is different, where the government performs control over finance with the aim of 
efficient financial resource allocation. Here the main function of financial institutions 
is to mobilise savings, efficient allocation and constant growth rates in the economy. 
Resource availability and resource allocation are decisive for the effectiveness of the 
state-owned sector. Policy lending hinders capital allocation with the highest 
economic returns, but might be helpful in receiving social returns. By protecting their 
monopoly status over the financial sector, the state as well as the Communist Party is 
consistent in their objective of maintaining the economic, political and social stability 
in the country. Costs occurring due to macroeconomic instability would be immense, 
and since it would be the state that would bear it, there is the incentive to safeguard 
stability. The role of the state is especially challenged in times of financial crises. 
Since the state is acting as guarantor for macroeconomic stability in the country, 
deepening of financial crisis and global economic recessions, require the government 
to take measures to promote domestic economic policies. Control over the financial 
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sector and investment facilitates the provision of rescue packages to bail out the 
financial systems and save banks and enterprises from solvency. Further, selected 
capital allocation antagonizes reduction in economic growth and welfare-decrease. In 
the light of financial crises, government intervention prevents a financial meltdown 
and economic collapse respectively which is essential in stabilising public confidence 
and trust in the economy. As the dominant creditor the government is interested in a 
healthy credit culture and minimum exposure to credit risk. Knowledge about 
repayment capabilities of debtors is essential, in order to be able to take adequate 
measures for risk management activities. Being engaged in credit lending activities, 
state-owned banks are acting in corporate monitoring and control over the state-
owned sector. Since state-owned banks are acting as an intermediary between the 
state and enterprises, they do provide to the state essential information about 
investment opportunity as well as risk. Therefore, state-owned banks combine several 
functions in the financial market, which involves saving mobilisation, investment 
selection and credit monitoring. The separation of commercial lending from policy 
lending is still not achieved in the banking sector, which leads to increased 
monitoring problems. The Chinese experience shows that traditionally close 
enterprise-bank relationships have a positive impact on the monitoring capability of 
the banks over enterprises. Regardless, whether Chinese banks possess debt or equity 
in enterprises, banks essential capital is information over enterprises. Corporate 
governance standards support state agents in providing adequate regulatory policies, 
so that efficiency and transparency in bank monitoring and compliance of banks with 
regulations can be improved. Since the capital market is still in its infancy and cannot 
be installed over night, it is very unlikely that the state will urge a change in the 
system and reduce the degree of control. Institutional change is still not completed in 
the financial sector, and this might be a reason why protection of this sector is more 
important than in other. Ongoing soft credit constraints and policy lending by state-
owned banks are not necessarily in line with corporate governance requirements on 
efficiency and transparency, but they fulfil objectives which are socio-politically 
desirable. Efficient resource allocation does not only involve project selection with 
the highest economic returns, but also involve project selection with the highest social 
returns.  
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The thesis analyses the role of the Chinese Communist Party as a mediator in 
preserving the integration of economic and socio-political interests within the reform 
framework. The Communist Party does not only have economic interests in 
corporations, but also political and social interests centred in their position for value-
orientation. Economic interests involve the upholding and improvement of the 
economic system, with public ownership playing a dominant role, and the 
strengthening of key industries in order to sustain economic growth (Constitution of 
the Communist Party of China 2007). With the introduction of the current official 
guiding socio-economic ideology of the scientific development concept and the 
harmonious society, the Communist Party has incorporated sustainable development, 
social welfare, a person-centered society and increased democracy in the reform 
process. The Communist Party’s commitment to corporate social responsibility and 
the creation of the harmonious society is regarded as a synonym of overcoming the 
trade-off between the monopoly of the political elite and the society. This approach 
responds to the increasing demand for social problem solving with regard to 
employment, healthcare reform, social security and affordable housing. By building-
up a socialist harmonious society, the Chinese Communist Party has shifted the focus 
from strong economic growth only to promoting economic growth in combination 
with social welfare in the country. State-owned enterprises have been transformed 
into corporations and are accountable to fulfill their responsibility in social and 
environmental areas of the country. Thereby the Chinese Communist Party acts as a 
mediator in promoting the integration of economic and socio-political interests among 
differing interest groups. With broader stakeholder participation, corporate 
governance regulations consider economic, political and social implications within 
the framework of transformation. Policy agenda reflects the accountability to 
different stakeholder groups for corporate social responsibility; otherwise there will 
be no public support for the economic reforms and the political system. Support for 
the realisation of the requirements of differing socio-economic interest groups is 
crucial for the Communist Party in order to avoid an imminent legitimacy loss in the 
country. Corporate governance standards address the need for dialogue and 
interaction between the main shareholder and various stakeholder groups, with the 
objective of balancing economic, social and environmental interests in the socialist 
market economy. This is essential, and stakeholder interests have to be comprised 
otherwise economic reforms will not be supported by the public anymore, and the 
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effective implementation of corporate governance regulations and ongoing economic 
reform efforts might be delayed or even interrupted. Without the support of various 
stakeholder groups, the ruling status of the Communist Party could be challenged. 
Expanded participation of various stakeholder groups in the public dialogue 
legitimates the one-party system in the country, without being in danger of facing 
public pressure for a multiparty system.  
 
In the beginning of reforms, strong economic performance has represented the single 
most important source of legitimacy for the Communist Party regime. Now, the 
Communist Party is showing strong engagement in redefining their former purely 
growth-focused economic concept of a socialist market economy to one where social 
and environmental interests of the society are integrated. Corporate mechanisms are 
applied to harmonise various interests which all have a stake in the firm. It can be 
stated, that policies do not focus on economic returns alone, but do acknowledge the 
importance of social returns in the country. Government intervention in capital 
allocation ensures projects with social returns with regard to employment, avoidance 
of spillover effects, environmental issues and the social function of the state-owned 
sector. Policymakers are sensitive about this social return, which are demanded by 
stakeholders in the reform process. The model of corporate governance applied in 
China, does not only serve for economic reasoning, but also possess a social function 
in the transformation process. In this view, effective capital allocation does not only 
consider profit maximisation and high returns on investment, but also selection of 
projects with social return. By putting corporate social responsibility on its agenda, 
the Communist Party recognises the need to take over a mediator role of differing 
interests of stakeholder groups and to enter into dialogue with these multiple factions. 
Interest intermediation is in response to the dynamic change in the economic 
environment and the transformation process where traditional socialist elements are 
coupled with co-ordinated market mechanism. The thesis concludes that by 
combining corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, the traditional 
relation of cooperation between the state and the economy has been maintained. The 
coalition between economic, social and political interest groups serves primarily for 
the preservation of social stability and conflict prevention, and is a platform for social 
dialogue. Thereby the state and the Communist Party support each other in reaching 
their individual as well as overlapping objectives in the course of reform. In the 
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Chinese context, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are 
instruments applied for the introduction of a sophisticated legal and regulatory 
framework in the socialist market economy. Unfortunately at the same time, the 
corporate mechanisms do not help to improve the implementation and enforcement 
capability in legal issues.  
 
In China, the government and the Communist Party have taken an active role in 
institution building, in establishment of a regulatory framework and in efficient 
resource allocation with the objective of sustainable economic, political and social 
stability in the country. The implementation of corporate governance is limited to the 
extent that one might expect the implementation of a Western model of corporate 
governance following market-based requirements only and not considering the 
requirements of the transformation economy. The thesis concludes that the 
implementation of corporate governance standards transformed the economy into a 
hybrid economy which is resulting in its own country or system-specific model of 
corporate governance, applicable for the socialist market economy. The Chinese 
model of a hybrid economy is characterised by its own distinctive mixture of state 
and market forces. The objective of the corporate governance model encourages 
collective problem solving and consensus building over economic efficiency and 
growth as well as political and social sustainability within state-ownership in the 
country.  
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9 Appendix 
9.1 Abstract 
In the last decade a lot of attention has been paid to corporate governance issues, 
evolution and growth. Worldwide, a large number of countries have issued 
governance codes, including recommendations on how to achieve good governance. 
In Western countries, enterprises are working under established corporate governance 
systems, which rely on functioning institutional, economical and social pillars. 
Therefore corporate governance systems in developed countries have already entered 
a mature stage due to a learning process. Transition economies are still on a learning 
curve, as most of these countries have recently changed their economic systems from 
a planned economy to a market-based economy. Most of the ex-socialist countries 
already introduced legal and institutional foundations combined with market-based 
mechanisms in order to create structures so that corporate governance can function, 
but they still did not enter a mature stage. In China, the development of corporate 
governance has gone through several stages, starting with the reform of the state-
owned enterprises in 1978. With the introduction of the banking and fiscal reform in 
1994, enterprise reform entered a new stage as financing of the state-owned sector 
was changed. In 2002, the Chinese corporate governance code was introduced to 
enterprises, followed by the implementation of corporate social responsibility in 2007 
(SASAC 2008). Summarizing, it can be stated that the Chinese model of corporate 
governance embraces both Western models, including the shareholder orientation as 
well as the stakeholder orientation.  In the last few years a considerable amount of 
research has been done in the field of corporate governance in an international context, 
but research on China is still limited, therefore the thesis analyses the development of 
corporate governance within the framework of transformation in a socialist economy. 
This thesis reviews some of the key issues in implementing a Western concept in a 
context of both state ownership and a transformation economy. On the basis of OECD 
principles of corporate governance five parameters relevant for the internal corporate 
governance framework in enterprises are observed. The thesis examines the corporate 
structure of China’s top 20 enterprises by studying the annual reports and websites of 
the enterprises, in addition to the economic methods commonly used in the field of 
new institutional economics. 
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9.2 Zusammenfassung 
Im letzten Jahrzehnt wurde dem Thema Corporate Governance, dessen Entstehung 
und Entwicklung viel Beachtung geschenkt. Weltweit hat eine große Anzahl an 
Ländern einen Corporate Governance Kodex veröffentlicht, mit Vorgaben um eine 
„good governance“ auf nationaler Unternehmensebene zu erzielen. In westlichen 
Industrieländern arbeiten Unternehmen bereits unter bestehenden Corporate 
Governance Systemen, die auf funktionierenden institutionellen, wirtschaftlichen und 
sozialen Rahmenbedingungen aufbauen. Somit haben sich Corporate Governance 
Systeme in den Industriestaaten bereits etabliert und einen Reifegrad erreicht. Die 
Entwicklung von Corporate Governance Systemen in Schwellenländern befindet sich 
noch in einer Lernphase, insbesondere da diese erste kürzlich von der Planwirtschaft 
auf die Marktwirtschaft übergegangen sind. Die meisten ehemaligen sozialistischen 
Länder haben mittlerweile rechtliche und institutionelle Fundamente in Kombination 
mit marktbasierenden Mechanismen implementiert, um die Strukturen für ein 
funktionierendes Corporate Governance System zu gewährleisten.  
 
Die Entwicklung der Corporate Governance in China zeigt mehrere 
Implementierungsstufen auf, die mit der Reform des staatlichen Unternehmenssektors 
im Jahr 1978 begonnen hat. Mit der Einführung der Banken- und Steuerreform im 
Jahr 1994, hat die Restrukturierung der Staatsunternehmen eine neue Stufe erreicht, 
da diese auch die Finanzierung des Staatssektors reformierte. Im Jahr 2002 kam es 
zur Einführung des Corporate Governance Kodex in China, gefolgt von der 
Einführung von Corporate Social Responsibility im Jahr 2007 (SASAC 2008). 
Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass das chinesische Model der 
Corporate Governance beide westlichen Modelle umfasst, welches sowohl den 
Shareholder als auch den Stakeholder Ansatz inkludiert. Während in den letzten 
Jahren im Bereich Corporate Governance im internationalen Kontext zahlreich 
Forschung betrieben wurde, ist die Forschung betreffend den chinesischen Modells 
begrenzt. Die Doktorarbeit analysiert die Entwicklung der Corporate Governance in 
einem sozialistischen Wirtschaftssystem, und beschreibt die Kernpunkte der 
Implementierung eines westlichen Modells unter Berücksichtigung von 
Staatseigentum und Transformation. Basierend auf den OECD Grundsätzen der 
Corporate Governance wird das Rahmenwerk der Corporate Governance in 
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chinesischen Unternehmen analysiert. Aufbauend auf der Methode der Neuen 
Institutionenökonomik, und anhand von Jahresberichten und Veröffentlichungen wird 
die Ausgestaltung von Leitungs- und Kontrollstrukturen in den führenden gelisteten 
Unternehmen Chinas untersucht.  
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